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Description des Hordes et des Steppes des Kirghiz-Kazaks ou Kirghiz-Kaissaks

[Description of the Kirghiz-Kazak, or Kirghiz-Kaissak, Hordes and Steppes]

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Part II. Ideas on the History of the Present-day Kirghiz-Kazaks.

Chapter 3. On the Origin of the Kirghiz-Kazaks and their Condition until their Submission to Russia in 1730.

121 The lack of authentic documents on the basis of which to write a history of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, the impossibility of taking advantage of their traditions, and our determination not to make suppositions which are pure guesses would leave us with nothing positive to say to our readers on the origin of this people if our honored orientalist, Mr. Senkovsky, had not been kind enough to give us help. Having profited from his works and his knowledge of the history of the Orient, we will complete here the account of what we know about the Kirghiz-Kazaks by glancing at their history, from their origin to the time when they began to appear in Russian chronicles, that is, until the middle of the 16th century.

173 175 For the last hundred years most Russians have believed and written that the first Kazaks sprang from the Tatars, or took form among them, and that the name Kazak arose among them, whence it was extended to all the Kazaks [136] of former times and to those who exist today. However, specialists in Oriental history are firmly refuting this opinion to which one is so accustomed in Russia and which has given rise to so many debates among the scholars there. These specialists affirm that the Kazaks formed an independent and compact nation in the earliest centuries of our era, and some even trace their existence back to a period well before the birth of Christ. It is certain that Firdevsi (or [114] Ferdussi), who lived in 1020, that is, two centuries before the Mongols appeared in the west, spoke in his history of Rurtam of a Kazak people and Kazak khans. His work and the most ancient [101 Persian chronicles upon which he has drawn inform us that the 721] ancient Kazaks, like those of today, made themselves famous by plundering and raiding and that their principal weapon was the

[136 cont.]

173 175 721 101 spear. For this reason in Asia the name Kazak began to be applied to all mounted bands armed with spears who practiced the calling of the true Kazaks, that is, who engaged in brigandage and raids upon neighboring lands. Thus the Tatar Kazaks, whom the Russians believed to be the first Kazaks, were only imitators, and their name was not Tatar but borrowed from another people. If this idea is established and irrefutable it destroys all the explanations and interpretations which have been made for the word "Kazak."

101 175 The meanings which have been given it since are based only on the conformity of certain peoples with the true and primitive Kazaks in way of life and type of arms. But the name, itself, as a proper name, does not lend itself to any translation or etymological argument. For this reason, those who have derived this word from koziavka; from koza, "goat" or "goatskin" (1); from Kipchak (2); or from a tongue [137] of land on the Dnieper called Kossa in Russian (1), or from Kazak, meaning Slavic general (2), or from Khozare (3); etc., have gone to useless trouble.

[114]

1. Unpublished work on the Kazaks, mentioned in Karamzin's history of Russia, Vol. V.

2. Remarques sur l'histoire d'Aboulghazi [Observations on the History of Abulgazi], Part II, Chapter V.

1. Scherer, Annales de la petite Russie [Annals of Little Russia, Strasbourg, 1788]; and Gartknokh [Hartknoch, C.J.], Histoire de la république de Pologne [De republica Polonica..., 1687].

2. Synopsis.

3. Sestrenzcevitch /Siestrzeńcewicz/, Histoire de la Tauride /Brunswick, 1780/.

[137 cont.]

175 Having spoken in passing of the ancient Kazaks' way of life to show their resemblances to those of today, let us return to what the Oriental writers teach us about them.

This people has been known in Asia for a very long time. As one of the branches of that very numerous race, the Turks, it is no less ancient than the Naimans or the Kirgiz, or any of the [636] Asiatic peoples of the same race. The Kazaks came under the domination of Chingis Khan, and after the death of the conqueror passed in appanage to his son Djuchi, but although they belonged to the Golden Horde, they kept their own khans. For this reason they were sometimes under the dominion of their own main chiefs, and sometimes were joined to the Chagatai horde, that of Almalyk, or that of Tashkent, which was later called the Mogul Ulus.

After the weakening of the powerful states of Djuchi and Chagatai, internal disputes arose within many of the descent lines [races] belonging to the sons and descendants of Chingis Khan, especially among the nomads. The Uzbeks, who had seized Maverannahr and Khorezm, became the most powerful. But not all the peoples contributing to the disorder came under their sway. Some of them joined the Crimean Tatars, others the Mogul uluses, still others the true Tatars, that is, those of Kazan, and finally some joined the Kazak horde. All this took place after the fall of the Golden Horde. Later, when the Uzbeks split up, many of their branches fused with the Kazak horde. In this manner two powerful states were formed at the beginning [138] of the 16th century, in the Kipchak and Chete steppes. The first of these states, the Mogul Ulus, was headed by Khan Dadam, while the second, ruled by Arslan, khan of the Kazaks, was so powerful that it could raise an army of 400,000 men. This is found in the writings of Sultan Baber, founder of the famous empire of the [648] Grand Mogul in India. He gave one of his nieces in marriage to Arslan Khan and was an eyewitness to his power.

175 In this period several branches or tribes of many of the peo-
631 ples known in the history of the Orient, and which broke away
727 from the Golden Horde, were united with the Kazaks, either
voluntarily or by force. It was at this time that the Kipchaks,

[138 cont.]
175 Naimans, Konrads, Djalairs, and Kankly mingled with the
[631 Kazaks, and their names are preserved in the descent lines,
727] tribes, and most powerful sections of the Kazak hordes.

After joining the Kazaks, some peoples, such as the Durmans, Karluks, etc., parted from them once again to rejoin the Uzbeks. But the Kazaks were reinforced from another side by various Turkic tribes [races] who joined them at the time Tashkent was taken by Shabakht Khan and after the complete destruction of the Mogul Ulus, overthrown by Khan Abdulla.

[669] We should speak here of the descendants of Khan Arslan and of the destiny of the Kazak peoples under their dominion, as well as of the successive revolutions to which they were exposed and the quick overthrow of the power which they had acquired under Arslan. Instead of this, we will content ourselves [114] with saying that the Kirghiz-Kazak led a nomadic life, had no chronicles nor any other historical monument of this nature, and, consequently, it is impossible to write a complete and coherent history about them.

Nevertheless this people did not remain entirely unknown to us after Arslan Khan. After having lost the thread of events described by the Oriental historians, we begin to find the Kazaks again, or, as they are called [139] today, the Kirghiz-Kazaks, in the works of European travelers and in Russian chronicles; and independently of the evidence which they furnish us, we have the archives to guide us, which preserve unimpeachable testimony of Russia's specific relations with different peoples of Asia.

Herberstein is the first of the European historians (1) to speak of the Kazak horde. Having twice been ambassador of the Holy Roman Emperor to Tsar Ivan Vasilievich, and having

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1. Herberstein arrived in Moscow for the first time in 1517 and for the second time in 1526. See Karamzin's history of the Russian empire, Vol. VII, notes 165 ff.

[139 cont.]
175 collected many geographical notes on Russia as well as on the
neighboring countries, he wrote the following in his memoirs (2):
[101] Ad Orientem (from the lands of the realm of Kazad /Kazan/)
autem aestivalem Tartaros quos Schibauski et Kozatski vocant,
conterminos habent /to the desert East, however, they have neighbors whom the Shibautski and Kozatski call Tartars/. He repeats (3)
almost the same thing in another place. Jenkinson, who was in
721 Bukhara in 1558 and 1559, says that the ruler of Tashkent was
181 then at war with the Kazaks, a numerous and cruel people, who
771 had no cities and were Moslems (4). It was no doubt on the basis
of this remark that the lands of the Kirghiz-Kazaks were previously
175 known on our maps in Europe under the name of the lands of the
101 Tatar Kazaks (5). The Russians had known them at least a century
earlier because of their frequent relations with the Nogais. We
find the evidences of this first of all in Herberstein's notes on the
Kirghiz-Kazaks, cited above, which he collected in Moscow in

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2. See his Rerum Moscoviti/c/arum Commentarii, Basle, 1571, p. 91.

3. Ibidem.

4. See Collection of Travels to the North, Vol. IV.

5. Vitzen /Witsen, Nicolaas/, in his Noord and /en/ Oost Tartary, included a map entitled "Asia ex magna orbis terrae descriptione Gerardi mercatoris disumpta, studio et industriâ G.M. junioris; edita anno M.D.LXXXVII." On this map he wrote "Kazaki Tartari" south of the Margus River toward the Caspian Sea.

[139 cont.]

175 101 the beginning of the 16th century, and in the second place in the documents of the relations with the [140] Nogais preserved in Moscow in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We find in the latter, under the year 1534, that an envoy of Tsar Ivan Groznoi (the Terrible) named Danila Gubin, then among the Nogais, reported the following: "And the Kazaks, sire, are [721] said to be very strong; and it is said, sire, that they waged war against Teshken (Tashkent); and the son of the king of Teshken is said to have fought against them twice, and the Kazaks defeated them." Likewise Semen Maltsov, sent in 1569 by Tsar Ivan Groznoi among the Nogais, who lived between the Volga and the Yaik /Ural/ rivers, spoke of the attack which "the Kazak hordes of Tsar Aknazar, Tsarevitch Shigai, and Tsarevitch Chelim" (1) made upon their ulus. These accounts, which we include here only because of their antiquity, tell us nothing about the name of the Kirghiz-Kazaks.

175 648 439 Four years later, however, Ivan resolved to establish political relations with them, persuaded no doubt by the demand of the Stroganovs who had established commercial relations with the Kazak horde. This circumstance obliged the Tsar to protect them and reach out to them by sending a deputy to the chief of the horde. This mission was entrusted to /the Muscovite/ Tretiak /deputy?/ Chebukov (2). But he was taken prisoner near the Kama River in 1573 by the famous Mametkul, nephew of Kuchum, the khan of Siberia, before he arrived at his destination. With the failure of this first attempt to open relations with the Kirghiz-Kazaks, Ivan put off a second attempt till a more favorable time. On May 30, 1774 /1574/, however, he gave the Stroganovs a letter patent, granting them permission to trade with the

1. See Karamzin's history of the Russian empire, Vol. IX, note 245.

2. Ibid., Vol. IX, p. 378.

[140 cont.]

175 Kirghiz-Kazaks without paying duty (3).

[648 439]

3. See Miller, History of Siberia /Opisanie Sibirskogo Tsarstva.../, p. 87, and Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 661.

The conquest of Siberia which took place not long after brought this people closer to the Russians.

[643] [141] Kuchum, the last khan of Siberia, was himself a Kirghiz-Kazak. When he had made himself master of Isker by force of arms and by putting to death the princes Yediger and [662] Bekbulat, who ruled there (1), it was indispensable that he have

1. See the Chronicles of Siberia; Fisher's History of Siberia /Sibirskaia Istoriia..., 1774/, introduction, article 84; Karamzin's history of the Russian empire, Vol. IX, p. 644.

around him an army made up of his former compatriots. Thus Yermak and the companions of his adventures undoubtedly fought against the real Kazaks, or Kirghiz-Kazaks.

[721 797] Murtaza, Kuchum's father, was probably quite a powerful sovereign, for he not only gave his son a year to conquer the land, but also sent him additional mullahs to spread the Moslem religion in Siberia (2).

2. See Miller's History of Siberia and Fisher's History of Siberia, introduction, articles 86 and 87.

175 After Yermak, Kuchum, as we know, was driven out of
648 Isker by Seidak, who later fell into the hands of the Russians.
662 Uraz Mehmet, the tsarevitch or sultan of the Kazaks and nephew
of Tevkel, who called himself khan of the Kazaks and

[141 cont.]

175 648 662 Kalmuks (3), was taken prisoner with Seidak.

3. This is what it says in Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 98, yet the bringing together of these two titles seems very extraordinary to us.

This event not only gave Tsar Fedor the power to revive his father's plans concerning the Kirghiz-Kazaks, but also the right to call himself their sovereign.

175 648 636 Tevkel, who wished to free his nephew, sent an ambassador to Moscow in 1594 with a letter to the Tsar in which he begged the latter to accept him with all his horde as subjects and to send him Uraz Mehmet (4).

4. See Kirghiz [i.e. Kazak] matters, 1794 and 1795, in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow and the reference to them in Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. X, note 332.

Knowing the customs and habits of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, one can be certain that this proposition was no more than a [142] meaningless promise in order to free Uraz Mehmet, one which Tevkel had no intention of keeping whether his nephew were given up to him or not. This he evinced when the Tsar replied to him by letter in 1795 that he accepted him with all his horde as his subjects and that he was sending him firearms, but that as proof of his allegiance he required him to force the khan of Bukhara to make peace and to compel Kuchum to submit. He promised to set Uraz Mehmet (1) at liberty as soon as Tevkel presented one of

1. Godunov later named this prince tsar of Kasimov. Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 22.

[142 cont.]

175 his sons, the Tsarevitch or Sultan Hussein, as hostage in his
648 place (2).
636

2. For this letter, see the packet [envoi] preserved in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This letter was conveyed by Tevkel's ambassador, who was accompanied by Veliamin-Stepanov, interpreter for the Tatar language.

What sort of news Stepanov may have brought to the Tsar upon his return from the horde is unknown. It is only known that his journey produced no political advantage for Russia, that neither Tevkel nor his successors were Russian subjects until the 18th century, and that they neither served Russia nor rendered her
[121] any kind of help. On the contrary, they attacked her new colonies in Siberia.

One must believe, however, that those who lived on the
175 frontiers of the new Russian territorial possessions must have had
648 frequent relations with them, as did our merchants, at that time,
439 and that they acquired accurate knowledge about their country. For in the book Bolshoi Chertezh /The Great Description, which according to the well-founded evidence of Karamzin must have been written during the reign of Tsar Fedor Ivanovich (3) /1584-1598/, many dwelling places which existed on the lands of the Kazak horde are spoken of in great detail.

131 [143] As this book is rare, we believe it is not irrelevant to quote that which concerns the steppes of the Kirghiz-Kazaks:

"And from the Sea of Khvalymsk (Caspian) to the Blue Sea (Aral), toward the east of summer, it is 250 versts /266 km./.

"And along the Blue Sea to the mouth of the Syr /Darya River/ it is 280 versts /299 km./, and across, by the Blue Sea,

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3. Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 259.

[143 cont.]
131) it is 60 versts /64 km./. And the water is salty in the Blue Sea.
The river Arzas flows out of the Blue Sea and into the Sea of
Khvalymsk.

131 "And in the east the Amu-Darya River flows into the Arzas
133 River. The Amu-Darya is 300 versts /320 km./ long, and the
Arzas is 1,060 versts /1131 km./ long. And 300 versts from the
Blue Sea is the Uruk Mountain (1). The Uruk is 90 versts /96 km./ long, and out of it flow three rivers: the Vor (Or) River, which flows into the Yaik /Ural/ River to the north (toward the night); the Irgiz River, which flows into Lake Akbashly (2), to the east; and the Gem (Emba) River, which flows south toward the Sea of Khvalymsk and falls into a lake before reaching the sea.

"And 280 versts /299 km./ from the Irgiz River toward the Blue Sea are the sands of Barsuk-Kum. It is 25 versts /27 km./ across these sands, and the sands of Kara-Kum, 200 versts /213 km./ from the Sea.

"The sands of Kara-Kum are 250 versts /267 km./ long and 130 versts /139 km./ wide, and these three /sic/ sands reach the shores of the Blue Sea.

"The Syr flows into the Blue Sea in the east, and the Kenderlik flows into the Syr. And the Kenderlik River flows out of the Ulutau Mountain in two beds.

"And from the mountain, [144] the course of the Kenderlik is 330 versts /352 km./ (1). And another river, the Kenderlyk,

1. The Uruk or Airuk, or Airuruk, is a branch of the Mugodzhar ridge.

2. Now called Aksakal-Barbi.

1. We spoke of this river in the geographical description [not translated].

[144 cont.]
131 which flows from the same mountain, falls into the Sarsu /Sary-Su/.
133 "And the Sarsu falls into a lake before reaching the Syr, at
150 versts /160 km./ from the mouth of the Kenderlyk, and 70
versts /75 km./ from Karachat (Kara Tag) /Kara-Tau/ mountain, and the length of the Karachat is 250 versts /267 km./, and
this mountain is 80 versts /85 km./ from the Syr.

"And at 150 versts /160 km./ from the mouth of the
Kenderlik, on the left bank of the Syr, is the town of Sunak
(Saganak), opposite Karachat Mountain and between Lake
Akbashly, the Sauk River, and Lake Ankul (Akkul). And on the
[311 two shores of the Zelenshik and the Kenderlik and Sarsu rivers,
233] and the Kara-Kum sands in this region are all the pasture lands
of the Kazak horde, covering 600 versts /640 km./."

175 It can be seen from this description that at this time the
[10] Kirghiz [i.e. the Kazaks] only occupied the middle of their
present territories. The eastern part belonged to the Dzungars
and other Mongol groups [races]. The north belonged to various
branches of the Siberian Tatars, while the west was occupied by
the Nogais and further north, the Bashkirs (2). Later the Kalmuks, now known as the Volga Kalmuks, took the place of the Nogais.

2. In the same book, the Bolshoi Chertezh, page 229, it says: "From the heights of Buzuluk and on the plains as far as the Blue Sea are the pasture lands of the great Nogais." In the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow under No. 10, a letter from Yusuf, prince of the Nogais, to Tsar Ivan the Terrible, written at the end of the 16th century, is preserved. Here Yusuf says clearly: "And I wished to make war against the Kazak horde, and now I am nomadizing on the Yelek (Ilek) River, on the other side of the Yaik Ural/."

[144 cont.]

175 At first the Kirghiz-Kazaks advanced northward. Fisher, in his history of Siberia (3), says that after the town of Tary was

> 3. I. E. Fisher, Sibirskaia Istoriia s Samogo Otkrytiia Sibiri do Zavoevyvaniia sei Zemli Rossiiskim Oruzhiem (The History of Siberia from the very Discovery of Siberia to its Conquest by Russian Arms), 1774], Russian translation, p. 180.

completed in 1594, the district of Kurdak was added to it, where the foundation of a fortress was laid to stop the raids of the Kalmuks and Kirghiz-Kazaks. Thus the latter were no longer far from the Russian borders.

They did not expand eastward until after the extermination of the [145] Dzungartan peoples by the Chinese, in other words, about the middle of the last [18th] century.

233 They expanded westward at the beginning of the 18th century, but at the end of the 17th century and even in the first years of the 18th, the Bashkirs were nomadizing between the raised regions of the Ural and the Emba rivers, while the Kalmuks had established themselves at the mouths of these rivers (1).

> 1. Kirilov, original founder of the Orenburg confederacy and author of the reconciliation between the Russians and the Kirghiz [i.e. Kazaks], wrote in one of his plans, in 1734: "Dorzhi-Nazarov, khan of the nomadic Kalmuks near the Emba and the Yaik /Ural/ rivers." See Kirilov's plans in the archives of the districts of Asia, 1734.

175
721 In the south, the Kirghiz [i.e. the Kazaks] were not satisfied with making raids over the borders of the neighboring peoples. According to our chronicles, they were already the masters of

[145 cont.]

175 Turkestan at the beginning of the 17th century, and this city was 721 always the residence of their khans. The year in which this conquest took place and the leader of the campaign are unknown. We could not even discover where Khan Murtaza, Kuchum's father, lived, nor whether his descendants reigned over the Kirghiz [-Kazaks] for a long period. Nor did we have any more success in our research concerning Khan Ak-Nazar, who attacked the uluses of the Nogais in 1569, when Semen Maltsov, the envoy of Tsar Ivan the Terrible was there (2). We have gathered

2. See above, p. 140.

some definite evidence, however, that Ishim khan of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, held Turkestan around 1630.

175 Abulgazi Baiadur is the first to speak of it, and it is re- [114] ferred to for the second time in the Annals of Siberia. We have found still more information about it in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg, in the file for 1748.

Abulgazi Baiadur made the acquaintance of the Kirghiz-Kazaks and Khan Ishim about the year 1630 (3), because at this

3. Histoire Généalogique des Tatars, /Leiden, 1726/, Pt. IX, Chapter XI.

time he was forced by his brother Isfandiar, khan of Urgendzhi, to flee his homeland, and he withdrew to Turkestan, where Khan Ishim [146] received him and protected him for three months. After that he escorted him to Tashkent and placed him under the protection of Tursun, khan of that country. Two years [662 later these two princes fell into disagreement. Ishim killed 579] Tursun and seized Tashkent, and Abulgazi withdrew into the realm of Bukhara.

175 Ishim Khan is known in the Siberian chronicles for his 721 disagreements and his wars, and particularly for the wars of his son Djangir, or Iangir, with the kungtaidii of the Dzungars, Batur, or Bagatyr (1). Fisher says that Bagatyr opened war on

1. Fisher, Sibirskaia Istoriia..., Bk. IV, Pt. 3, paragraph 13.

[146 cont.]
175 Ishim in 1635, and that Djangir, then the commander of the
721 Kirghiz-Kazak army, was taken prisoner. When he had regained his liberty by chance, he wished to avenge himself against the Dzungars, and tormented them constantly by his raids. In order to force peace over a long period, or if possible to completely exterminate such dangerous neighbors, Bagatyr assembled an army of 50,000 men, made up of an equal number of his own men and those of his allies.

175 At the head of his forces he easily subdued two descent
722 lines of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, 10,000 persons altogether. He would have continued to destroy all those whom Djangir set in opposition to him if this Kirghiz [-Kazak] sultan, a gifted warrior as one can see, had not used the most salutary measures in defending himself. He had only 600 armed men, and not daring
175 to attack the enemy openly with this handful of men, he placed
723 half of his group in a gorge between two mountains, causing them to be surrounded by a deep ditch and with a raised entrenchment. Then he himself lay in wait with the other half on the other side of the mountain. The Dzungars arrived in front of the entrenchment and attacked it. While they were losing many men in this struggle, in which they were at a disadvantage because of the narrow expanse of the terrain, Djangir fell upon them from the rear. This unexpected attack, the daring of the men he had chosen for this purpose, and the excellence of the guns with which they were all [147] armed, inflicted great losses upon Bagatyr. At this moment Alantush, the Tatar prince, arrived to support the Kirghiz [-Kazaks] at the head of 20,000 fresh troops and completed Bagatyr's ruin. The Dzungars were forced to withdraw and to limit their vengeance to taking away the prisoners they had taken during the battle. The Kazaks continued to harass them with frequent raids, not only during Bagatyr's time, but also under his successors.

175 We found the third reference to Ishim in the papers of
648 Tevkelev, former interpreter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later major general. He spent two years among the

[147 cont.]

175 Kirghiz [-Kazak] hordes by order of Empress Anna, and induced
648 them to submit themselves to Russia. Later, as we shall see below, he was for a long time a member of the Orenburg Commission. In following government orders, he was in constant contact with the Kirghiz [-Kazak] khans and sultans. He knew their language thoroughly and kept a journal of the oral conferences he
[15] had with them. He says, in one of these journals, written in 1748, that Abulkhair, khan of the Little Horde, and Abul Mahmet, khan of the Middle Horde, and the most distinguished sultans had informed him of their genealogies.

We will place the three charts which we have composed at the end of this work.

175 The first chart shows us that Djadek, one of the two
643 founders of a line, was the father of Shigai Khan, whose son was Ishim, the same one whom, as we mentioned earlier, was khan
[121] of Turkestan when he waged war against the kungtaidji of the Dzungar and to whom Abulgazi Baiadur went to seek refuge.

It is easy to prove that this Ishim is not some other unknown Kazak khan, for Abul Mahmet, who gave Tevkelev this genealogy (1) and called himself the [148] great-grandson of Ishim, was born at the end of the 17th century, as can be seen from many writings and other papers of this time. If we go back from this prince to his father, his grandfather, and so forth, we will find that Ishim in his youth and Djangir at a mature age

1. Abul Mahmet wrote the same thing about his origin to Prince Urusov, on July 19, 1740. See the archives of the Orenburg Border Commission. With two accounts as certain as this, we can assure our readers [148] that the Siberian Herald /Sibirskii Vestnik/ of 1820, on page 114 of the article on the Kazaks, is wrong in calling Abul Mahmet the son of Kuchiuk.

[148 cont.]
175 were contemporaries of the Kungtaidji Bagatyre. A second proof
643 can be added to this first one, namely, that in our table, as
well as in the history, the son of Ishim is named Djangir.

In this way we find that Djadek, father of Shigai and grandfather of Ishim, lived with his brother Usiak toward the middle of the 16th century, that is, at the same time as the khan of Siberia, Kuchum, and his father, Murtaza. However, we do not know whether they were related nor whether they came from the same branch.

[14] Our knowledge does not go beyond Djadek and Usiak. In the middle of the last [18th] century, Tevkelev could not know the name of their father, because of the lapse of time since he had lived, and consequently it is still less possible to know it today.

175 From the questions we posed on this subject to Kazaks in
643 the years 1820, 1821, and 1822, we learned only that their khans
554 and sultans consider themselves the descendants of Chingis Khan.
Most of the princes of upper Asia accord themselves this honor, and it is rarely without grounds. It is possible that many of the Kazak chiefs have a right to it, like many other Chingisids who received no other heritage from their strong and terrible ancestor but his name.

Abulgazi Baiadur proves that Kuchum, khan of Siberia, was descended from Sheibani, the grandson of Chingis, but Kuchum is known to have been a Kazak sultan, and therefore it is not surprising that other Kazak khans and sultans are also descended from Sheibani. Following [149] this first manuscript chart, if we go down from Ishim and Djangir, whose existence is known to us, to times closer to our own, we see that after Djangir comes his son, Khan Tiavka.

175 On hearing the name of this prince, the heart of every
643 Kazak capable, through intelligence, of rising above his turbulent
728 compatriots is filled with gratitude and veneration. He is the
669 Lycurgus and Draco of the Kazak hordes. Once more he brought
peace among them after the bloody dissensions. He stopped the

[149 cont.]
175 bloodshed caused for several years by the quarrels of certain
643 tribes among themselves. He compelled everyone to obey him
728 by his wisdom and equity. He caused the weak tribes to reunite
669 in order to resist the strong ones, and forced the latter to be peaceful. He gave them all the laws by which he judged them, and their memory is still preserved among the wisest Kazaks, but unfortunately they are not carried out (1).

> 1. See the article on the form of government in the statistical section /of this book/. [Not translated.]

175 In spite of all his services and his influence among the
643 hordes, Tiavka apparently did not enjoy wide power over his people, and used prudence, experience, his connections, and his cleverness more than force. As leader of all the Kazaks, he lived in Turkestan, as did his father and grandfather. He chose three chiefs, whom he held dependent upon himself, to govern and watch over each particular horde. These were: Tiul, in the Great Horde, Kazbek in the Middle Horde, and Aitiak in the Little Horde.

175 We speak here of the division of the Kazak people into
631 three hordes, without having said when and how this took place.
173 Unfortunately, this event is a mystery to us, and we have no way of determining anything in this regard. We do not know how much to believe of a folk tradition which says that a powerful Kazak khan divided all his people among his three sons, and that those [150] given the eldest son were called the Great Horde, those to the second, the Middle Horde, and those to the youngest son, the Little Horde (1).

> 1. The Kazaks translate the word "horde" by iuz, which means "hundred" or "century." This is why they say ulu-iuz ("the great hundred"), urta-iuz ("the middle hundred"). However the word iuz also has other meanings in Turkic.

175 [150 cont.]
631 We could not find any information on Pulat, son of Khan
173 Tiavka and father of Abul Mahmet, who is found in the table.

175 The traditions say only that the calm re-established by
721 Tiavka did not last long among the Kazaks. Dissensions and troubles began again, and the neighboring peoples were quick to profit from them. On the west they were attacked by the Volga Kalmuks [Kalmyk], and on the north by the Bashkirs and the Cossacks of Siberia. But the most terrible of all were the Dzungars to the east. At this time their chief was the powerful Kungtaidji Galdan Tsyren, who not only made all the nomadic peoples tremble but also spread terror in Russia and China. In this unfortunate situation, the Kazaks could not expect help except from the power of Peter the Great, whose vast genius, concerned with the glory and welfare of his people, watched over the Asian border while he had the most important dealings in Europe.

176 Prince Gagarin was governor of Siberia at that time. The
648 Tsar commanded him not only to open relations with the Kazaks,
662 but to help them, if possible, against Galdan Tsyren, in order to put some check on the continual increase of power of the Dzungarian leader. Gagarin carried out the Tsar's commands in 1717, and the Kazak khans, Tiavka, Kaip, and Abulkhair (2)

[243]

2. We have drawn this information from works and translations /Sochineniia i Perevody, k Polze i Uveseleniiu Sluzhashchiia/ of January, 1760. See the article on the "golden saber" /Izvestie o pesotnom zolote v Bukharii... (On the Gold Dust in Bukharo)/. The Khan Tiavka in question must be the famous legislator of the Kazaks of whom we have spoken. But at this time he was already very old. His weakness and the loss of power which ensued, were no doubt the cause of the election, while he still lived, of the khans Abulkhair and Kaip, whose names we see here for the first time (the year 1717).

[150 cont.]
175 replied by [151] promising to be obedient to Russia in all things.
643 These relations had no sequel, however, for Prince Gagarin was
[662] recalled to Moscow shortly after, and Tiavka, the oldest and most cautious of the khans, died. His companions did not know enough to profit from this favorable situation. Instead of joining together again to ask Russia's protection against the Dzungars, they
[578] began to quarrel among themselves, and without any thought of the general welfare they continued in their usual calling, that is, they pillaged all their neighbors. And Russia, who had offered them help and protection, was not the last to suffer from
[726] this. Not content with their frequent raids across the borders of Siberia, in that same year, 1717, they moved in as far as Novo-Sheshminsk (in the Kazan guberniya), took the city, and laid it waste, and although they were driven out with great losses, they
[727] took away a large number of prisoners. This last expedition was made by the subjects of Khan Abulkhair (1). Kaip was afraid that it might be attributed to him and that he might be punished, although innocent, for the crime of his rival, so he sent a letter
[728] in 1718 to Peter I, in which he offered perpetual peace and alliance (2).

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721
726 This letter, however, did not stop the just vengeance of the dwellers along the border, who were annoyed by the constant

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[643] 1. See Rychkov's History of Orenburg /Istoriia Orenburgskaia/ and governor Nepluev's reports to the senate. Rychkov does not say who commanded the Kazaks in this expedition, but Nepluev says that it was Khan Abulkhair, who later became a subject of the Russian empire.

2. This letter, as well as the reply made to it by the governor of Kazan, is still preserved today /1832/ in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[151 cont.]
175 raids of the Kazaks. The Volga Kalmuks, the Bashkirs, and
721 the Siberian Cossacks began to attack again with more strength
726 than ever. Galdan Tsyren could not watch the ruin of the old
enemies of his people with composure, nor leave unavenged the
aggressions and wrongs which his ancestors had been obliged to
endure for more than a century. After having delivered several
terrible blows against them, he [152] seized Turkestan, the capital of their khans, in 1723 (1), in addition to Tashkent and Sairam,
and finally he brought several branches of the Great Horde and
the Middle Horde completely under his rule.

[722] A similar fate awaited all the other Kirghiz-Kaisaks [Kazaks],
who were pressed and pursued from all sides, and they might have
been completely exterminated if they had not retreated to the
south. The remnants of the Great Horde and a small part of the
Middle Horde fell back toward Khodzhent /Leninabad/, most
175 of the Middle Horde retreated to Samarkand, and the Little Horde
167 moved to Khiva and the realm of Bukhara (2). These migrations
731
brought inevitable ruin and disaster in their wake. The herds and
the studs dwindled from one day to the next, and misfortune and
misery befell everyone, some died of hunger, and others abandoned

1. Nepluev and Rychkov, in their reports written from Orenburg to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often say that Abulkhair lived in Turkestan until 1723, at which time he was driven out by the Dzungars.

2. This is what the famous elder of the Middle Horde, Bukenbai, said to Tevkelev when they met in Orsk in 1748, and he added: "At that time we fled before the Kalmuks, the Siberian and the Yaik /Ural/ Cossacks, and the Bashkirs like hares before the hounds."

[152 cont.]
175 their wives and children. Finally, the fugutives halted, but in
[167 barren localities offering no support to a nomadic people. It
731] was impossible for the Kazaks to endure such an unhappy situation for long. Of the two scourges which menaced them, it was
best to choose the one which promised some advantages, if not
for the present at least for the future. Despair drove them to
make themselves masters of their old territories, which they could
not do without. Danger had snuffed out the flame of dissension
and replaced it with unanimity of sentiment, and the efforts of all
[646] were directed to the same end. It was decided in a general assembly of the people to advance, attack the common enemies,
and drive them from the lands of the Kazaks. This undertaking
was sanctified at once by a common oath to remain faithful to
[643 each other. Khan Abulkhair was chosen as [153] leader of the
782] nation, and the sacrifice of a white horse (1), which was made according to the custom of this people, was considered a pledge of future peace.

[726] After these preparations the Kazaks advanced, attacked the
Dzungas, and won a number of battles against them, and re-
[727] covered their old lands. But as they expected new attacks from
Galdan Tsyren, they found it more opportune to move away from
this dangerous neighbor, and some retreated to the north, while
others moved westward. Only the Great Horde remained near the
Dzungars, and they submitted to the latter almost in entirety, as
we shall soon see. The Little Horde did not stop at the Emba
175 River, which was formerly the border, when they arrived there,
166 but crossed over to the right bank and attacked the Volga
726 Kalmuks, and after seizing a large part of their pasture lands,
they moved all the way to the Ural River. The Middle Horde
moved north to the Ori and the Ui, and drove out many Bashkirs
from the vicinity of these rivers. Although the strength of the

1. See the article on "Customs" in the statistical section of this book, for more details. [Not translated.]

175 [153 cont.]
[166 latter, like that of the Volga Kalmuks, did not compare with the
726] power of the Dzungars, nevertheless the lands which the Kazaks
had seized belonged to them, and consequently they wished to
[721] give no peace to the people who had taken the lands from them.
Expeditions for revenge and constant raids were planned for the
future and began from this moment. The Cossacks of the Ural,
[648] new neighbors of the Kazaks, promised to do the same. It was
necessary to seek a defender against so many enemies; it was
necessary to ask help from Russia. Perhaps this thought had often
come to the minds of the sultans and the wisest elders, but it was
difficult not only to put it into execution, but also to propose it
to the people. Although we find in the archives of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs a detailed account of the articles proposed
orally in 1726 by Kaibakar, deputy of the Kazaks, who [154]
came to ask the protection of Russia for the Little Horde, in the
name of the elders Sugur, Iedikbai, Khadjibai, Tiak-Kulybai,
and others, nevertheless this communication had no decisive
sequel. Judging by the names of the elders who sent Kaibakar,
one is forced to think that they were too weak and inconspicuous
to win the people over to them, and their mission remained unsuccessful.
It is not known what suddenly led them to take this
step, but one can be sure that most of the Kazaks were displeased
by it. They preferred their barbarous freedom to any kind of order
[636 and to dependence upon laws, nor had they forgotten that the
181] tenets of their religion commanded them to regard the Russians as
infidels.

[648 These two obstacles seemed to make the free union of the
636] Kazak hordes with a Christian empire impossible. But unfortunate
circumstances, endless dissensions, bloodshed, and the clever
mind of Khan Abulkhair changed the inclinations of the people
to the point where, after a feeble resistance, he decided to carry
out a measure, based on the individual views of a single man, to
which he could not have been moved by love of the public weal.
I speak here of the voluntary submission of the Kazaks to Empress
Anna, an event which took place in 1730, as we shall see below.

[128] Before coming to the description of this revolution, which
is so important, we should note here that it forms the line of

175 [154 cont.]
128 demarcation dividing the history of the Kazaks into two parts.

The union of the Middle Horde and the Little Horde to
175 Russia brought them closer to us, but it did not give us the means
128 of following the successive march of events which took place in
114 the Great Horde, which remained independent. For this reason our historical information on its situation in the 18th century is far more imperfect than that which we possess on the Kazaks who were Russian subjects. This makes it necessary for us to divide [155] into two parts the period from 1730 to our times. In the first part we will examine the history of the Great Horde, while in the second there will be an account of the events which took place in the Middle Horde and the Little Horde.

Chapter IV. A Look at the History of the Great Horde from 1730 until our Times.

x648 Having said that the Kazak Great Horde did not participate at all in the voluntary submission of the two other hordes to Russia, we must first clarify a fact which could be imputed to us as a contradiction.

It is seen in the archives as well as in Rychkov's history of Orenburg that Sultan Erali, who traveled to St. Petersburg to submit in person for his father Abulkhair to the Empress Anna, was accompanied by "deputies of the Great Horde, who came to give the same assurances of submission, and this horde, like the other two, received a letter patent for its acceptance among Russian subjects on July 10, 1734."

If there were no fabrication in this matter, it alone would suffice, no doubt, to refute our statement. But a thorough investigation of the events of this period proves the contrary to be the case.

x648 The Kazaks Aralbai and Arasgeldy-Batyr, who accom-
662 panied Sultan Erali to St. Petersburg, did indeed belong to the Great Horde, but they were neither its deputies nor its representatives. Instead they were only the partisans or mercenaries of Khan Abulkhair, who [156] wished, by attributing to himself

x 648 [156 cont.]
[662] a power over the Great Horde which he did not possess, to make himself important in the eyes of the Russian court and thus to acquire influence over the entire Kazak nation.

Empress Anna's letter patent of July 10, 1734 proves Abulkhair's deceit. First of all, this letter is presented in the name of various beys and elders and not in the name of Djulbars, who was then commander of the entire Great Horde, as is known from several documents and Rychkov's History of Orenburg. Furthermore, in the letter patent it says: "Our subject Abulkhair Khan has reported to us as a faithful subject that he has already accepted you among the ranks of our subjects, and for this purpose he has sent your deputies Aralbai and Arasgeldy-Batyr to our court." These words are founded upon Abulkhair's writings and the oral declarations made by his son, but neither the one nor the other promoted anything but falsehoods. On the one hand, it is recognized that Abulkhair, who lived a long distance from the Great Horde, could never have any influence upon it. On [636] the other hand, we see that this horde never took an oath of loyalty to Russia and was not counted among her subjects. In the third place, it must be noted that the head of the Orenburg expedition, Kirilov, who received this letter patent at the moment of his departure from Petersburg, did not even send it to its destination. It is probable that he felt this move to be [57] indecorous when he arrived at the border and was able to appreciate the truth of the circumstances mentioned in this document.

x 648 The second proposal to admit the Kazaks of the Great
439 Horde as Russian subjects is much more probable than the first, though little more sincere. This was made in 1738, not by a man claiming to be chief of the Great Horde but by Djulbars, the true and legitimate chief of this horde. Having learned of the founding of a Russian city at the mouth of the Ori River and the opening of trade with the Kazaks of the Middle and the Little Hordes, he sent to ask for the same benefits, and to help [157] attain his end, he proposed making not only his own people Russian subjects, but also the neighboring nations, if it was

x648 [157 cont.]

439 desired to protect and facilitate their trade at Orenburg. The conditions suggested by Djulbars show that he was thinking less about submission than of profiting from the advantages of trade relations, and experience justified this assumption. Djulbars did not swear his loyalty and never even came to the border. The letter patent prepared in Petersburg on July 17, 1739 as a result of his promises still rests today in the archives of the Orenburg Border Commission.

x648 Later the Russian government received several more proposals related to the submission of the Great Horde, but these were made by sultans or individual tribal chiefs whose authority did not extend over the entire horde and who desired the gifts which the Russian sovereigns made to their new subjects more than the protection of the empire.

Besides, if the Great Horde had decided to submit with the Little Horde in 1730, or with its Khan Djulbars in 1738, it would have found great obstacles to the fulfillment of its desire. The contiguity of the Dzungars and the distance of the Great Horde from the Russian frontier would have stopped it. Galdan Tsyren or Cheren, Kungtaidji of the Dzungars, would never have allowed his Kazak neighbors to take such a step, for he sustained a hereditary hatred against them and never allowed an opportunity to escape for oppressing them or avenging the wrongs done to [721] his forefathers. The union of the Middle and the Little Hordes with Russia persuaded him to reduce the Great Horde to a position where it could not follow the example of the others; he attacked it, defeated it, and subjugated it.

x648 This conquest, however, like all victories won over nomadic 181 peoples, could not be a permanent one. Even though the Russian employees who were then (1) in the [158] Kazak steppes said that Galdan's new subjects gave him a korsak /steppe fox/ pelt apiece as a sign of their submission, nevertheless misfortune could not destroy their love nor habit of freedom.

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(1) See Lt. Gladyshev's journal preserved in Orenburg at the Border Commission.

[158 cont.]
x648 could not destroy their love nor habit of freedom.

When they realized that it was impossible for them to keep
their old regions on Lake Balkash, they drew back to the Tsuya
[724] and Sara-Su [Sary-Su?] rivers. Later when they united their
forces, they attacked Tashkent and Turkestan and laid them
waste, as well as many other cities and villages belonging to
those two states, and they acquired so much power over the
residents of Tashkent that they forced them to choose their khans
from the horde.

Shubai, Arslanov, and Mansur, residents of the former province of Vyatka, came from Tashkent to Orenburg in 1742 (1)

and told how the khan named above ruled in Tashkent until 1739,
and that a powerful old Kazak named Tiul Biu shared his authority,
[651] and every year they levied a tribute on the city. Later Djulbars
was killed, but Tiul Biu continued to rule after him for a time and
to levy tribute. A certain Kussiak Bek, a tributary subject of
Galdan Tsyren, and perhaps his lieutenant, put an end to the
power of Tiul Biu.

He was the ruler of Tashkent while Shubai and Mansur were
there, but the Dzungarian sovereign received the tribute he took
from the people. According to our travelers, under Kussiak Bek
the Kazaks had no more influence over Tashkent, but they re-
[726] strained the environs of this city to such a degree that it was as
though under a state of permanent siege. They cultivated land
under its walls, seized the neighboring forests, and at the slight-
est dissatisfaction they seized the residents of the city and the
merchants who came to trade with them.

x648
Turkestan too was for a certain time in a [159] similar
721 position, although the Kazaks did not hinder the Dzungars from
[439] trading there. As for the small towns between Tashkent and
Turkestan, the Kazaks who conquered them during this period
kept them until the beginning of the present [19th] century.

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1. See the file for 1742 in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

[159 cont.]

x648 721 We are obliged to note with surprise, however, that in spite of these conquests and hostilities of a people subject to Galdan Tsyren, the Great Horde never dared to go and attack the Dzungars, nor even to call themselves independent of them.

x648 662 Some years later, in 1749, Tiul Biu, who had been driven out of Tashkent by Kusiak [sic] Bek and was dissatisfied by his insignificance, wished to elevate himself through the protection of Russia, and he sent deputies to Orenburg to propose that he become a Russian subject (1). His weakness was no doubt known to the Russian government, and his proposal also had no effect.

[152] The terror with which the Dzungars filled the Kazaks and the apparent submission of the latter lasted until internal dissensions began to weaken the Dzungars and until these dissensions finally led to the complete dispersal of this people, as is known. The disagreement had scarcely begun to be noticeable when the Kazaks took the most active part in it. They offered asylum to all the exiled Dzungarian princes and zaisangs, and joined with [726] them to avenge their wrongs. They attacked their enemies, and on the pretext of helping the unfortunate, they never let the opportunity pass of weakening their old enemies by raids. Finally, when the Chinese wished to interfere in the dissensions of the Dzungars, and the success of their arms had reduced Galdan Tsyren's successors to a state of utter weakness, then the Kazaks of the Great Horde took Amursan's (2) side and formed a part of the army which opposed the invaders [160] until 1756, the time when the Dzungarian empire, which had been so powerful ten years earlier, fell under the blows of the Chinese. The people who had

1. Tevkelev mentions this in one of his journals.

2. This prince was the last Dzungarian sovereign. At first he was a subject of China, then her enemy, and he died in Russia.

[160 cont.]
x648 comprised this empire were exterminated or dispersed, and the
662 lands they had occupied remained deserted.

This event brought about two great advantages for the
[726 Kazaks. It delivered them from enemies who were as restless
727] as they were dangerous, and it gave them the means of extending
their pasture lands over excellent places.

x648 The Bogdo Khan /emperor/ of China was far from being
opposed to their occupying the ravaged steppes of Dzungaria, and
indeed he tried to attract them there. To halt raids, he established
[712] a fortified line between them and their old lands, which is still
called the New Line today.

Thus the Kazak Great Horde, which had been constricted for so long, expanded on all sides to turn the best pasture lands to account. The part of this horde which came closest to the Chinese frontier and mixed with some of the remnants of the Dzungars was punished several times by force of arms for its usual brigandage, and it became subject to China and remains among Chinese subjects to this day. The others, who nomadize a little further west, have retained their independence.

x648 Some fractions of these two groups live next to the Buruts,
181 and having often had to fight against them, have become more
721 warlike and dangerous than all the other Kirghiz-Kazaks. We
could not enumerate all their continual battles with their neighbors here, but we cannot help mentioning the violent attack they
x648 made in 1771 against the Kalmuk Torguts, who were fleeing
726 from Russia under the command of the famous Ubashi.

The man who distinguished himself most in this event was
Erali, sultan of the Great Horde, who was known in China for his
bravery and who received the title of knight or paladin of the
[721] court from the Bogdo Khan (1). When he had learned of the

1. We have taken this information [161] on the exploits of this sultan from the Chinese work by Prince Tsichi [Chi Shih?], which is about the flight of the Torguts and was translated into Russian by Lipovtsov.

x648 [160 cont.]
726 approach of the [161] Torguts to his lands and of the misfortunes
[721] they had had to endure in the Middle Horde, he prepared at once to fight them once more and with the utmost severity. He called upon Sultan Ablai to attack them from the rear and his weaker allies to make a flank assault, while he himself marched to meet the enemy at the head of his elite troops, taking the precaution of sending his family, as well as the women, children, and old people, and their most precious possessions, to places sheltered from danger. These first plans were very well conceived but were not as fully successful as was expected, for Ablai refused to participate in carrying them out. Erali (1) remained alone, and since he was much weaker than the Torguts, he could not attack them openly. But his presence of mind and military strategems took the place of the assistance he lacked. He disclosed his intention of halting the fugitives and not allowing them to pass through.

Ubashi and his subjects, who had already suffered so many mishaps during their journey, were struck with terror by this hostile move of the Kazaks, and instead of overthrowing their enemy at once, they halted before him and began to take counsel and to reflect, and spent 18 days in complete inactivity. Erali was able to profit from their indecision. While the Kalmuks busied themselves with fruitless deliberations, he gathered around him auxiliaries and allies from all sides to defend himself. Sometimes he indicated the injustice done them by the closeness of the Kalmuks, or else he dazzled them with hopes of the rich booty which would be the reward of victory over a people moving from one land to another with all its wealth and a large number of women.

[162] Ubashi, who saw the forces of his enemies constantly increasing, completely lost his courage and instead of fighting

1. Prince Tsichi calls this sultan Erelinasali. This name is not Kazak and was no doubt erroneously composed from two names or was distorted by the Chinese.

x648 [162 cont.]
726 preferred to humbly ask permission to pass beyond toward the Ili
River. Erali pretended to consent but had the intention of striking
[662] a most terrible blow against the fleeing prince after having lulled
him into security to some extent. And this is exactly what hap-
pened. Scarcely had the Kalmuks moved away from the Kazaks
and set up their camp to spend the night when Erali and his allies
attacked them abruptly, annihilated whole groups which had gone
[727] to sleep without taking precautions, and took an immense booty
of prisoners, various objects, and livestock. The third part of
the Great Horde, which had camped in the neighborhood of
Tashkent from the time of Galdan Tsyren, did not move after the
annihilation of the Dzungars but began to establish itself on the
spot in the localities it occupied, and persecuted the neighboring
cities and villages more strongly. Tashkent was the city which
suffered most. Raids, the pillage of caravans, and the almost
complete loss of arable lands brought about the absolute ruin of
its inhabitants. Although they were not subjects of the Kazaks,
they were dependent upon them for everything and were obliged
to purchase all the necessities of life and trade from them at a
high price.

In 1760 a large number of Karakalpaks [Kara-Kalpak] joined
this part of the Great Horde. These Karakalpaks lived at the
mouth of the Syr [Darya] River, but being hemmed in by the
Little Horde, especially under Khan Nurali, they had retreated
further east. It is not known why the Kazaks, who were so power-
ful, did not seize Tashkent completely and establish themselves
there. But there is no doubt that this city has had to suffer from
their aggressions until our day. The khans of this country, being
weak and unenterprising, have tried to avert these raids by
favors, gifts, and concessions more than by resistance and
[829] vigorous measures. The Kazaks are accustomed to viewing in-
dulgence as [163] a sign of weakness, and consequently this kind
of behavior, far from disarming them, leads them to renewed
violence.

Tashkent proved the truth of this by its own experience some time later when Iunus Khodja became ruler of this city.

x648 [163 cont.]
726 He soon saw that the behavior of his predecessors toward the Kazaks had produced general misfortune, and that until this people was brought to reason by force of arms it would not stop tormenting his subjects. He acted in accordance with this political fact and assembled an army with which he attacked the Great Horde in 1798 (1). Luck was with him and he won great victories over the oppressors in the first battles. Encouraged by these fortunate beginnings, he continued to pursue them and added to the force of arms punishments which could only be conceived by the imagination of an exasperated Asiatic. He had the prisoners de-
[727] capitated and formed pyramids of these heads in the sight of the enemy army. These frightful sights struck the hearts of the Kazaks with inexpressible terror. Lacking true courage and being accustomed to fighting only for pillage, they could not unanimously
[721 828] resolve to die to avenge the blood of their brothers. They dreaded slavery, and this fear obliged them to submit to Iunus Khodja.

x648 Having thus proved the superiority of severity and decision, this prince seized from the Kazaks all the villages which were in
[727] their power and not only demanded complete submission in the future but also reparations, according to Asiatic custom, for the pillage and murder done against the residents of Tashkent. Finally
[651] he prescribed rules for their litigations and made them pay a tribute of one sheep out of every hundred. In a word, he reduced them completely to the state of subjects, and later he put them in his armies like his own subjects.

We repeat, however, that he did not subjugate the entire [164] Great Horde, for many Kazaks, even among those neighbor-
[166] ing him, escaped his power. Several thousand tents retreated to the Irtysh River and joined the Middle Horde, while others gained the Ak-Tau Mountains with their troops, and still others various other places.

The Kazaks who had become subjects of Iunus Khan remained under the domination of Tashkent as long as this city, with the lands which belonged to it, including Turkestan, did not fall under

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1. See the unpublished journal of Pospelov, who was in Tashkent in 1800.

[164 cont.]

x48 foreign domination. In 1814 this territory became the property of the khan of Kokand, and the Kazaks were also obliged to submit themselves to this new master. Even on this occasion some of them proved how difficult it is to control a nomadic people against its will. Those branches which were in the neighborhood [167] of the town of Chimket /Chimkent?/ abandoned their arable fields and even their gardens and retreated toward the Chinese border (1).

The result of what we have said above is that the Great Horde does not form any whole. One part is obedient to China, another to the khan of Kokand, and a third is regarded as independent. Several thousand tents of the last group, which was camping on the site of Semrek [Semirechye] (the seven rivers) as well as near the Kuk-Su and Kara-Tal rivers and close to the Chinese border were recognized as Russian vassals in 1819, under the command of Siuk, son of Khan Ablai.

In addition some Kazaks of the Great Horde have left the steppes altogether to become settled in one spot within the Russian borders. This was how Sultan Churigei was received with 4,000 Kazak tents of both the Great and the Middle Hordes. He received a concession of lands near the fort of Ust-Kamenogorsk, by ukase of the Empress Catherine II of February 28, 1789.

[165] Likewise, in 1793, Tugum, sultan of the Great Horde, petitioned to become a subject immediately, forever, with a hundred tents of his subjects who had actually crossed over the border into Siberia.

1. See the memoirs of Nazarov, who was sent to Kokand in 1813 and 1814, p. 34.

[165 cont.]

Chapter V. Historical Studies of the Kirghiz-Kazak Middle and Little Hordes from 1730 until our Times (1832).

x648 The events which have taken place among the Middle and Little Hordes since their union with Russia are so interrelated that it is impossible to separate them. For this reason we are combining into a single description the historical account we wish to give our readers concerning these two hordes from the year 1730 until our times.

At the end of Chapter III we said that the Kazaks who refused to submit to Russia at a time when the public interest would have forced them to do so later became subjects of Empress Anna for the personal advantage of a single individual.

+648 This individual was Khan Abulkhair, of whom we have al-
643 ready spoken. He was chief of a large part of the Little Horde, and his power extended over some tribes of the Middle Horde, and he had the well-being of his people in mind. But he thought
[662] still more about means of consolidating his power and rising above his rivals and enemies, especially above Khan Kaip, who also ruled over a part of the Little Horde.

The situation of the Kazaks in 1730 favored Abulkhair's ambitions. His subjects were enervated by frequent losses of men and goods; hemmed in on all sides by their neighbors, who warred against them; and expected [166] new misfortunes at every moment; and they were ready then for any sacrifice. The Khan knew how to profit from their frame of mind, and he announced to them definitively that there was no way out except voluntary submission to Russia.

x648 At first this proposition was rejected, but Abulkhair no
662 doubt knew how to point out, with such paternal solicitude and persistence, the misfortunes which menaced the Kazaks without the support of Russia; he depicted them so vividly and his arguments were so convincing that they were irresistible. When Abulkhair's adherents had compared the remote advantages they

x 648 662 [166 cont.]
could derive from their liberty with the pressing need for immediate help, they decided to submit themselves to Empress Anna, perhaps with a firm resolve to return to their independence at the first opportunity. The number of those who took part in this resolution was not great (1), but the Khan could not lose time in increasing it and thus fail to profit from the first effects of his remonstrances. At once he chose several deputies from among those on whom he could count the most and sent them to Buturlin, voivode of Ufa, under the escort of Aldara, chief of the Bashkirs, with a written proposal acknowledging allegiance to Russia. These deputies arrived in Ufa in the month of July, 1730, and from there Buturlin sent them to St. Petersburg.

In his letter Abulkhair explained the reasons which had led him to submit himself. He spoke of the misfortunes and adversities which the Kazaks had had to endure from the Dzungars. He recalled the attacks of the Volga Kalmuks, the Bashkirs, and the Yaik /Ural/ Cossacks. He promised to maintain himself at his own expense, allowing Russia to hope for his aid in overthrowing her enemies, and in the meanwhile, he demanded troops [167] to help him overcome the people of Khiva, the Karakalpaks, and the Aral people, and finally he acknowledged himself and his horde to be subjects of the empire forever.

x 648 This unexpected event, the reasons for which were not yet known, produced the greatest joy in Petersburg. It was that much more glorious for the empire that without the slightest bloodshed it acquired several hundreds of thousands of additional subjects. It promised peace and safety to the southeastern

1. Tevkelev said very clearly in his report to the Empress after he returned from being among the Kazaks (this will be discussed below) that Abulkhair was submitting himself to Russia without the consent of the people, with the exception of a small number of his trusted followers.

[167 cont.]

×668 648 provinces, which had suffered from the ravages of the Kazaks for so long. Finally it prognosticated the most brilliant political hopes for the government. It was hoped that these hordes which had voluntarily submitted themselves would be willing to engage in weakening the Dzungars, whose ruler, Galdan Tsyren, a man who had inspired fear in Peter the Great himself, still lived.

[661] It was also hoped that the Kazaks could be used to bring to reason the enemies which Russia had within her, such as the Bashkirs, whose frequent revolts were alarming the government. It was also impossible to ignore Abulkhair's proposal to subject his neighbors, the Aral people and the Karakalpaks, to the Russian scepter, and particularly the people of Khiva, whose hands were still red with the blood of Prince Bekovich-Cherkaskii, shamefully assassinated during the reign of Peter the Great with all his unfortunate companions. Once she had punished this perfidious people, Russia could found a profitable trade with Central Asia on a solid basis, and even (as was generally hoped) with India.

The vast genius of Peter the Great had already seized upon most of these prospects, but he had neither the time nor sufficient means to accomplish his projects. He would have found them if death had not struck him at the moment when he had just terminated the war with Sweden and had begun to fix his attention upon the Asian border (1).

1. Rychkov, in Chapter I of his *History of Orenburg*, says: "This is why [168] His Majesty (Peter I), as is known, I believe, by many highly distinguished persons, had reflected several times about ways of insuring himself against the attacks of this changeable people (the Kazaks." Farther on he says: "Thus, after having ended the war with Sweden victoriously, he sought means of securing against the Kazaks the very places where, with God's help, the Orenburg line is now being raised, and of

[167 cont.]

x248

opening a thoroughfare to southern Asia along that way and of putting the capricious nation of Bashkirs in its place once and for all. And although His Majesty received with kindness several representations with regard to this enterprise, which was as great as it was necessary, especially from the hand of Prince Alexei Mikhailovich Cherkaskii, then governor of Siberia, who later became Grand Chancellor, death, which surprised His Majesty suddenly, did not permit him to carry out his projects." Rychkov wrote his history of Orenburg under the reign of Empress Anna (it was published in 1759), at a time when the events of the reign of Peter the Great were still fresh in everyone's memory. Thus he could not have attributed to the sovereign plans which he had invented, for the lie would have been disclosed instantly by eyewitnesses.

[168] Six full years had not yet passed after his death when the Kazaks evinced the desire to submit themselves to Russia. Those who had aided in his administration of the empire still lived, and they remembered his plans. Thus Abulkhair's envoys arrived in Petersburg at a very favorable moment. The court was charmed to see on the banks of the Neva the very men for whose submission it had sent troops to the Ural and the Irtysh rivers, and was ready to satisfy all their wishes.

Laden with favors, kindnesses, and gifts, Abulkhair's envoys returned to their master with a letter from the Empress, in which she accepted his submission and promised him the assistance and protection he had asked. In order to certify the truth of what had been asserted and to induce the new subjects to swear the oath, Murza Tevkelev, interpreter at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of whom we have already spoken and who will often appear later in this work, was sent with them. They were also accompanied by

5: Levchine--37   G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840   RQ2 Kazak RQ2

[168 cont.]

648 several gentlemen from Ufa, several faithful Bashkirs, and some Russian Cossacks. Also two geodetic officers were charged with making a map of the country occupied by the Kazaks.

[169] Tevkelev's arrival at the horde revealed all of Abulkhair's ambitious scheming. The officers charged with re- [576] ceiving the oath from the new subjects not only were not received in conformity with their rank, but were in danger of death scarcely after they had arrived. The Kazaks were incensed at the very thought of losing their rude freedom and revolted spontaneously when they saw the Russians among them, wishing to sacrifice Tevkelev instantly to their anger. The Khan saved him but could not quiet the uprising. His more daring subjects even attacked him and asked him by what right he had opened relations with foreign powers without the consent of the people, promising his obedience as well as that of the hordes. One would naturally expect a violent opposition of this kind upon learning that Abulkhair had had difficulty in obtaining the consent of a small number of Kazaks to send his deputies into Russia. This bold trick could even have cost him his life, and if at that time he did not fall under the blows of his angered compatriots, he owed his salvation more to luck than to his power, for we shall soon see how limited it was.

Tevkelev himself, whose life was threatened by the Kazaks several times, owed his survival less to the protection of the Khan than to his profession of the Moslem faith, and above all to his eloquence, by means of which he disarmed those who had come to take his life several times. The story of these events is preserved in the archives.

[554] In his report of them in his History of Orenburg, Rychkov says that the power and captivation of Tevkelev's speech caused him to be regarded by the Kazaks as an extraordinary man. We will add that he owed his success partly to Batyr Taimas, a Bashkir elder who was then with him and who had made himself known among the Kazak hordes through his exploits and his valor.

Tevkelev's pains and troubles were not useless. No matter how strong the resistance of the people with whom he had [170] to deal was, too much effort finally tired them, and

[170 cont.]

x648 cleverness triumphed over force.

662 x648 Vexed by the presence of the Russians and fearing their influence, the Kazaks firmly resolved to rid themselves of these distasteful guests. For this reason they announced to Tevkelev that they were going to call a general assembly of the nation, at which they would definitively decide whether they would or would not swear the oath of allegiance to Russia, and that he himself should be present at the assembly without being accompanied by anyone. It was all but certain that they wished to assassinate him, and yet Tevkelev did not refuse this invitation and even knew how to turn it to his own advantage.

x648 646 662 He knew the greediness of the Kazaks, and he was guided by the Khan and his partisans. He took care to secure himself by gifts to certain of his principal and most dangerous enemies, and next he appeared at the assembly. Emboldened by the hope of having defenders and seeing himself placed in a position where he must perish or distinguish himself, he showed all the firmness, eloquence, and presence of mind of which he had given so many indications to the Kazaks and which had yielded him the greatest consideration on the part of the Moslems. Bukenbai, a Kazak elder who was as eminent as he was respected in the Middle and the Little Hordes, was the first to proclaim himself his protector. Tevkelev, together with this elder and with Khan Abulkhair, who presided in person over this assembly, spoke with such force and authority in favor of Russia that the party which was opposed to the Khan was won over by the arguments of his partisans. The result was that all the persons in attendance, starting with Abulkhair and Shemiaka, khan of the Middle Horde, swore the oath of loyalty to Russia. All this took place in 1732. As he was far from the border, Tevkelev had not yet had time to inform the government of the success of his mission when violent disturbances took place in the Middle Horde.

x648 At first the Khan and the tribal chiefs envied the [171] power which Abulkhair was to gain by his alliance with the court of Petersburg, and they even feared him. But the common people, among whom there were fewer partisans of Russia than in the Little Horde, did not wish to give up their independence. They saw

[171 cont.]

x648 only slavery and oppression in this submission, not the tranquility and peace which would be its fruit, and they forcibly opposed the Kazaks who were partisans of Russia.

x648 669 This opposition was not enough for them, and they attacked the Bashkirs living within Russia, but were driven back by force. Shortly afterward a second attack was prepared against the Bashkir settlements, and Khan Shemiaka, who had sworn loyalty to Russia, did not refuse to lead the campaign. However, this second attempt was just as unlucky for them as the first.

x648 The unrest fomented by these displays of the partisans of liberty affected those Kazaks who had sworn the oath of loyalty. They became uncertain once more and began to disavow their oath, and Tevkelev's position again became very critical. At that time he began to dream of ways of returning to Russia, but they did not wish to allow him to leave. Yielding to circumstances and lucky to escape death, he had to be content with permission to send his suite back to Russia with reports on the state of matters entrusted to his charge. He himself remained with the horde under the protection of Abulkhair.

Thus it appeared that Tevkelev had been abandoned as a sacrifice to the semibarbarous Kazaks. The danger which menaced [166] him seemed to become even more imminent when he was forced to accompany Abulkhair when he went to camp at the mouth of the Syr [Darya]. But this journey, on the contrary, was the source of the very successes for which the government had hoped and which its representative among the hordes had striven to obtain.

Abulkhair's move to the Syr took his subjects further away from [172] those who stood for independence and from his personal enemies, and it brought them closer to the peaceful Karakalpak nation, which had long been oppressed from all sides. As soon as they perceived the power of Russia, they sought her protection through Tevkelev, acknowledged themselves as subjects of the empire, and took the oath of loyalty immediately. Abulkhair was the man who took the most active part in this event, for two reasons: first, to make his power and services more glorious in the eyes of Russia; and second, in order to use this example in

[172 cont.]
order to make a strong impression on the minds of the Kazaks and to incline them more easily to similar submission. Actually, his subjects became much more peaceful after this and finally decided to acknowledge themselves the subjects of Empress Anna. Finding no more adversaries, the Khan and Tevkelev once more took the road to the Russian border, the latter in order to return to Petersburg and bear the good news of the successes of his mission, and Abulkhair with the intention of sending his son to court to present his submission and those of his people to the Empress in person and at the same time to reveal various plans which will be discussed later.

When he had reached the Russian border in December, 1732, Abulkhair sent to Petersburg with Tevkelev an embassy composed, first of all, of his son Erali, then sultan, who later achieved the rank of khan, and second, Sultan Niaz, his close kinsman. Third, there were several Kazak elders, and fourth, out of vanity he added Aralbai and Arasgeldi-Batyr, elders of the Great Horde, of whom we spoke in Chapter IV. They all arrived in Ufa with Tevkelev in January, 1733. Tevkelev left them there and hastened to present himself alone in Petersburg, as much to report what had happened to him as to obtain permission to present the Kazak embassy to the court. His unexpected arrival caused the ministry of Empress Anna as much astonishment as [173] it did pleasure. They had believed him to be either dead or enslaved. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had even sent money to Ufa to ransom him. This was within an ace of putting an end to all the political plans which had been created by Abulkhair's proposals. But suddenly Tevkelev arrived in Petersburg with an air of triumph, made his report concerning the successes he had won, the arrival in Ufa of the Kazak embassy, and finally, the oath of the Karakalpaks, which he had recently received.

At the same time Shemiaka, khan of the Middle Horde, sent deputies to Ufa to express his regret at the hostilities undertaken after the swearing of the oath and to offer to submit himself to Russia again.

This pleasant news revived all the old hopes. Tevkelev,

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648 after having been received at court with all the consideration he deserved, was sent back to Ufa to conduct Sultan Erali with all his suite to Petersburg.

These journeys and negotiations filled the entire year of 1733, and the Kazak embassy did not arrive in Petersburg until the month of January, 1734.

In February Sultans Erali and Niaz, the elders who accompanied them, as well as the supposed representatives of the Great Horde sent by Abulkhair, were formally presented to the Empress. On this occasion Erali delivered a short speech in which he announced the submission of his father and of the entire Kazak nation and requested that they be received under the protection of and in dependence upon Russia.

The Empress listened to this address most graciously and commanded that rich gifts be presented to each member of the embassy. And she saw to it that they were provided with every comfort and every pleasure imaginable, at the expense of the Crown, during their sojourn in Petersburg.

Their return could not take place until [174] all Abulkhair's demands had been examined soberly, until they had been brought into accord with the interests of the empire, and until the principles had been finally resolved which should be the basis of the conduct of the Russian government toward the Kazaks. Time was needed for the resolution of all these matters. In the meantime, so as not to leave Abulkhair in uncertainty about his son's fate and the proposals he had made, on April 20 a letter patent was sent to him through two Kazaks attached to the embassy, in which first of all gratitude was expressed to him for the trouble he had taken to lead the Great and the Middle Hordes to become vassals of Russia, and at the same time he was charged to strengthen them in their obedience (1). Secondly, it was announced to him that his son, as well as his suite, had been most

1. We should call attention here to the fact that Sultan Erali had no deputy from the Middle Horde with him.

[174 cont.]
x648 graciously received by the Empress and would return home soon.
Thirdly, he was told that the reports given by Tevkelev had
made known Abulkhair's ambitions, and he was directed to keep
on good terms with the hordes and with the Karakalpaks.

Abulkhair, who had been wearing himself out at the long
wait, having been soothed for a time, the examination of his
promises and proposals continued, in order to make them agree
with the good of the empire. He was put under obligation verbally
and in writing: first, to enforce the safety of the Russian borders
[651] contiguous to his horde; second, to defend the merchant caravans
and to escort them across the Kazak steppes; third, to furnish in
case of need, like the Kalmuks and the Bashkirs, troops levied
from among his subjects; fourth, to pay a tribute, or iasak, in
animal hides.

He could not carry out a single one of these promises, for,
like all the other khans who succeeded him, he did not have
enough authority over his subjects. Several experiences soon
proved how impossible it was for him to fulfill the first and
[175] second promises. At first there was no reason for reminding
him of the third, but in time it was proven that it was as risky
as the others. The government at first believed it should decline
the fourth, and later it was not even brought up, the matter being
regarded as impossible.

In exchange for these promises, which were so pompous,
Abulkhair, through his son and Tevkelev, asked two things above
all: "the confirmation of the office of khan in his family forever,
and the building of a city and a fort at the confluence of the
[7/2] Ori and the Ural rivers, which could serve him as asylum in case
of danger."

The Khan's requests and the attention of the government, and the State Councilor Kirilov was charged with satisfying them. He was a man who had distinguished himself by his geographical knowledge, a mapmaker whose collection of detailed information on upper Asia had aroused admiration as widespread as it was deserved. In addition he had kept all the treatises of Peter I regarding his views and plans concerning the Asiatic principalities contiguous to Russia. These facts decided him to draw up and

[175 cont.]

x648 present to the cabinet of the Empress two plans concerning the Kazaks and their neighbors, one on the means of maintaining their obedience and governing them, and the other on the need for building the city and fort asked by Abulkhair to attain the first end, and finally, one on the political and financial advantages to be gained from the possession of the Kazak steppes. His views were so well founded and promised such advantages that the Minister and the Empress herself could not help but approve them.

His views having been accepted as their rule of conduct, it was decided to entrust Kirilov himself to carry out all the government projects with regard to the new subjects, and they presented him with all the powers and means necessary to their success. Several engineers were sent with him to build the forts, several geodetic specialists to draw maps, and three naval officers with builders and [176] sailors to build and man some sailing vessels. [54] At Moscow he was joined by mine workers, artillery officers, a historian, a botanist, an apothecary, a painter, a physician, students of the Slavic-Latin school, and several other employees of different classes charged with various functions (1). At Kazan he took command of an entire regiment and adequate artillery. At Ufa he was joined by an infantry battalion, a suitable number of Cossacks, and several other detachments of troops, regulars and irregulars. Kirilov was given free disposition of part of the revenues of Ufa to pay the expenses of the expedition. In addition he was given as aide and interpreter for his communications with the Kazaks, Murza Tevkelev, of whom we have already

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1. At this time Kirilov demanded and was granted permission to be sent several young officers from the Cadet Corps, so that they might study under his supervision the languages as well as the customs of Asia, and thus become capable of later occupying positions in these lands. This idea, which is worthy of imitation, does the greatest honor to Kirilov's foresight.

[176 cont.]

*648 spoken and who had been promoted to the rank of colonel for his discreet conduct during his stay with the hordes and for having induced Abulkhair's subjects to swear loyalty.

Here are the most outstanding articles of the instructions presented to Kirilov as he was about to depart. He was enjoined to do the following:

1. To build a city and a fort at the mouth of the Ori River, and to seek to attract residents to it;

2. To send the letters patent which he had for Abulkhair, for Shemiaka, khan of the Middle Horde, for the tribal chiefs of the Great Horde, and for the khan of the Karakalpaks;

3. To invite the khans and the elders or tribal chiefs of all the hordes to come to him;

4. To require the swearing of the oath from the Great and the Middle Hordes;

5. To send Sultan Erali back to his father under a good escort;

[177]

6. To maintain the obedience of the Kazaks by gentle means and gifts or by force and terror, depending on the circumstances;

[31] 7. In case Abulkhair or other khans or ordinary Kazaks wished to pasture their herds near the new city, to assign them lands for this purpose. And in case the khans wished to have [342] houses, either as temporary lodgings or to live in, to build them under the walls of the city according to their custom, and even to give them permission to build mosques, but to maintain a guard there for a service of honor and for supervision;

8. To designate the Ural River as the border and to guard it so that no Kazak might cross it without permission;

[692] 9. To establish a tribunal for litigations, composed of Russian officers and Kazaks chosen from among the most distinguished men, such as the sons of khans and of other sultans or of elders, and to see that each was judged in this tribunal according to the customs of his country;

[439] 10. After the founding of the city and after conferring with Abulkhair, to profit by the first good opportunity to send a caravan

X 648 [177 cont.]
[439] with goods to the realm of Bukhara and further, if possible, and likewise to seek to attract merchants from different parts of Asia to come to Russia;

[654] 11. To send geodetic specialists with the first caravan to examine places and draw maps;

12. To look for mines as much as possible and to examine the place where, according to Abulkhair, there was supposed to be gold;

[504 501] 13. To seek to establish a port on the Aral Sea and to hold armed vessels there, and to build a few longboats on the Yaik (Ural) River at first to this end, and after having taken them down, to keep them ready at all times with all their gear; and when the city is built and the relations with the Kazaks and Karakalpaks are more stable, to transport [178] these vessels thus dismounted [716] to the Aral Sea during the winter, with the consent of Abulkhair and the Kazak princes, and there to assemble them and arm them with artillery;

[705] 14. To buy Kazak horses for the cavalry at favorable moments;

[654] 15. To be active in the discovery, exploitation, and sale of metals (excepting gold and silver) which are to be found in the Kazak steppes, according to the principles of trade without losing time in observing forms.

In order to make it easier for Kirilov to execute these orders, everyone everywhere was directed to give him all the help possible.

He was also entrusted with complementary diplomatic instructions, whose ends were:

1. To watch the Bashkirs, among whom there had been frequent disturbances up to that time;

2. To watch the Kazaks likewise;

[662] 3. If one group or the other came to an uprising, to use one people against the other in order to spare the Russian troops;

4. To seek to acquire precise information promptly about contiguous peoples;

5. Above all to watch the behavior of the Dzungars, to seek means of putting an end to their raids upon the Siberian colonies, and to divert them from levying tributes on the peoples

[178 cont.]

x 648 called the Dvoedantsy /"payers of double taxes"/. If any movement was noticed on their part, to report it immediately to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and inform the border commanders of it;

[705] 6. Not to give Abulkhair any help other than powder and arms in the war against the people of Khiva and to give him no auxiliary troops.

We have made it our duty to transcribe here in full the letters patent entrusted to Kirilov for the Middle and the Little Hordes. The first was given to Abulkhair after Kirilov arrived in the area in question. The second [179] could not be delivered because of the death of Khan Shemiaka, to whom it was addressed. Both are presented below.

"We, by the grace of God, Anna, Empress and autocrat of all the Russias, etc., etc.

"To Abulkhair, khan and elder of the Kirghiz-Kazak horde, and to all the Kirghiz-Kazak army, greetings from Our Imperial Majesty.

"It is our hope that the Kirghiz elders, Tatlymbet-Batyr and Baibek-Telengut, who were here with your son Erali and whom we sent, in the company of three Bashkirs, with a gracious letter patent, have already arrived in your presence. This letter patent apprises you, Abulkhair Khan, of our imperial favor toward you and of the fact that your son has been well provided for in our vicinity. And today, we, Great Sovereign and Imperial Majesty, by particular benevolence to you, Abulkhair Khan, our subject, and toward the elders and toward the entire nation of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, have most graciously acceded to your prayer, Abulkhair Khan, and have deigned to send from here our State Councilor Ivan Kirilov and our Colonel Murza Mahmet Tevkelev, and have commanded that a city be built at the mouth of the Ori, and that it be provided with men, artillery, mortars,
[712] cannon, and other munitions of war, to protect you and to defend you, our subject, Abulkhair Khan, more easily and quickly, and the elders and all the army, as well as the other khans and elders of the Kirghiz-Kazak and Karakalpak hordes who have submitted

[179 cont.]

x648 themselves to us, as well as all the army and the mission, against your enemies and our own. And to this end power has been given on the part of Our Imperial Majesty to State Councilor Kirilov and to Colonel Tevkelev; and with them your son Erali Sultan and your brother Niaz Sultan are being sent back to you, and with them the elders and their suite with the rewards of Our Imperial Majesty presented upon their departure, that their journey might be made pleasurable. And you, Abulkhair, khan of the Kirghiz-Kazak horde, as well as the elders, the army, and all the Kirghiz-Kazak horde, knowing the favor of Our Imperial Majesty toward you, are bound to render us important services, namely, on the first occasion, during the building of the city, as well as always, you must protect it from all unforeseen attack from enemies and give timely warning to our State Councilor Kirilov and Colonel Tevkelev and our armies, according to the circumstances, of every kind of hurtful and injurious machination, and confirm our said subjects, the khans, elders, and the army in this, and in everything you must act according to the oath of obedience which you, Abulkhair Khan, and the elders and the army did swear. In addition the said Kirilov and Tevkelev have [180] more extensive ukase from us to communicate to you, and they will assure you by word of mouth of the favor of Our Imperial Majesty. See them often, Abulkhair Khan, for this reason, and believe what they will tell you concerning the matters which are to take place, and carry them out accordingly.

"Given at St. Petersburg, June 10, 1734."

On the original letter patent is the seal of Her Imperial Majesty.

" We, by the grace of God, Anna, empress and autocrat of all the Russias, etc., etc.

"To our subject, Shemiaka Khan, to the elders and to the entire Kirghiz-Kazak army of the Middle Horde, greetings from Our Imperial Majesty.

"It is known to us, Great Sovereign and Imperial Majesty, how you, Shemiaka, in 1731 as well as during the sojourn of our envoy Murza Tevkelev with the Kirghiz-Kazak horde, did enter

[180 cont.]

x648 into obedience to us and swear loyalty; and later, violating this oath, the Kazaks of your horde desired to attack our Bashkir subjects and do damage to them, and subsequently you yourself, Shemiaka, came to attack these same Bashkirs with your Kazaks. It is known to us how in the first attack as well as in the second you were vanquished by the said Bashkirs, our subjects; and in this second attack, without having come to extremities, you joined the Bashkirs and were reconciled; and you, Shemiaka, and the elders and all the army, once again as before did swear allegiance to us, Great Sovereign and Imperial Majesty, and did send deputies to Ufa expressly with a most humble prayer that you might be received among our subjects. These deputies were returned to you. And since today, by the most gracious wish of Our Imperial Majesty, our State Councilor Ivan Kirilov and Colonel Murza Tevkelev mentioned above, have been sent to erect a city at the mouth of the Ori River, and they have been given every power to announce our consent to the Khan and the elders of the Kirghiz-Kazak horde and to the entire army, and to assure our faithful subjects of our good graces, and to receive the oath of those who wish to be dependent upon us. To this end, we, Great Sovereign and Imperial Majesty, in accordance with our power as autocrat and above all in accordance with our compassion for the Kirghiz-Kazak people, do most graciously grant pardon to you, Khan Shemiaka, to the elders, and the entire Kazak army of the Middle Horde, for the violation of your first oath, if it is your intention to wish to place yourself under our domination and to remain there. And you, Khan Shemiaka, and all the Kazak army of the Middle [181] Horde may know what you are to do and how it is proper to conduct yourselves by our ukase, concerning which the State Councilor Ivan Kirilov and Colonel Tevkelev are to make declaration to you.

"Given at Saint Petersburg, June 10, 1734."

The original of this letter patent was likewise invested with the seal of the Empress.

Armed with these letters and accompanied by Sultan Erali and his suite and Tevkelev, Kirilov paid his respects to the Empress

[181 cont.]

248 and left Petersburg on June 15, 1734.

The extent of the means afforded Kirilov, the indulgence and generosity with which the government gratified all his demands, the authority with which he was invested, the privileges granted to the city of Orenburg, which was planned to be built, and the zeal with which relations were opened with the new subjects at once, show the degree of importance attached by the cabinet in St. Petersburg to the submission of the Kazaks and the number of advantages it expected from this. Unfortunately most of the plans made on this basis were not realized, first because of the revolt of the Bashkirs, and then because of the premature death of Kirilov.

The new mission with which he had been charged during his trip from Petersburg to Ufa had the same fate. At this time troubles broke out among the Volga Kalmuks, and Kirilov was ordered to prepare the Kazaks to punish them if they did not resume their duties soon (1).

Instead of busying himself with all these political matters with the Kazaks, when Kirilov arrived at the border he had to
[249] devote his full attention to pacifying the revolt of the Bashkirs.

This people presented obstacles to the realization of all the new plans. From the time of their submission to Russia, the limits of the lands they occupied had not been fixed, and they had had complete liberty to extend their camping grounds on all sides and complete ease not only in crossing the Yaik /Ural/ River freely and [182] attacking the Kazaks, but also in using the first favorable opportunity to rise against Russia herself.

With the erection of cities on the Yaik and the setting of the border on this river, which left the Bashkirs surrounded by Russian colonies and Russian troops, they felt their danger. In order to impede the execution of these measures, they formed a plan to oppose Kirilov's passage to the mouth of the Ori, where he had been ordered to lay the foundations of the new city and fortress.

1. See the ukase of August 26, 1734 under the name of Kirilov at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[182 cont.]

x248 This attempt was fruitless, however. Although some detachments did suffer from their attacks, Kirilov himself reached his goal, and on August 15, 1735, he laid the foundations of the new city on what is now the site of the fortress of Orsk.

As soon as the fortifications began to rise, and troops and artillery had been introduced, Sultan Niaz, kinsman of Abulkhair Khan, was sent to the horde with several elders to announce to the Khan that his request had been fulfilled, in other words, that Orenburg had been built on the site which he had chosen, and also to invite him to present himself with all the chiefs of the hordes in the spring of 1736 in the new city to confer with Kirilov. At this same time the merchants of Tashkent who had come into [439] Russia with goods were sent back. In order to induce them to come and trade in the new city, various assistance was given them and many gifts, and they were informed of the privileges accorded to Orenburg.

[469] Moreover the revolt of the Bashkirs far from being put down grew more and more violent, and constant attacks were made on the supplies of our armies. Count Rumiantsev, commander in chief of the armies and father of the famous Zadunaiskii (1), was appointed to force them to submission. Meanwhile Kirilov, who was constantly occupied with him about Bashkir matters, had no time to make closer contacts with the Kazaks.

[183] These facts indicated to him that another fortified line from this river to Samara, independent of the line of fortresses on the Yaik, was indispensable in order to guarantee the safety of Russia's relations with her Yaik colonies. As soon as he saw a chance, Kirilov endeavored to establish both the one and the other. From his reports to the imperial cabinet (1)

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1. This means "beyond the Danube" and was a nickname given the famous Rumiantsev after his Turkish campaign. Note of [French] translator.

1. See the report of October 27, 1736.

[183 cont.]

648 we know that in 1736, in addition to the fortress of Orenburg, he had founded the forts of Guberlinsk and Ozernaya on the Yaik, which still exist today, and three fortified ports, Sredny, Berdskoy, and Krylov. We do not speak here of the forts erected on the Samara River and in the interior of the country of the Bashkirs since they have no connection with our subject.

The arrival of Russian troops at the Ural River could not help but influence the peace of the Kazak hordes, even if only momentarily. But this did not prevent them from harassing Russian subjects in the west.

Although Kirilov had not succeeded in seeing the Kazak princes and consequently could not carry out the order he had received to prepare their hordes to attack the Volga Kalmuks who were revolting, the Kazaks had no need of being urged to an act x648 toward which they were naturally inclined.

726 Scarcely had they heard of the disturbances on the Volga, when they hastened off to pillage the Kalmuks (2). The successful outcome of this campaign and the seizure of many prisoners and some livestock in 1736 was not enough to satisfy the greed of the Kazaks, and they repeated their attacks in 1737, returning home with considerable booty.

x648 Kirilov was charged (3) with making Abulkhair realize how much the ravages which his subjects were inflicting upon those of the empire [184] were contrary to the views of the government, and ordered to take measures to prevent them from committing similar acts in the future. This admonishment did not achieve

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2. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of February 9, 1737, under the name of Kirilov, and the copies of reports of Prince Repnin and Beklemishev which are appended to it.

3. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of March 8, 1737.

[184 cont.]

x648 its aim, for Kirilov, who had spent the winter of 1736 to 1737 drawing up plans, which he had firmly resolved to carry out in the spring, for the regulation of Kazak matters, died in the month of April of the same year.

It is especially unfortunate that he did not have time to
carry out two acts: first, to meet with the Khan and tribal chiefs
who were soon to arrive in Orenburg at his invitation, and second,
to send to Tashkent a caravan which had been lead by Tashkent
[439] merchants who had come to Kazan by way of Orenburg in 1736.
Elton, a naval officer in the British service, was to accompany
this caravan as a merchant (1), in order to gather information on the principality of Tashkent, and especially to explore the Aral Sea, on which it was being proposed to establish a flotilla, as was said earlier. Elton's order had already been written, as was found among Kirilov's papers after his death; but it remained without consequence, as did the plan to erect a city at the mouth of the Syr /Darya/, on the Aral Sea, which it was planned at first to populate with criminals who had been condemned to exile (2).

The importance of the matters entrusted to Kirilov and their anticipated results required that a man be chosen to replace him who was both intelligent and energetic, and this was the case. Tatishchev, famous for his history of Russia, was appointed as chief of the Kirghiz [-Kazak] expedition, or, as they said then, the Orenburg expedition. This appointment was made known at once to the Kazak Middle and Little Hordes by two letters patent in the name of the Empress. One was immediately delivered to Abulkhair, but the other, addressed to the deceased Khan [185] Shemiaka,

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1. This same Elton later went into the service of Shah Nadir and was the cause of diplomatic explanations between the Russian and English ministers.

2. There was an ukase on this subject of February 11, 1736.

[185 cont.]

x648 was never sent and still remains today in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg (1).

x648 669 The Bashkir revolt had still not been put down. Abulkhair was afraid to take any part in this revolt, and he himself suggested to Tatishchev that he help to subdue the rebels. The higher authority was informed of this proposal and gave permission for it to be accepted (2), authorizing the Khan to enter the land of the Bashkirs, provided however that in acting against the rebels he would leave in peace those who remained loyal and would defend their persons and properties if necessary. In defiance of this order, x648 726 Abulkhair pillaged the lands of the Bashkirs for two consecutive months without distinguishing between rebels and loyal subjects, and the results proved that he had no other end in proposing his [662] services but to gorge himself and his Kazaks on booty. It is even asserted that he intended to make his son khan of the Bashkirs, x648 726 727 and when he entered the lands of this people, he announced himself their protector and defender before the Russian government, but when he saw that his deceit was a failure he began the pillage. As a consequence it was commanded that he be made to depart from the lands of the Bashkirs as soon as possible. Tatishchev carried out this order with gentle means and without wrangling.

The son of Abulkhair Khan, Erali, remained in Orenburg as hostage, however.

While Abulkhair was carrying out his ravages against the Bashkirs, part of his horde, which was camping at the mouth of the Ural, renewed its attacks against the Kalmuks and took many Russians prisoners during one of the raids (3). Fearing the just

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1. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of December 30, 1737.

2. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of March 22, 1738.

3. See the reports sent from Astrakhan,

x648 726 727 [185 cont.]

and the ukase of February 6, 1738 addressed to Tatishchev, in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

punishment for their misdeeds, Abulkhair and his partisans were terrified to hear that Tatishchev was approaching from Orenburg with troops in the month of July, 1738. They believed that this army, which according to [186] rumor had been joined by several thousand Kalmuks, was coming to punish them, whereas Tatishchev, who was being escorted by the army, had no other purpose but to open meetings with the Khan and the principal Kazak sultans.

x648 Wishing to assure themselves of his intentions, they sent Batyr Bukenbai, of whom we have already spoken and who was universally respected, to meet Tatishchev. The ostensible reason for his mission was to discover at what time Abulkhair should come to Orenburg and the number of sultans who should accompany him. The true reason was to reconnoiter the strength of the army and to find out if there were Kalmuks.

[728] In spite of the fact that Bukenbai had calmed his compatriots on this subject, Abulkhair, who was conscious of his crimes, took a long time to decide to go to Orenburg. He finally arrived, and halted with his entire suite below the walls of the fortress, but he was afraid to surrender himself before Tatishchev, making the excuse that it was not befitting the person of a sovereign to make the first visit to a general. He held to this idea primarily because of the arguments of the elders who accompanied him. However Tevkelev, as his coreligionist and an old acquaintance, reassured him and made him decide to renounce his proud claim. The assurance that he was surrendering himself to the imperial camp and not to the State Councilor Tatishchev made him reduce his pretentions and go to Orenburg, which was then no more than an armed camp.

The interview was scheduled for the month of August, 1738.

In order to give it greater pomp, and thus to strike the fancy of the Asiatics, who love pageantry in all things, a major

[186 cont.]
x648 was sent before the Khan with a company of dragoons, two platoons of grenadiers, a military band, and twelve stud horses. This detachment met Abulkhair on the road and escorted him to Orenburg. The other troops in the city were armed and lined the route, and when the Khan passed by the artillery, they saluted him with nine rounds of cannon. When he dismounted from his horse near [187] Tatishchev's tent, Abulkhair was met by a lieutenant, outside the door of the tent by a major, and inside the door by a colonel. The portrait of the Empress was placed at the far end of the tent. The Khan was awaited in the middle of the room by the commander, surrounded by senior officers and subalterns. As he approached him, Abulkhair made an address in his language of which this is the translation:

"Her Majesty, the Empress of Russia, surpasses all other sovereigns just as the sun in the skies eclipses all the other stars. Although distance prevents me from seeing her, nevertheless I am sensible of her grace in the depths of my heart. You, lord and illustrious chief, I consider as the moon, illumined by the light of Her Majesty. For this reason I declare to you my submission to her and my loyalty as her faithful subject. I congratulate you upon the victories won over the enemy and wish you future success. I place myself, my family, and my hordes under the defense and protection of Her Majesty, as under the wing of a powerful eagle, and on my part I promise eternal submission. To you, lord general and my friend, I present my compliments upon your arrival here. I commit myself and my close kin to your friendship, and I hereby assure you of a friendship which is reciprocated on my part (1)."

1. This address was not written down at all but delivered orally, and was later put in the account of the first visit of the Khan. For this reason we have permitted ourselves to correct the mistakes of the translation without changing the meaning. Rychkov placed it in his history of Orenburg, likewise making certain corrections in the translation.

[187 cont.]

x 648 Tatishchev replied that he would not fail to make his submission known to the Empress. He promised him assistance and protection, but suggested, at the same time, that he swear the oath again. Abulkhair responded that he had already sworn the oath once, but in spite of this he was agreeable to swearing it [793 [778 641] again. At this the most senior member of the Moslem clergy was ushered into the tent with the Koran, and a [188] golden rug was brought on which the Khan knelt, and after having heard the reading of the oath, he kissed the Koran.

Immediately after the ceremony Tatishchev put aside for him a rich saber mounted in gold which, as a special mark of favor, the Khan was not to draw except against the enemies of Russia. At the same moment the elders and the common Kazaks swore the oath before Tevkelev in other tents.

The ceremony ended with a feast, during which, in order to divert and astonish the guests, the health of the Empress and that of the Emperor were drunk to, to the sound of the cannon.

The following day Sultan Nurali, eldest son of the Khan, arrived in Orenburg. He too was shown great honor, although less than that shown to his father. He too swore the oath in Tatishchev's [431] presence and later received in the name of the Empress a saber mounted in silver.

The first meeting of the head of the Orenburg expedition with the Khan was soon followed by several others. Tatishchev and Abulkhair paid each other frequent visits, both in Orenburg and outside the fortress in the camp of the Kazak chief, in public and also in private. In these meetings it was settled:

1. That Erali Sultan, Abulkhair's son, who lived in Orenburg as hostage, should be sent back to the horde, and Khodji Akhmet, another son of the Khan should take his place.

2. That the Khan obligated himself to free and send back to Russia all Russian prisoners, not only those within the horde, but also those in all the neighboring lands.

[662] We will mention in passing that he could never have carried out this promise, and when he made it he knew the impossibility of keeping his word.

[188 cont.]

x648 3. As greater proof of his submission, in 1739 Abulkhair expressed the wish to send his spouse, the Khaness Papai, to the court, but the reason for this plan was curiosity, no doubt, and the hope of receiving rich presents.

[189] In gratitude for all the favors which he had received, the Khan proposed and solemnly obligated himself to defend and protect Russian caravans passing across the Kazak steppes. In accordance with these assurances, Tatishchev sent the first caravan [439] to Tashkent just at this time, and a part of the merchandise belonged to the crown. Lieutenant Muller was appointed head of [654] this caravan, and a geodetic officer was assigned to him to make geographic sketches.

This caravan passed through the Little and Middle Hordes [579] successfully but was pillaged in the Great Horde, two days from Tashkent.

[431] Before the Khan departed for the steppes, rich gifts were distributed in the name of the Empress, not only to him, but to the sultans, elders, and even to the ordinary Kazaks of his suite.

At this time the Middle Horde had not yet elected a khan to replace Shemiaka, but it was ruled by two khans, Abul Mahmet and Ablai, whom Tatishchev had invited to come to meetings in Orenburg at the same time as Shemiaka [sic]. Neither of them came, however, and for this reason an officer was sent to them to find out their attitudes toward Russia and to discover what reasons had prevented their coming to Orenburg. This envoy returned at the end of August, 1738, bringing with him certain elders who informed Tatishchev that Abul Mahmet and Ablai had not been able to respond to his invitation because of the distance of their auls [nomad villages], which were on the Irtysh /River/, but that they would not fail to come the following spring and that they would swear an oath of loyalty.

x648 This meeting did not take place, however, for Tatishchev
439 left for Petersburg at the beginning of 1739. The first news learned
579 by his successor, Prince Urusov, who arrived in Orenburg only at
the end of the summer, was that two Russian caravans, which had
left Orenburg shortly before, had been pillaged practically upon

[448 [189 cont.]
[437 our border by Kazaks of the Little Horde. Such were the first
577] proofs of the [190] protection of our trade in Asia promised by
Khan Abulkhair.

[843] A second proof of the impotence of the princes, or rather the Kazak chiefs, was seen in 1740 when Karasakal, chief of the Bashkir rebels, fled beyond the Yaik with his accomplices. The Khan and the sultans absolutely refused to arrest these deserters.

All these circumstances, and particularly the pillage of the caravans, caused Abulkhair to be embarrassed about appearing in Orenburg in 1740 for a meeting with Prince Urusov, and he sent excuses that he was ill and too far away.

To these two reasons, which he gave openly, a third must
be added, which was secret. He knew that at this time Abul
Mahmet, new khan of the Middle Horde, was expected in Orenburg.
[554] This man was his enemy and one over whom he had pre-eminence,
and he was afraid of seeing the other treated as his equal. But in
order to avoid reproaches and dispel suspicions, he sent the Sultans
Nurali and Erali, his sons, to Prince Urusov.

On this occasion they were received with all the honors
which had been shown their father two years before. The Kazaks
[574 576] who accompanied them were also treated with special regard.
Seventy-five elders dined at the table of the chief [Prince Urusov?],
and food and beer were distributed to the persons of their suite
outdoors.

Although Sultan Nurali was at that time a grown-up man, yet his father had given him as a preceptor during his trip to Russia a man, Batyr Djanibek, who was universally esteemed among the Kazaks and known for his wit. He was received in Orenburg practically as an equal of the sultans, and with them received rich gifts at the first meeting in the name of the Russian government.

[574] The first visit of the Khan's sons to Prince Urusov was only a
ceremonial visit and an exchange of pleasantries. At the second
meeting the affairs of the horde were discussed. [191] They ex-
[628] plained that the first caravan sent by Tatishchev was pillaged by
the Great Horde, over which they had not the slightest influence.

x 648 [191 cont.]
Later, in imitation of their father, they undertook to satisfy demands which were beyond their power to fulfill. These were: to
[728] make restitution of all the merchandise taken from the caravans which were robbed near Orenburg and to surrender all the Russian prisoners who were among the hordes. Finally, they announced that their father requested a certain number of cannon for the war against the Khivans, and also that a city be built on the Syr /Darya River/, after having drawn a preliminary plan of the site for which it was destined. As a result of this request, Prince
[654] Urusov sent the geodetic specialist, Muravin, and the engineer, Nazimov, along the Syr and from there to Khiva, and they, after having made the first map of the part of the steppes of the Kazaks and the lands of Khiva that they had seen, returned to Russia a year after their return from this mission. The artillery was absolutely refused to Abulkhair on the pretext that there was very little in the forts built along the Ural.

Nurali and his brother Erali had not yet left when Abul
[574] Mahmet, khan of the Middle Horde, who had long been awaited, was seen to arrive in Orenburg with the Sultan Ablai, accompanied by a large number of tribal chiefs, elders, and common people. At the time of their visit to Prince Urusov, they were received with the same honors as were shown to Abulkhair. However when they entered the tent, instead of delivering an address, each presented a letter whose content had the same sense as Abulkhair's speech, and for that reason we have not believed it appropriate to transcribe these letters here.

x 648 After the letters had been read to him by an interpreter,
641 Prince Urusov responded with flattering remarks and promised them, in the name of Her Imperial Majesty, her good graces, assistance, and protection should they show themselves to be faithful subjects. Then he proposed to the Khan as well [192] as to the Sultan and the Kazaks of their suite that they swear the oath. Abul Mahmet and Ablai at once complied with the request of the head of the expedition, knelt on a golden rug, took off their headgear and swore their loyalty according to their customs. Then they kissed the Koran, placed it on their heads, and placed

x [192 cont.]
648 their seal on the leaves on which the oath was written in lieu
641 of signature. In imitation of them, 128 Kazak elders of the
Middle Horde swore the oath in a neighboring tent, and the
people took the oath outdoors. This ceremony was followed
by a feast, the firing of artillery, etc.

x648 On the following day the Khan, accompanied by Ablai,
returned to Orenburg to discuss Kazak matters. During this
[439 meeting Prince Urusov particularly insisted that they should
728] escort the caravans coming from Russia or returning there, that
they should surrender the goods seized by the Great Horde from
Muller's caravan, and that they should put an end to the disagreements
existing between the Kazaks and the Volga Kalmuks. They
were unable to satisfy this last request because they belonged to
[721] a people which was more accustomed to pillage than to obeying
its chiefs. Furthermore, the Kalmuks had suffered more from
the Little Horde, which was their closest neighbor. We will add,
by way of proof, that in this same year, 1740, Abulkhair himself
sent nearly 3,000 Kazaks to ravage the Kalmuk uluses.

[579] It was impossible to satisfy the demand for escorts for the
caravans. Ablai, who was more powerful than Abul Mahmet,
could have assumed this obligation, but it was not to the advantage
of the people or the chiefs, since no matter how high a price the
escort received, it could not counterbalance the benefits accruing
to the Kazaks from seizing the goods.

Two days after the first meeting with the chiefs of the Middle
Horde, Prince Urusov invited them, together with the sons of
Abulkhair, to come to see the maneuvers of the infantry and
artillery. Abul Mahmet and Ablai admired the exercises [193]
[662 and especially the fireworks which were displayed in their honor.
152] But in order to avoid meeting Abul Mahmet, Nurali and Erali
not only failed to appear in response to the invitation which they
had received, but left Orenburg the same day without taking leave
of Prince Urusov. It was later learned that the real reason for this
hasty departure was the fear of being kept as hostages in Russia at
the instigation of Abul Mahmet.

The Khan and the sultans left Orenburg giving every sign of submission and devotion to the Russian government. But the events

x648 [193 cont.]
of 1741 gave reason to doubt the sincerity of their demonstrations and promises. We said above that Karasakal, chief of the Bashkir
[167] rebels, had retreated to the Kazak hordes. It is not known which khan or sultan took him under protection, but it is recognized that having announced himself to be the brother of Galdan Tsyren, the general of the Dzungars, he went out and laid waste the settle-
[726] ments of the latter people at the head of a large number of armed Kazaks. Galdan had been warned of this attack and sent to punish these brigands an army of 15,000 men, who pursued them
[727] almost to Orenburg across the Kazak steppe and devastated the auls in their path, killing or taking away men and livestock. The subjects of Abul Mahmet and Ablai suffered most from this situation, which causes one to suppose that they had supported Karasakal and aided him, and that this had brought down all these misfortunes upon them. The swift advance of the Dzungars was stopped by the commander of Orenburg, who saw them approaching the border and sent word to them that they were violating the peace which existed between Russia and Galdan Tsyren. The head of the Dzungarian army withdrew at once, after declaring that neither he nor his master had been informed of the submission of the Kazaks to Russia, and that these peoples had made all their neighbors lose patience with them because of their constant brigandage. They were told that in future they should address their [194] complaints about the Middle and the Little Hordes to the Russian government and not take justice into their own hands. It can be imagined that neither Galdan nor his general could understand the justice of this diplomatic solution, and that they continued to act toward the new Russian subjects as they had during their independence.

This event made Abul Mahmet request the Russian government to erect a fortified city in the midst of the grazing lands of the Middle Horde. He knew that a similar promise had been made to Abulkhair, and he considered himself worthy of being treated on the same footing.

[726] Although the Kazaks had been given a strong lesson by the Dzungars, a still more terrible storm menaced them from the

x 648 [194 cont.]

[726] southwest. Shah Nadyr, the terror of Asia, was nearing Khiva, and once he had conquered it he could easily attack the Kazak hordes. The cabinet in St. Petersburg had already taken measures to fortify the new border along the Ural as much as possible. But this precaution was useless, for Nadyr passed around the Kazak steppes without paying any attention to it. He could not help but know that the conquest of a nomadic people is difficult in general, and that the booty which can be gained from it is practically nothing. Thus it is not surprising that he left the Kazaks in peace.

Abulkhair had seized Khiva in 1741 and was there when the Persian armies entered this country. At that time with him was Muravin, a geodetic officer who, as we said above, had been ordered in 1740 to explore the site on the Syr /Darya/ where Abulkhair had requested that a city be built. Relying upon this officer more than upon his sultans, Abulkhair sent him as his representative to meet the Shah to pay him his respects and to beg the latter to allow him to remain khan of Khiva. Nadyr received Muravin most graciously, gave him gifts in silver and clothing, and sent him back, directing him to tell Abulkhair to present himself in the Persian camp, where he would be received and rewarded as a subject of the [195] Empress of Russia, with whom the Shah wished to maintain peace and good terms (1).

[727]

1. As proof of his sincerity we cite the following fact: Zhanaiev, a Russian Tatar, brought to Samara ten Russian slaves who had been prisoners in Khiva. Nadyr freed them and gave each one 50 rubles and a horse to return home.

x 648 726 Whether from fear, or from lack of faith in Nadyr's words, or because of a conspiracy plotted by the Khivans, Abulkhair refused to appear before the Persian conqueror and withdrew within his horde. After his departure the Khivans decided to resist the Persian army and shut themselves up in the city. Nadyr took it by assault in three days (2) and gave the people of Khiva one of

2. See in the archives of the Orenburg

x 648 [726] [195 cont.]

Border Commission the reports of the Tatar Zhanaiev, already mentioned, who himself was in Khiva during the siege.

[669] his generals as khan. But this new prince had few troops at his disposal, and the Khivans were not slow in getting rid of him.

Nurali, son of Abulkhair, was chosen to replace this chief, who had done nothing more than appear, but his reign was no longer than that of his predecessor. When he learned that Nadyr was angered at the revolt of the Khivans and was preparing an army to punish them, he hastened to leave Khiva and to rejoin his father within the pasture lands of the Kazak Little Horde.

[726] He had not yet found security, however. Galdan Tsyren had grown impatient with the raids the Kazaks made while he had been engaged in war with China, and having finished his most important affairs, he again sent two bodies of troops, one of which attacked the Little Horde and the other the Middle Horde. Abulkhair appealed at once to the Russian government, requesting help. In order to respond to the Khan's wishes, the Imperial Cabinet gave orders that in case of danger he should be allowed to enter the fortress of Orenburg with his family and servants.

This permission was a kindness to Abulkhair, but it did not protect him from the attacks which the Dzungars might make later. Since he lived most of the time in the midst of the steppes or near the Syr /Darya/, [196] it was not always easy for him to seek refuge in Orenburg, which was too far away; the Dzungars could always cut him off from it by occupying the northern part of the Kazak steppes. In the west the Dzungars would have been aided by the Kalmuks, who belonged to the same race. It was still more dangerous for Abul Mahmet and Ablai. In many localities their subjects were the closest neighbors of the Dzungars and often themselves lived as nomads closer to the lands of the latter than to Orenburg.

When the danger was proven by the abduction of Ablai, the

[196 cont.]

x648 Dzungarian sultan (1) made the Kazak leaders see that they were obliged to have recourse to the mercy of Galdan in spite of their dependence on Russia. Abul Mahmet sent him an embassy to pay him his respects, and finally he gave him his own son as x648 hostage (2). Abulkhair, who was cleverer than Abul Mahmet and who lived closer to the Russian border, had, on the one hand, less to fear from the Dzungars and, on the other, greater need for the protection of the Russian Empress. Consequently he decided to employ the most subtle deceit in this case. Through his agents he made it known to Galdan's army that he was ready to obey him and that he would send assurances of his submission if it was so desired.

Galdan received this message and, regarding Abulkhair, no doubt, as the most powerful of the Kazak princes, sent his own officers himself to make certain of his submission and to receive the hostages which had been promised. The arrival of these deputies did not cause the Khan, who was as wily as he was full of resources, to lose his natural presence of mind. He did not wish to carry out the request of the Dzungars, and as a Russian subject he was afraid to do so. Therefore he resolved to lead them to Orenburg, where he was [197] preparing to go on the invitation of Nepluev, who was the new commandant there. He had two reasons for such an action. First of all, he could prove his trust in, and absolute obedience to, the Russian government

1. See the orders given in 1742 to Major Miller who was then sent from Orenburg to Galdan Tsyren, having been charged to work for the freeing of Ablai.

2. See the reports of Prince Irakov, who was with the Middle Horde in 1742, in the archives of the Orenburg Border Commission.

x648 [197 cont.]
in this way, and second, he could make his excuses to Galdan
662 for not having sent him hostages, for he was certain that the
border commander would not permit this.

This was exactly what happened. Abulkhair had scarcely
arrived in Orenburg when Nepluev announced to the Dzungarian
envoys that since the khan of the Little Horde was a subject of
Russia he had no right to negotiate with foreign princes or to give
them hostages. The same was stated for the Middle Horde and
Khan Abul Mahmet. The Dzungars replied that the Kazaks were
[728 constantly making raids in their territories; that it was impossible
651] to have any peace without taking hostages from them; and that
besides they themselves had offered to satisfy this demand just as
the Great Horde, which having become their vassal, not only
gave hostages but also paid a tribute, and because of this there
was perfect peace. The Dzungars were told once more that
Russian subjects could neither make nor carry out such promises
without the consent of their government. Nepluev himself assumed
the burden of preventing any more Kazak raids into
Dzungarian territory. It was then suggested to the deputies that they
return home, but they answered that although they were thoroughly
satisfied with their reception by Nepluev, his words were still
not enough; for knowing the Kazaks intimately, who had deceived
the Russians and the Dzungars alike with their promises of submission,
they could expect nothing but pillage and robbery in the
future, and that therefore they dared not return home without
hostages. Finally, they said openly that they had been sent by
their kungtaidji to Khan Abulkhair and not to the Russian government.

x648 Nepluev and the Khan had considerable trouble in persuading
them to leave with the promises they had been given, but they
finally departed from Orenburg to go directly to their [198]
country. Major Müller, who had been in command of the first
Russian caravan which was pillaged by the Great Horde, was
sent with these deputies, in order to persuade Galdan Tsyren more
firmly that the Kazak hordes were vassals of Russia, and to deliver
a letter to him from Nepluev.

[198 cont.]

x648 All this took place in August, 1742. At this same time Abulkhair, his son Erali, the famous Batyr Djanibek, several sultans and elders, and the common people who were then with him swore an oath of loyalty to Empress Elizabeth. On this occasion, after the feast, a company of grenadiers performed their rifle practice. The Dzungarian envoys had not yet gone, and Abulkhair did not fail to say to them that one could be secure under the protection of the Empress of Russia, who had such troops.

[728] After the departure of the envoys, Nepluev did his best to show Abulkhair that neither the Little nor the Middle Hordes should attack the domains of Galdan Tsyren. Abulkhair seemed to yield to his admonitions and promised that in future his subjects would not renew their former raids.

Similar admonitions were still more needful to Abul Mahmet,
khan of the Middle Horde, who was even closer to the Dzungars
and who had recently felt the cruelty with which they avenged
x648 their injuries. Nepluev was expecting him at Orenburg at this
662 time, and he was only a day's journey from there, but he turned
on his tracks because of rumors spread by Abulkhair that he and
his elders would be held as prisoners when they arrived on Russian
territory. Hoping that the reason for Abul Mahmet's departure
would never be known, Abulkhair asserted his own submission to
Nepluev, which he set up against the supposed obstinacy of his
rival, whom he sought every means of injuring. The motive of
all these schemings of Abulkhair was not only to injure Abul Mahmet
but also to carry out a plan which was quite difficult to accomplish.
He wished to give [199] another son, Chingis, in exchange
for his son Khodja Akhmet, who was then a hostage in Orenburg.
[595] But Chingis was the son of a concubine and not of a khaness, and
Nepluev, who was acting according to the instructions and views of
his predecessors, could not receive Chingis in place of Sultan
Khodja Akhmet. The Khan was so angry at this refusal that he
[622] wished to leave immediately, but he soon calmed down and
agreed to await the decision of the supreme authority on this
matter.

The artful, hypocritical, ambitious, and violent nature of Abulkhair was diametrically opposed to the mildness and goodness

[199 cont.]

x641 of Abul Mahmet. When the interpreter Urazlin arrived, sent 642 him by Nepluev, Abul Mahmet frankly admitted the reason for [redacted] his sudden return from the outskirts of Orenburg and then confessed that fear had made him give his son as hostage to Galdan, after which he swore loyalty to Empress Elizabeth. It was in this same year of 1742 that Barak, the powerful Kazak sultan, swore the oath to the Russian government for the first time, at the same time as Abul Mahmet. He was the leader of a large part of the Middle Horde, and his subjects gave him the title of khan.

[643] As an independent sovereign, he sent deputies to Orenburg after the oath with the request that they be directed to the court, so that they might present his respects to the Empress in person [redacted] and in his name.

[644 431] Several months later he showed how insincere this submission was. His deputies were presented to Elizabeth, allowed to kiss her hand, and were ~~overwhelmed with~~ favors and gifts. He himself was sent, through the government of Orenburg, a letter (1) and a golden saber with an inscription to him. Nepluev, who had never seen Barak and knew that he had had no previous relations with Russia, felt obligated to deliver the marks of favor from the Empress, and with this intention he sent him a messenger, who left with his ambassadors to invite him to come to Orenburg.

[579] [200] The proud sultan was angry because the letter and the saber had not been brought by his own embassy and ordered various rude things said to Nepluev's officer, sending him back without having seen him. The primary cause of the gross insolence can only be attributed to Barak's blind pride, and the secondary one can be considered to be the fact that no other gift except the saber accompanied the letter.

Sultan Ablai, who had languished about a year as a prisoner of the Dzungars, was finally liberated in the spring of 1742, thanks to the efforts of Major Müller, who had been sent to Galdan.

1. This letter was presented March 24, 1743.

[200 cont.]

x648 662 No matter how insincere the Kazaks' protestations of obedience were and how vain their promises to return the prisoners, protect the caravans, etc., at least from the moment they had declared themselves vassals until the year 1743, neither they nor their subjects had dared to make raids openly on the Russian borders or against their fortresses. But in the course of this year, they gave evidence of extraordinary daring, secretly incited by the same Abulkhair, who never ceased to assure the Russian government of his good faith and of his carrying out of all the duties of a faithful subject. Having been met with a formal refusal to accept his illegitimate son Chingis in place of his son Khodja Akhmet, he was [152] so angry that he began to incite the Kazaks to attack the border villages. One can imagine that his subjects were not slow to profit by counsel which was both advantageous to them and in accord [579] with their customs. At once pillaging, murder, and the carrying off of men and beasts began. Groups made up of from 1,000 to 2,000 bandits threw themselves upon sparsely settled villages, which had only just been founded, and carried away across the Ural River everything which could not escape them or which they could not destroy. Even the fortresses and fortified posts were exposed to their attacks. In one day, [201] 82 men were carried off from the small town of Iletsk. We will not enumerate the other robberies and violences which were committed (1), but limit ourselves only to saying that the leader of these furious bands was Derbeshali, a sultan and kinsman of Abulkhair, and that his aim was to go to the fortress of Sarachinsk where Khodja Akhmet was and carry him off, after he grew tired of brigandage. Russian troops prevented him from carrying this plan out, but being busy building forts, they could not stop the other raids. Part of their horses were worn out by labor and part ran away into the country, and this made them a prey to plunderers.

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(1) See the reports of Nepluev to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[201 cont.]

x648 Meanwhile Abulkhair concealed his resentment and never 622 ceased to give assurances to everyone of his devotion to Russia, [152] asserting that all these attacks had been made by Kazaks who were disobeying him. He even went so far as to advise that they be penalized and punished by death (2).

2. See the letter of July, 1743 from Khan Abulkhair to Nepluev.

But when the troops were reinforced along the Russian border, and the Bashkirs profited by the absence of the Kazaks [727] to attack their auls and began to carry off their studs, Abulkhair thought seriously of halting the raids. But this was no longer in his power to do. His people, greedy for plunder, wished to be at peace only when they were alarmed by the advance of Russian troops across the Ural to go into the steppes to punish the [61] brigands. This was only a rumor, spread on purpose, no doubt, by the prudent head of the Orenburg region. Yet this was not where the true intentions of the Russian government lay. It did not wish to lose the regular army in pursuing nomad brigands in the desert wastes, but found it more advantageous to punish them through another people, as restless and as unfaithful as the Kazaks themselves. In a word, the government wished to arm the Kalmuks against them. In the meantime, Nepluev was ordered (3) to [202] try to seize Kazaks of the leading families

3. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of October 31, 1743.

as hostages. Either as a consequence of this order or for some other reason, Abulkhair suddenly delivered a considerable number of Russian subjects who had been taken prisoner by his horde during the most recent raids, and promised to return the others soon.

[728] The year 1744 not only failed to bring peace along the Russian border, but even increased the dangers of those who lived there, for Khan Abulkhair removed his mask and took an open part in the hostilities of his people. His more daring subjects continued

[202 cont.]

x648 [706] their attacks on the borders while he, fearing to come near the Ural River, found a way in the heart of his deserts to avenge himself upon the Russians who had retained his son. First he robbed a caravan going from Astrakhan to Khiva, which had the misfortune to pass through his lands. Later he stopped the journey of Lieutenant Gladyshev, who was going from Orenburg to the Karakalpaks. Nor was he satisfied with robbing the Karakalpak envoys who had come from St. Petersburg and were accompanying Gladyshev, but he even seized the imperial letter which was entrusted to them (1).

[439] 1. It is worthy of note that in his journal Gladyshev speaks of having found an English merchant named Djake [Jack?] with the Little Horde in 1742, and that he bought various articles from him in order to present them to the Karakalpaks as gifts.

x648 721 This conduct strengthened the Russian government in their intent to punish the Kazaks through the Volga Kalmuks, inasmuch as the quarrels of these two peoples and their raids upon each other had become more intense at this time. Consequently, on April 24, 1744, Dunduk Dash, deputy of the Kalmuk khanate was presented with a letter patent commanding him to collect as many armed Kalmuks as possible, who would receive powder and shot at Astrakhan, would march against the Kazaks, and would act under the orders of the governor of Orenburg, Nepluev. By way of recompense, the Kalmuks were promised all the plunder they could take from the Kazaks, except for elders and their children. This letter, out of precaution as much as through confidence in [203] Nepluev, was sent to him directly instead of to the horde, so that he could use it if it were indispensable. It is not known what he thought of such a decisive measure, but this letter remained at Orenburg, and the original is still preserved in the archives of the Border Commission.

[203 cont.]

x648 The order given in this letter was not carried out. On the contrary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave orders that the Kalmuks as well as the Kazaks were to be prevented from crossing the Ural to attack each other.

[726] It must be supposed that the government changed its mind because of the troubles which broke out at that time on the Siberian frontier. The Dzungarian kungtaidji suddenly advanced with his troops toward the Russian border, and his subjects began to threaten the garrisons with war, while the rumor spread that he wished to attack the establishments of Kolyvano-Voskresensk, where he was attracted by the mines of precious metals.

At this time the Dzungars were still formidable, and an attack by them could not be compared to the raids of the Kazaks. Therefore it was indispensable to prepare adequate forces against them. As a result the insolence of the Kazaks was forgotten, and Nepluev received an order (1) to persuade them to make raids against the Dzungars.

It was a difficult task to carry out. Khan Abulkhair still
[186] held resentment against Russia in spite of the indulgence granted for his crimes. Abul Mahmet, khan of the Middle Horde, retreated toward Turkestan in order to avoid Abulkhair's intrigues, and thus practically put an end to his relations with the border authorities. Besides he had less need for the help of Russia than the protection of the kungtaidji of the Dzungars, who held his son as hostage.
[662] Finally, Abul Mahmet sought to be khan at Turkestan, and this city recognized the authority of Galdan Tsyren.

[664] [204] Sultan Barak, who had sworn allegiance to Russia two years earlier, lived far from her border, and fearing the Dzungars more than the Russians, he, like Abul Mahmet, had given his son to Galdan Tsyren as hostage.

[662] The latter sought to attach the sultans and the common people of the Middle Horde to himself by every means. To attain

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1. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of November 3, 1744.

x 648 [204 cont.]
this he used threats and favors by turns, and finally he bought [262] various Russian articles at his own expense which he had sold to the horde, not only without profit but even at a loss.

[186] Although the circumstances were so opposed to the views of the Russian government, yet the hereditary and inveterate hate of the Kazaks for the Dzungars still had enough power to keep them from being entirely indifferent to the hints of the Russians. They preferred to leave their border in peace rather than neglect the opportunity to attack their perpetual enemies, who at this time threatened to reduce them to complete subservience. In spite of their submission to Galdan Tsyren, the khans and sultans feared his domination more than that of the Russians. However, they took part with the people in the preparations for hostilities which were being made. The tribes of the Middle Horde, who were still suffering from the ravages committed against them in 1741, almost under the walls of Orenburg, were the most anxious to help the Russian troops. They were only waiting for the opening of war between them and the Dzungars, and at the first news of the beginning of hostilities they would have thrown themselves upon the settlements of their enemies with all the fury of semi-primitive people. But their hopes were dashed, for the Dzungars, in spite of their threats, left Russia in peace. This was the only way the Kazaks could have avoided the storm which threatened them, for in spite of all the patience with which the Russian government had borne their raids on the border for more than a year, it had been firmly decided to use the troops [205] stationed on the Orenburg line and others to be added to them in order to punish the Kazaks severely.

During the interval, Sultan Khodja Akhmet, who until then had been detained as hostage in the fort at Sarachinsk, was transferred to St. Petersburg. Although Abulkhair could not have been [152] happy to see his son taken further away when he wished him closer, and although he was furiously angry with Nepluev and allowed [721] himself new violence in his relations with him, still his subjects

X 648 [721] [205 cont.] made no raids during the year 1745. Rychkov says (1), according to a Russian Cossack who was with the Little Horde then, that this year as in 1773, Khan Abulkhair incited his subjects to renew their raids on the right bank of the Ural, but on this occasion the people refused to obey. However we cannot accept this report as accurate for the following reasons:

1. The Kazaks were too accustomed to pillage to refuse the proposal of their khan to attack a foreign country, especially when they had not had a chance to test the force of its arms.

2. At that time Abulkhair's attention was directed to Khiva, whose inhabitants, attacked by those of Turkestan, had sent to him to ask help, and who although subjects of Persia wanted to have Sultan Nurali as khan later. He sent Nepluev the letters he had received from Khiva on this subject and asked his advice.

[727] 3. It was at this time that he swore an oath of loyalty in his aoul in the presence of a Russian officer, to Emperor Peter III, successor to Elizabeth, and afterwards liberated 30 prisoners, Russians as well as Kalmuks, who had been taken by his subjects.

[661] 4. He complained about Nepluev to the highest authorities (2), and indicated that except for his personal quarrel with this governor and the displeasure he had felt at the refusal to exchange [206] his son Khodja Akhmet for Chingis, he had no other cause for complaint against Russia nor any harmful intention.

As for the office of khan which had been proposed to the son in Khiva, Nepluev had sought by all possible means to persuade

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1. The continuation of his history of Orenburg.

2. See Abulkhair's letter and Nepluev's rescript of September 17, 1745 in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

[206 cont.]

×648 him in the name of the Empress (1) to make Abulkhair refuse it,

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of October 21, 1745.

but the latter would not have paid any attention to his advice if other circumstances had not prevented him from acceding to the wishes of the Khivans. Nurali received a letter from the son of the Shah of Persia inviting him to come to him. This prince considered the khanate of Khiva his property, being the conqueror. Nurali was on the point of departing for Khiva when his wife, whom he had left in that city, sent word that the Persians were only inviting him there in order to put him to death (2). This news kept

2. Continuation of the history of Orenburg by Rychkov, events of 1745.

him back with his father.

[652] Meanwhile the leaders of the Middle Horde, who had had no relation with Russia for nearly two years, approached the Russian border and renewed their assurances of devotion to the Empress. Abul Mahmet left Turkestan to join his horde and sent a messenger to St. Petersburg to volunteer his services; later he renewed his oath of loyalty. Sultan Barak did likewise. He also sent an embassy to St. Petersburg.

[668] The Kazaks were not yet at peace when disturbances took place in the Volga Kalmuk horde. The rumor spread that a large section wished to leave Russia, on the invitation of Galdan Tsyren, to join their compatriots, the Dzungars. This rumor, which was confirmed in fact 26 years later, was false at this time, but it disturbed the government, especially when the news had been received from the Ural that a large number of Kalmuks had crossed over from the Russian bank to the Kazak side, and [207] when reports from Siberia stated that the Dzungarian
[726 armies had reached the Irtysh /River/ in some places. Subsequent
727] events showed that the passage of the Kalmuks across the Ural

[207 cont.]

x 648 River had no other end but to attack the Kazaks, from whom they [726 took many horses at this time; meanwhile the Dzungarian army 727] returned to its home in peace, and Galdan Tsyren, the leader, died (1746).

This retreat, which was soon followed by the destruction of the Dzungarian state, brought peace to the Siberian frontiers, but it did not cause the Volga Kalmuks to lose their desire to join their compatriots. In order to hinder this project as much as possible, and also to put an end to the pillaging between the Kalmuks and Kazaks, both peoples were strictly forbidden to cross the Ural /River/. Also a regiment of Russian troops was detailed to keep watch there and to show that in the future such infractions would not remain unpunished. The Kalmuk leaders [597] who had taken part in the last raid against the Kazaks were treated as state criminals and punished in [sur] the Volga, in order to serve as an example to their compatriots.

It was hoped that these measures would restore peace between the two enemy hordes, but it was hoped in vain. It is possible that the strict prohibition to crossing the border and the punishment of several violators of this rule, by way of example, did have some effect upon the Kalmuks, but it did not stop the Kazaks, who had become accustomed for two or three years not only to pillaging the Kalmuks with impunity but also the Russians. [713] The building of forts and fortified posts along the lower sectors of the Ural River could only hinder the raids against the Kalmuks but could not stop them. Careful observation indeed suggested to the Kazaks a way of surmounting this obstacle.

[724] The northern part of the Caspian Sea freezes over during the winter, and during the great frosts not only may it be crossed by men and horses, but also the heaviest weights can be transported over the ice without any [208] danger. Profiting by this fact, in February, 1746 the Kazaks moved from their steppes to those of the Kalmuks across the ice, opposite the mouth of the Ural River, and they carried out such an impetuous and unexpected [727] attack below Krasny Yar [Krasnoyarsk] against the Kalmuks that they carried off nearly 700 prisoners of both sexes, killed about

x648 [208 cont.]

[727] 100 men, and led away an enormous number of livestock.

After this celebrated expedition, several small raids took place on the Russian border.

[186 152] Khan Abulkhair was still the cause of these new plunderings. He continued to nurse a deep hatred of Nepluev and was angry because the government had not satisfied his complaints against the border authorities and had not given up his son Khodja Akhmet. For this reason he adopted the course of wreaking his vengeance against all the Russians. Not content with the wrong he had committed against Russia through the raids of his subjects, he took the advice of the latter and abused an interpreter whom Nepluev had sent to him with papers, did not let him out of sight, and detained him for about a year, tormenting him in different ways.

It was still too little. Abulkhair's fury was so blind that he sought to persuade his people to depart from Russia and go south into the sands and the waterless deserts. But the Kazaks knew the [662] advantages of the lands neighboring Russia, and they openly refused to obey him in this case. His rage then fell upon those of his subjects who had opposed his plan to move, and he wrote to the border authorities to arrest these people when they entered fortified localities, as the fomenters of all the disturbances.

[720] While he was thus delivering the innocent to punishment, he was preparing the true brigands for a new attack against the Volga Kalmuks and was only waiting for winter to send them off. In [726] January, 1747, when the ice was strong enough on the Caspian Sea, they left their camps, successfully crossed [209] the ice opposite the mouth of the Ural River, and attacked the uluses of their enemies once again. But this time fortune betrayed them: the Kalmuks had been warned of the attack in time and retreated into the western part of their steppes. They were too far away, and it was too dangerous to pursue them; thus the bandits returned with empty hands. Then, to complete their misfortune, the ice began to melt, the passage across the ice became difficult, and they were obliged to cross the Ural River where the Yaik Cossacks, who had been sent against them, were waiting. The passage through the Russian troops was very costly, for when they had reached their shore, many dead were found there, and a greater number drowned in the river, for the ice had broken. Most of their horses fell into the hands of the Russians.

[209 cont.]

x648 Blinded by his resentment, Abulkhair considered this punish-
[262] ment as a new offense against him. He sought every means to
harm Russia, and requested the protection of Persia.

[584] His son Khodja Akhmet had been transferred from Petersburg to Kazan, where he had fallen in love with the daughter of a Tatar and asked for her hand in marriage. Abuljhair's impertinences had been so frequent and so serious, that one cannot admire enough the patience with which the court at St. Petersburg put up with it. In order to give this khan one more proof of its indulgence, both toward him and toward his people, Tevkelev, who, as we have said, professed the same religion as the Kazaks, was sent to Orenburg in 1747. Furthermore he had spent more than a year among them and had acquired general respect, and he knew their customs and habits and had always been a friend of Abulkhair's. He was charged with placating Abulkhair through his advice, of reconciling him with Governor Nepluev, and of returning his son Khodja Akhmet to him, but in exchange for another son born of a khaness.

Abulkhair's death, which took place soon after, prevents us from [210] saying what the consequences of his dealings with Tevkelev would have been. But at the opening of these conferences, Abulkhair showed himself disposed to reconciliation. During the summer of 1748, he arrived at the fortress of Orsk (1) for an interview with his old friend, and he not only gave as hostage another legitimate son named Aichuvak, who later became a khan, in place of Khodja Akhmet, but he also added the
children of some of his elders. Furthermore he promised to
[728] deliver immediately all the Russian prisoners taken by his subjects,
and promised in writing that the Little Horde would never attack
[662] the borders. When he arrived at the horde, however, he secretly

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(1) This was the name given to the old Orenburg, after the new one was founded on the site which it now occupies.

*648 [210 cont.]
[662] dispatched several trusted Kazaks to propose the marriage of his daughter to the Dzungarian sovereign.

[682] As the Russian government, which was still unaware of this last step taken by Abulkhair, awaited the execution of his promises, it was informed that he had been assassinated.

These are the circumstances which preceded his death. [726] When he returned from the fortress of Orsk to the auls, he assembled a band of armed Kazaks and moved at their head to pillage the unfortunate Karakalpaks, who had already suffered so much from him and his son. He met Sultan Barak, who had long hated him and who envied him the marks of distinction and the prerogatives which had been granted him by the Russian government. He held a grudge against Abulkhair particularly because [579 643] the latter had pillaged the gifts he had been sent by the khan of Khiva. In addition, both claimed rights of sovereignty over the Karakalpaks who had established themselves in the Kazak horde. Both were violent and vindictive, and consequently their meeting could not take place without a quarrel.

Barak, who had more people with him, was the first to open combat. Abulkhair's band, which was less numerous, could not withstand the first encounter and took to flight, and the Khan, who was carried away by the fugitives, was obliged to follow their example. But Shigai [211] the sultan, son of Barak, overtook him and unhorsed him with a blow of his spear. Then Barak himself arrived and assuaged his bloody rage by killing his enemy with his own hands (1).

1. We have drawn this information from Tevkelev's journals, which are preserved in Orenburg in the archives of the Border Commission.

[726] Although the Karakalpaks had suffered much from Abulkhair, his death only brought them a new blow instead of bringing them relief. For Barak, delivered from his rival, did not miss the chance to attack them and pillage them.

[211 cont.]

Y648 This act against a people considered subject to Russia and
[726 the assassination of a khan who was a vassal of the empire made
152] Barak afraid to remain in the regions near the Russian borders,
[166] and for this reason he hastened to move away from the Aral Sea.
Having taken the route toward Turkestan, he seized the towns
of Ikan, Otrar, and Saganak and established his camps between
these towns. He did not reside here long, however, for the
[632] following year (1749), on a visit to a khoja with his two sons,
he was poisoned (2).

2. In the papers preserved in the archives
of the Border Commission in Orenburg it
can be seen that the Kazaks of the Little
[662] Horde who came to the Russian border then
affirmed that Barak had been poisoned by
order of the Dzungarian kungtaidji, who
was blamed by Nurali for the assassination of
his father.

The news of Abulkhair's death could not have caused an unpleasant impression in Russia. During the last years of his life, the conduct of this khan had been such that the [possibility of the] administration of the Little Horde by a new chief aroused greater hope than Abulkhair's death aroused compassion. The dignity of the empire demanded only that the Kazaks, as subjects, should request the Empress to confirm their new khan. It would have been dangerous and useless to annul the choice made according to the ancient customs of the nation and to designate another arbitrarily. But it seemed easy to cause the people to elect one of Abulkhair's sons. With this in mind Nepluev, after [212] consulting Tevkelev, sent to the horde an officer who was charged with contriving the means of making the choice of the people fall upon Sultan Nurali and if he was successful to convince him as well as the elders of the necessity of sending an embassy to Petersburg to request the confirmation of the Empress.

[212 cont.]

x648 This measure was fully successful. Nurali was proclaimed [643] khan in an assembly of the people, and they sent to the court Sultan Djanibek and several distinguished Kazaks, who came to bring this news to Orenburg. They said they had been sent on behalf of the Middle and the Little Hordes, and requested therefore that Khan Nurali be named khan of the two hordes. Several reasons made it impossible to satisfy this request. 1) The Russian officer who presided at the election of Nurali stated that Djanibek Batyr was the only elder of the Middle Horde who had taken part, and that he had always lived near Abulkhair, as had several tens of ordinary Kazaks who had long been separated from the Middle [661 Horde and who also lived among the subjects of Abulkhair. 2) Al- 668] most all the most distinguished sultans of the Middle Horde had either their sons or their closest kinsmen as hostages with the Dzungarian prince, who from that moment had begun to raise claims to sovereignty over the entire horde, and this caused the Russian government grave suspicions as to the obedience of that horde.

On the other hand they did not wish to vex Nurali by presenting a formal refusal to the request of his ambassador, and it [643] was decided to name him khan of the Kazaks without designating any horde. On the day of February 26, 1749, he was sent the imperial letter patent concerning his new office. At the same time another letter patent was sent in the name of the Kazak people to confirm their choice, and Nepluev was enjoined to invite Nurali to come to Orenburg and to proclaim him khan there in an imposing manner.

[662] Before speaking of this ceremony, we will say that [213] Nepluev and Tevkelev were aided in their design to cause Nurali's election by his mother, Khaness Papai, who by her intelligence had won the respect of the entire Little Horde and sometimes had much influence upon its administration. Because she liked the Russians, she had often dissuaded her husband Abulkhair from carrying out plans which were harmful to Russia (1). All this

[562]

1. She possessed a stamp with her name,

Y648 [213 cont.]

[562]

> which was an absolutely extraordinary distinction among a people accustomed to treating their women as slaves, for they are not allowed to take any part in public affairs.

[562] was brought to the knowledge of the court, and when Djanibek returned to the horde, he delivered a letter to her from the [431] Chancellor, accompanied by a piece of precious brocade from the Empress.

[721] At the same time as Nurali's election it was learned in St. Petersburg that the Dzungars, at the instigation of Sultan Barak, wished to attack the Little Horde. Although it was later proved that this rumor was false, measures were nevertheless taken to protect the horde from attack.

+648 At Nepluev's invitation, Khan Nurali arrived near Orenburg 643 in the month of July, 1749, escorted by the most distinguished sultans and elders and many commoners. He stopped on the left bank of the Ural River, where a camp had been prepared in advance in order to make a ceremony of his elevation with éclat. Like his father, he was received at the camp with the firing of cannon and with music. The ceremony began with the reading of the letters patent given to him and to his people. Next he was presented with a robe, a cap, and a saber sent by the court. Finally, the new khan knelt and swore an oath of fealty to Russia upon the Koran.

We will not give the details of this ceremony here, because they were repeated at every new elevation, and we will describe it elsewhere in the article on the customs and ceremonies of the Kazaks (2).

> 2. See Part III [this particular section on customs not translated].

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[664] [214] Having become the khan, Nurali demonstrated that he would not be content with the title but also wished to have the authority. His first request to the Russian government was to

[214 cont.]
x648 obtain auxiliary troops in order to take vengeance against Barak
[664] for the assassination of his father. In his second request he asked
that those Kazaks whom he described as men of evil intent and
harmful to Russia should be arrested on the borders.

Barak or his successors and their followers would have failed
x648 to escape the vengeance of Abulkhair's sons, no doubt, if they had
662 received support in troops from Russia. But Nurali's exploits would
not have ended there. He had planned to use the Russian troops
against all his enemies, and especially against those princes of
the Middle Horde who did not honor him and whom he wished to
annihilate in order to subject their descent lines and tribes to his
brothers, and then he would have made himself sole khan of both
the Middle and the Little Hordes.

The second request, to arrest the Kazaks of evil intent on
the Russian borders, also tended to the same end. He represented
it as a necessary measure for the security of Russia, but ambition
was its true motive.

On the one hand, the execution of this demand would have
been really useful and indispensable for the Russians, for it would
have made it possible to deliver into the hands of justice at least
a part of the brigands, and, by adding to the power of the Khan,
[439] it would have given him new means of acting upon his people.
But on the other hand, it could have been the source of an endless
number of injustices and would have abolished the commercial
exchange which was then just beginning to be established between
the Russians and the Kazaks.

For these reasons, the Khan's first request was formally refused, and it was promised that the second would be considered.

x648 Upon his departure from Orenburg, Nurali, in the name of
[765] his brothers and his mother Papai, voiced the desire to have some
great monument on his father's grave and requested 1,000 workers
for 15 days for this end (1). This wish was nothing more than the

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[114] 1. All the conversations which the khans
had with the border commanders [215] were
written down in journals which have been

x648 [145] [214 cont.]

preserved until today in the archives
of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

x648 765 result [215] of the vanity which is very common among the Kazaks. But since there was nothing harmful in it, Nepluev reported it to the higher authorities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs not only consented to satisfy the wish of Abulkhair's family, but even found that its execution would be useful, if Nurali consented to choose the site of the burial monument in the vicinity of the Russian border and to bring the body of his father there. Then a rule could be established of burying all the khans of the Little Horde there, and a city could be erected near the cemetery which Abulkhair himself had asked to be built. It was resolved, in accordance with these considerations, to yield to Nurali's wish, and a civilian official and an engineer sent from Orenburg announced to him the conditions under which this work had to be carried out. The official was told to invite Nurali to locate the site of the sepulcher three or four days' journey from the Russian border, above all on the Ilek River, and to associate a town with it. The engineer was ordered to examine the site, draw a map of it, and to make the façade of the monument.

This object gave rise to correspondence and conferences which went on for several years. Regulating itself according to circumstances and the conduct of the Khan, the Russian government showed itself sometimes ready and sometimes averse to carrying out his desire. Finally the project was relegated to oblivion, as we shall see below. The reasons for it were strong enough on both sides.

[152 661] Nurali was afraid of establishing himself near the Russian military lines, and his subjects were against it. Thus the first response they gave as the choice of a site was too undecisive. Subsequently it was proposed to lay the foundation of the cemetery and build the town at the mouth of the Emba instead of on the Ilek River, but since this river too was near the border, and the Kazaks also feared to settle there (1), [216] the khan for the second

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1. Second Lieutenant Rigelman, who went

x648 765 [216 cont.]

> with Nurali to make a definitive agreement [216] on the building of the funeral monument, reported that in order to dissuade their khan from approaching the Russian border, the Kazaks reminded him of the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan and assured him that if the former nomadic residents of these cities had not settled at a fixed place their descendants would still be free today.

time was unable to give a positive answer. As for the site where Abulkhair had been buried, it lacked stone, lime, and construction timber. While these parleys were taking place, more important matters came up in the horde, and the desire felt by the Russian government to satisfy the request of Abulkhair's family grew weaker with time and circumstances. The map and the façade of the funeral monument made by the engineer and sent to Nurali are still preserved in the Orenburg archives though never executed.

x648 [567] To the Khan's joy, Empress Elizabeth's cabinet and the border authorities at Orenburg claimed only one service. This was to give up the Russians who were languishing as slaves of the Kazaks, and he was sent a special letter patent to this effect from St. Petersburg. Nurali and his brothers pledged themselves to satisfy this most just request, but to do so was beyond the limits of their weak power, and the promise was without effect, like the hundreds or even thousands of similar demands and obligations repeated to this day by the border commanders. Nurali had scarcely returned to the *auls* from Orenburg when he received [584 583] ambassadors from the Djungarian *kungtaidji*, who had come in accordance with the proposal made by his father before his death to ask for his sister in marriage for their sovereign, and [662 584] promised him the town of Turkestan in lieu of *kalym* /bride price/. It was difficult for him to form this alliance while

[216 cont.]

X 648 recognizing the suzerainty of Russia, but it was even more difficult to refuse a liaison by marriage with a sovereign who was so dreaded by Nurali's enemies, and especially to miss the chance of taking possession of Turkestan without bloodshed, for [217] his ancestors had reigned there and were buried there, and Abulkhair himself had lived there until he was driven out by the Dzungars.

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Balanced between fear and hope, Nurali did not know what to decide. The sultans and elders advised him to send his sister to the kungtaidji without delay and then, relying on his help, to go to take revenge on Barak and his subjects for his father's death. This advice accorded perfectly with his wishes, but he did not see that they were contrary to the interests of Russia, which could punish him for his disloyalty.

Besides this, at that time there was a Russian officer with him who had accompanied him from Orenburg. In the presence of such a witness, he could not act except in secret, and for this reason he dismissed the Dzungarian ambassadors without the girl, but he promised to send her soon. When Nepluev asked the reason for this embassy, Nurali claimed it had come from Galdan Tsyren's son with proposals of peace and friendship. He also pretended that the Dzungars had proposed to him the exchange of the Kazak prisoners they had in their power for Volga Kalmuks, a large number of whom were slaves of the Little Horde. His knavery was of no avail for the Russian officer (1) who was then with the horde reported matters as they really were to the border authorities, and these reported them to the higher authorities, who found that an alliance by marriage between the Dzungarian and Kazak sovereigns could bring great harm to Russia. There had even been an example of this already, when Aiuka, khan of the Volga Kalmuk horde, had married Darma Bala, kinswoman of

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1. See Captain Iakovlev's journal and reports in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

[217 cont.]

x648 the Dzungarian kungtaidji. She had incited his son Sanzhip to
584 depart for Dzungaria with 15,000 tents in 1701. If the
662 Dzungars, who had already subjugated the Great Horde long since and had hostages from all the sultans of the Middle Horde, also were united with the Little Horde through the alliance of their sovereigns, then the entire population of the lands [218] beginning from the western territories of China of that time until the northern part of the Caspian Sea could be put in movement at the first signal of one single chief, and the entire length of the Russian border, from the upper Irtysh all the way to the mouth of the Ural River, could be exposed to attack on the same day.

In order to avert this danger, it was indispensable for the Russian government to forbid Nurali to become the brother-in-law of the Dzungarian kungtaidji, and it was ordered that all proper measures be taken to prevent this alliance. It was regarded as most efficacious to use the counsels of a man respected by the Khan and known to all the Little Horde, namely Tevkelev. To this end he was sent to Orenburg expressly to have a conference with Nurali. In order to support the advice, favors, and promises with which Tevkelev was to load the Khan, Nepluev was commanded to begin the funeral monument for Abulkhair immediately and to add residences for the khans in order to please Nurali and his brothers. It was likewise decided to accept the illegitimate Chingis as hostage in place of the khan's legitimate brother (1), a thing which had often been refused to Abulkhair.

1. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of November 2, 1749 and August 13, 1750.

During the interval, Nurali was dismayed by the rumor which
[152] was spread that if the Dzungarian kungtaidji had a son by his sister, he would exterminate all the Kazak chiefs and their descendants in order to give that son the position of sole khan of all the Kazaks.

x648 The death of Abulkhair's daughter destined for the chief of the Dzungars, which took place in 1750, reassured Russia.

x 249 [218 cont.]
The news of her death arrived in Orenburg before Tevkelev had been able to have a conference with Nurali (2), and prevented the latter from being told of the orders given to begin [219] his father's tomb immediately and the intention to receive Chingis as hostage. These measures had become unnecessary in a time of calm.

[661] Being in ignorance of the indulgent disposition of the government and in order to conform to previous demands, Nurali in 1749 presented his legitimate brother Adil as hostage to replace Sultan Aichuvak, and in 1750 he exchanged this brother for his own son Pirali, who was only five years old.

[662] At this time Sultan Batyr, the father of Kaip, then khan of Khiva, and the son of the Kaip who had been the sultan of the Kazaks, opened relations with the authorities in Orenburg. As was already said above, his father Kaip had written in 1718 to Peter the Great. Batyr had inherited his father's hatred for Abulkhair and had never recognized his authority, and for this reason had had no relations with Russia for a long time. But when a part of the Little Horde proclaimed him khan, the equal of Nurali, and when his son had become the sovereign of Khiva, he had still less respect for Abulkhair's son and hoped that Russia would have the same consideration for him as for his rival.

However, at the beginning of his relations with Orenburg, he had not decided to request that he be recognized as khan. In

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[#39] 2. While waiting for Tevkelev, Nepleuv had delegated an officer interpreter to Nurali and his mother to advise them and to acquire information about the Dzungarian ambassadors. This interpreter was ordered to present to the Khan, as a rare thing, 10 chetverts of flour and as much [219] groats. The principal aim of this gift was to induce the Kazaks to take wheat from the Russians in exchange for their merchandise.

X [219 cont.] In
649 1750 he only requested the Orenburg authorities, through his [439] envoys, that the Russian caravans proceeding to Khiva and the dominion of Bukhara should pass through his pasture lands, and he undertook to escort them and defend them. In order to give this proposal greater force, his son, Khan Kaip, sent a deputy charged with bearing assurances of peace and amity and also the request that the caravans be sent by way of the auls of his father. This wish of Batyr and his son could not be fulfilled because it tended to do an obvious wrong to Nurali, who in his capacity as a vassal of Russia and a khan recognized by her was [220] in charge of protecting Russian trade in the steppes between the Ural River and the Syr [Darya] and had already undertaken this task.

It is true that one could scarcely count upon his efforts, but the Sultan Batyr's promises presented still less security in view of his distance from the Russian border. For this reason he was answered that the obligation of escorting the caravans across the lands of the Kazak Little Horde was under the jurisdiction of Nurali, that he could help in this, and finally that he was to live on good terms with Nurali if he wished to enjoy Russian protection.

The envoy from Khiva received a reply from Nepluev which contained nothing decisive but was, nevertheless, very honest.

These measures, without regard to their justice, were based on the benefits to Russia. She had to protect and even augment the power of the khans she had installed or recognized, for their weakness would not produce or even promise any use for her. At that time the Kazak hordes had been numbered among her subjects for nearly 20 years. For nearly 20 years she had been losing money in keeping them peaceful, presenting gifts to the sultans and elders, building forts and maintaining troops. Yet, in spite of all these [721] sacrifices, she had been unable during this interval to protect her borders from pillage, nor even to find a way of rescuing her [567] native subjects from the fetters of a people who had submitted to Russia voluntarily. Abulkhair's excuses as to his lack of power, [662] expressed rather rarely because of his vanity, were regarded as subterfuges, as much because of his knavish character as of his

[220 cont.]

x 648 open disobedience. Nurali's declarations and his oft repeated re-
[662] quests to use reprisals on the borders by seizing bandits or their kinsmen were more sincere than was believed at the beginning, and later they were taken into consideration. They were also confirmed by the opinion of Tevkelev, who had had experience in relations with the Asiatics, as well as the replies of several sultans who had been requested, like the Khan, with no success over [221] several years, to give up their Russian prisoners.
[721] There were also the examples of Khiva, the land of Bukhara, and other powerful states who regarded reprisals (baranta) as indispensable in order to restrain a nomadic people.

Convinced by its experience and seeing that indulgent patience was far from lessening the temerity of the Kazaks, but
[683 indeed increased it, the Russian government finally decided to
685] behave toward this people in the same manner as did all their other neighbors. Thus the border authorities were given orders (1) that in case of theft or the carrying off of persons they should require the Khan to release at once what was missing, and if he refused satisfaction or advised that reprisals be taken, they should
[681] take advantage of the first favorable opportunity to seize one of the kinsmen of the guilty person, or even any individual of his tribe (assuming that the guilty person himself did not show himself to the Russians again), and to hold this person under careful guard until the prisoner or the stolen objects should be returned.

This measure was not in harmony with the principles of equity customary among civilized peoples, but it was indispensable with the nomad brigands.

During this same period, in order to oblige Nurali to carry out the requests of the Russian government and to furnish him means of paying for the services his subjects rendered to Russia without injury to himself, he was assigned an annual stipend.
[431] At the same time a rule was set to send various gifts of fixed amounts in the name of the border government. But it was

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1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of November 27, 1749.

x648 [221 cont.]
[431] ordered that these stipends were not to start being paid until he had returned all the Russian prisoners and the Volga Kalmuks, or at least most of them. It was supposed that this would be carried out soon, but it turned out completely otherwise, and Nurali did not receive his stipends until five years after they had been assigned to him.

[721] [222] At the beginning of 1750, Sultan Aichuvak, brother of the Khan, devised a plan, together with his father's friends, Batyr Djanibek, and a numerous band, composed partly of people of the Middle Horde but mostly made up of members of the Little Horde, to attack a people who lived near the Aral Sea and who were called the Aral people. These people were few in number and unaccustomed to war. One can easily guess that [727] Aichuvak and his accomplices were successful in their enterprise and that they returned home with a large number of prisoners, studs of strange horses, and with many objects of different kinds which they had seized. But the Aral people were subjects of the khan of Khiva, who did not care to let the damage done to them [648] pass without amends. Consequently he took into custody a large number of Nurali's subjects who had come to trade at the market in Khiva, and even his ambassador was arrested. There was no other way of releasing them than to return to the Aral people at least part of what they had lost, and especially the prisoners.

[729] Shortly after this, Sultan Erali, following the example of his brother, attacked the Karakalpaks. But the troops which served as his army were too few, and in place of the booty he hoped for, he was taken prisoner and most of his companions were killed.

After having freed him, at the end of several months, Nurali arrived in Orenburg to see Nepluev and Tevkelev, but his journey did not have any important consequence.

[169] Intercourse between the Middle Horde and Russia rarely took place at that time. Their khan, Abul Mahmet, had retreated [643] to Turkestan where he lived until his death without being heard from; and Barak, as we have said, had been imprisoned /poisoned/. The successors to their power had not yet made the

[222 cont.]
x648 acquaintance of the Russians. Sultan Kuchak, who had been
[643] proclaimed khan by several tribes, had not been confirmed by
Russia and had not even sought her protection. The good graces
of the Dzungarian prince were more necessary to him, as they
were to all [223] the sultans of the Middle Horde. Only Ablai
[642] failed to renounce the protection of Russia, in spite of his secret
relations with the Dzungars, for most of his subjects lived near
the Russian border, and he sensed how useful it was to him to
remain on good terms with Russia.

[439] Since he had to look out for the advantages of trade with
the Russians in addition to the interests of his security, he requested that a market be opened in the fort of Troitsk, saying
that Orenburg was too far away for him and particularly for most
of his subjects to go there.

Batyr Djanibek, who had moved away from Orenburg after *Abulkhair's death, asked for the same thing. The fulfillment of* this request was equally advantageous to the Russian government, giving it greater means of surveillance over the Great Horde, and consequently a trade market was opened at Troitsk in 1750.

Before his death Galdan Tsyren had become reconciled with
the Kazaks and seemed to wish to attach them to him more by
kindness and good deeds than by terror. But his son had an entirely
[721] different view of the matter and renewed his attacks. The
Middle Horde especially suffered greatly in 1751 near the Ulu
[166 Mountains. The considerable loss of men taken prisoner by the
727] Dzungars made it necessary for most of this horde to come closer
to the Russian border and almost to mix with the Little Horde,
after reaching the Ori River and the Mugodzhar Hills.

[439] In 1752 Russia's relations with Nurali Khan had less to do
with Kazak matters than with the expansion of caravan trade with
Khiva, the dominion of Bukhara, and Tashkent, and across these
lands with the other states of Central Asia, even to the Indies,
which were regarded as the source of all riches. Since the Indies
were not far from the Kazak steppes, it was wished to make the
first step across this country to reach that [224] region. This is
why Nurali's help, if he were to give it in good faith, would have
been of great importance to Russia in connection with trade.

[224 cont.]

×648 With this in mind he was granted several favors, including [361] the fact that his youngest son, aged three, was accepted as hostage in place of his eldest, Sultan Pirali.

[361] To this same end there was a return to the thought expressed by Empress Anna in her ukase to Kirilov, dated February 11, 1736, an idea which was in accord with what we mentioned earlier concerning Abulkhair's wish, to build a city at the mouth of the Syr Darya and to begin its population with criminals condemned to exile. But all these projects were unsuccessful.

×648 The hatred of the Khans Abulkhair and Kaip, which had 578 been known since the beginning of the 17th century, was not extinguished by their death, but was left as a heritage to their children and their children's children. We shall see in the course of this work that it has not only not been entirely eliminated today, but even has not weakened among the principal descendants of these two chiefs. But before speaking of these contemporaries, *we shall describe the history of their ancestors. The constancy* with which these two families have hated each other and pursued each other for a hundred years merits special attention. This hatred may go back even farther, perhaps, for we do not know what sentiments existed between Abulkhair's father and Kaip's father.

×648 We have already said that Sultan Batyr, son of Kaip, and his son, the khan of Khiva, had sent ambassadors to Orenburg for the first time in 1650/1750/. Although their proposals were not accepted, being prejudicial to Khan Nurali, who was recognized by Russia, nevertheless the arrival of Batyr's envoys and their intentions of allying themselves with the Russians gave birth to suspicions in Nurali's heart and reignited his hereditary hatred for Batyr. Furthermore he could not view with composure the fact that in spite of the refusal of the [225] Russian government to send all the caravans in general across Batyr's pasture lands, his son, the khan of Khiva, had forbidden his subjects to go from Khiva to Orenburg and to return by a route other than [643 661 651] that of the lands of his father. This measure diminished Nurali's influence over trade and the revenues which he took in, like all the Kazak khans, based on the notion of a right over merchandise passing through their steppes.

[225 cont.]

x648 In 1753 the angry Nurali directed that the first caravan
[579 from Khiva which went to Russia or returned from there was to be
439] pillaged. His orders were carried out. At once Kazaks of the
Alimul descent line of the Karakitin tribe pillaged many Khivan
and Turkomen merchants on the Sagiz, who were coming with
goods under the escort of Kazaks of the same Alimul descent line
but of the Chiklin tribe. Nepluev sent a civil official to the
horde expressly to persuade the Khan to call the bandits to account,
[662 deprive them of the goods, and return them to their owners.
681] Nurali replied decisively that the pillage had taken place by his
order because Sultan Batyr, not content with disobeying him, was
also seeking to arouse the Middle Horde against him, and that
Batyr in agreement with his son was requiring the Khiva caravans
to travel only by way of his own auls. Moreover, in order to
justify himself and with the aim of arousing Russia against Khiva,
he wrote to Orenburg that Kaip and Barak (or Batyr) were preparing
to attack the Russian border, and in that case he advised that the
land of Khiva be conquered and promised to take it in a few days
if he were sent the assistance of 10,000 Russian troops with
artillery.

[579 His goal in proposing his services was easy to guess, and
577] thus Nepluev and Tevkelev did not listen to his insinuations but
repeated the demand for the return of the stolen merchandise of
the robbed caravan and reproached him for conduct unbecoming
to a khan. Their entreaties would have been useless if the
interpreter charged with delivering them had not caused Nurali to
hope, on instruction from Nepluev, that if he gave satisfaction
to the [226] merchants he would gain the right to request the
stipend from the government which had been assigned to him but
had not been given all this time. This produced a greater effect
than all the advice, and he busied himself at once with making
his subjects give up the goods.

[661] Kaip, the khan of Khiva, acted quite differently. While
the Russian government was causing the restitution to his subjects
of what they had lost, this khan had a Russian caravan halted
in Khiva, and in spite of the demands of the Orenburg authorities,

X 648 [226 cont.]
[661] he did not release it until nearly a year had passed. When this
caravan returned to Orenburg in 1754, an envoy of Kaip himself
[662] accompanied it as well as a Russian officer who had been in Khiva. The latter declared that he had met Sultan Erali on his way and that this prince had begged him to report to Nepluev that he and his brothers were ready to attack Khiva to avenge the insults of Sultan Batyr and his son, and that he planned to join the discontented subjects of Kaip, to put him to death, to seize his place, and to release the Russian prisoners who were then in Khiva. He asked only that in case he were unsuccessful Russia would promise to ransom him if he himself were taken.

To everyone's great astonishment the envoy from Khiva, instead of carrying out his master's orders, complained to the Russian government of the avidity and injustices of the Khan. He described the evils he made the people suffer, and in the name of all the Uzbeks, the people [race] to whom he belonged, he demanded help in order to dethrone the Khan.

Although this demand provided Russia with an opportunity to punish the Khivans for their perfidy and their prince for his insolence the year before in detaining a caravan from Orenburg, nevertheless the government then thought the conquest of Khiva more difficult than it was useful. Moreover Erali's pledge provided hope for acquiring some influence over this land without bloodshed. Consequently the government refused to acquiesce to the proposal of the Khivan envoy, who [227] had solicited help in overthrowing Kaip, but did not forbid him to ask help from the Kazak princes (1). Khan Nurali and Sultan Erali were permitted to march against Khiva and to seize it if luck was on their side. Also it was decided to grant Erali his ransom if he happened to be captured on this expedition.

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Russia would certainly have gained an enormous advantage
439] commercially if Abulkhair's sons had carried out their plan and

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1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of April 2, 1755.

x 648 [227 cont.]
had been successful in seizing Khiva. But unfortunately they did [721 not even start toward the realization of the end proposed by Erali. 439] The reason for this inaction was no doubt the insufficiency of the troops they could have opposed to the forces of Kaip and his father together.

[721] Prince Maksiutov, the captain sent at that time from Orenburg to the Little Horde, wrote in his reports that Nurali Khan and his brothers were preparing to march against Khiva and con- [772 voked an assembly of the people who approved of the plan. But 783] when a khoja, who as a kind of saint had been asked for a blessing for the success of the expedition, forbade them to make war against the Khivans, they obeyed him. The Middle Horde then [722] suffered from the last exertions of the Dzungars. In 1754 they found themselves so harassed by the latter that a large number of Kazaks of this horde asked the government to allow them to pass their women and children over the Russian lines if they could not be allowed this permission themselves. Some of them went so far as to ask that they be granted lands on the border, where they promised to engage in agriculture and to build villages.

Such a guard would have been too unsafe, and it would even have been dangerous to allow the wives and children of the Kazaks to enter the forts. Thus the governor of Siberia was directed to pay no attention to [228] such demands (1). Shortly after this, part of the Middle Horde once more asked to be received under the protection of the ~~forts.~~ This time, because of the remonstrances of Nepluev and also because it wished to treat the Kazaks favorably, the government allowed them to live as nomads near the Uisk line and directed that in case they [661] were attacked they were to be allowed to cross within the Russian border, but with hostages taken from them to guarantee their peacefulness.

This favor, which was granted them at the end of 1756,

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1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 317, 1755.

[228 cont.]

x648 became unnecessary (2) because by then the Dzungars, the most terrible enemies of the Kazaks, had been almost destroyed. These were those same Dzungars who, under the reign of their kungtaidjis, Batur and Galdan Tsyren, had not only been seen to spread terror through the weak principalities of Central Asia, but also to arouse justifiable alarm in the emperors of Russia and China.

With an astonishing speed this people passed from the zenith of its power to absolute ruin. In 1745 under the commands of Galdan Tsyren it was still able to cause an important revolution in all of Central Asia. Under Galdan's sons, whose genius did not approach that of their father, this people imperceptibly lost all its energy, but its neighbors continued to fear it. In 1756 it had already been vanquished and dispersed, and so many had been annihilated that its lands became almost completely deserted. x648

578 669 The principal causes of the fall of the Dzungarian empire were, as is known, the discord which took place among its last chiefs and the civil wars provoked by Amursan's ambition, which caused the ruin of the entire nation. Having quarreled with Davatsi, who disputed his authority, in 1754 he acknowledged himself a subject of China and begged this empire for auxiliary troops against Davatsi. Emperor Ch'ien Lung received him most graciously and [229] gave him a large army, which was given secret orders to accompany him not to assure him supreme power but to overthrow the Dzungars, who had so often disquieted the Chinese government. The intentions of the Emperor were realized, and in 1756 the ravaged lands of Dzungaria were annexed to China (1).

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2. Ukase of the Senate of October 24, 1756.

1. See the extracts from the Chinese work entitled Hsi Yu Wen Chien Lu, in /E.F./ Timkovskii's Journey to China [Puteshestvie v Kitai chrez Mongoliiu v 1820 i 21 gg. (Journey to China through Mongolia in 1820 and 1821)], Vol. I, p. 155.

[229 cont.]

x648 Sultan Ablai, who was as wise as he was enterprising, did [662 not fail to profit from the quarrels of the Dzungarian princes, 729] and he worked to prolong them, realizing the usefulness, both for his own security and that of the Kazaks on the outside, of weakening and parceling out their old enemies. To this end, he not only gave asylum to Amursan (2) and Lobacha (another Dzungarian prince) in his village but went out to fight for them (3) and helped them to destroy their own compatriots. When matters took a new turn, and the Chinese army won decisive victories over the Dzungars, Ablai joined the conquerors. But this change of allies did not cause him to change his goal, and he continued to exterminate his hateful neighbors as an ally of the Chinese, just as he had killed them when he was allied to the partisans of Amursan. But when Dzungaria had been completely vanquished, and the Chinese army, in order to complete its occupation, began to approach the Kazak steppes, Ablai came to meet them and acknowledged himself a vassal of the Emperor.

From this time on (1756) the vanity of the Chinese led them to include Ablai's pasture lands among their states, and he was immediately sent by Ch'ien Lung (4) a [230] letter patent

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2. Amursan had broken away from China and wandered among the Kazak hordes. Later he sought refuge in Russia, where he died.

3. See the reports of Captain Iakovlev, who was then with the Middle Horde and who accompanied Ablai for some time as he followed Amursan and Lobacha in order to fight the Dzungars.

4. This is recorded by the Chinese who wrote the book Hsi Yu Wen Chien Lu, and we find an extract of it in Timkovskii, op. cit., I, p. 253.

[230 cont.]
x 648 of prince and a calendar [sic] in which the conditions were stated
by which he was recognized as a vassal.

[726] While Ablai and the weak sultans of the Middle Horde, who
were his partisans, ravaged Dzungaria with their subjects, the
Little Horde was fighting its coreligionists, the Bashkirs. An
[721] offense committed by the former produced such a hatred between
the two peoples that it has not been entirely eliminated today.
In order to describe this event better, we will present a picture
of the condition of the Bashkir country at this time.

[669] This people, which had been under Russian domination since
the reign of Ivan the Terrible, had often raised the standard of
revolt and had been punished for so doing. The misfortunes
which caused the revolt of 1735 had scarcely ended in 1742.
In spite of the difficult circumstances of this land, which for
those seven years had had to mourn the loss and the sufferings
of many of its inhabitants, the survivors did not remain quiet for
long. On May 18, 1755 they revolted once more. Mutiny
broke loose at once and began with the massacre of all the Russians
to be found in the country, not only on the same day but almost
at the same hour. This revolt was incited by the letters of a
[793 mullah named Batyr Shah, who reproached the Moslem faithful
721] for obeying Christians and implored every believer in God and
Mohammed to take arms, assuring them that those who died
[775] in this holy dispute would receive the eternal rewards promised
by the Koran. Similar letters were also sent to the Kazan Tatars
[726] and the Kazak hordes. The latter took advantage of the
occasion and began at once to make raids across the Russian
borders under the pretext of supporting the Bashkirs.

The position of the Orenburg line then became extremely critical. It extended over a length of more than 1,000 versts; it was separated from the settlements in the interior and was surrounded by the Bashkirs in the north and [231] the Kazaks in the south. Most of the so-called fortresses and fortified posts had no fortifications at all. The garrisons were weak. In a word, at the slightest reverse all the residents along the border could perish, excepting those defending the fortress of Orenburg.

[231 cont.]
x 648 Fortunately this region was then governed by Nepluev. His
[643 presence of mind and his actions averted the storm which
722] menaced it. He immediately united the troops under his command at the points where defense was most necessary. He had reinforcements brought in from Kazan and also drew them from the Don Cossacks and from the khan of the Volga Kalmuks. While waiting, he armed the Meshcheriaks and Teptiars against the Bashkirs. He promised a complete pardon to those rebels who showed signs of repentance, and offered large pecuniary rewards for the heads of Batyr Shah and his principal accomplices. He sent declarations in the Tatar language to the Kazak hordes in the name of the akhun of Orenburg, in which this senior member of the Moslem clergy expressed his approbation of the Bashkir revolt but at the same time his fear that if they came to make themselves independent of Russia they might attack the Kazaks and finish by conquering them.

[726] When the auxiliary troops had entered the land of the
Bashkirs, the latter were not powerful enough to resist the Russians, Kalmuks, Teptiars, and Meshcheriaks together, and they fled across the Ural River with their wives and children, numbering more than 50,000 persons. A large number perished crossing the
[727 river, and the others concealed themselves within the hordes.
662] Those who remained in their settlements asked pardon, but their repentance was not sincere, and they were waiting for a new revolt. To avert this, and above all to prevent the Bashkirs from joining the Kazaks, Nepluev was obliged to take a cruel measure, but one which the times and circumstances made absolutely necessary.

x 648 He felt that it was necessary, for the security of the [232]
662 Orenburg line, to cause an irreconcilable hatred between the
661 Bashkirs and the Kazaks, for without this a reunion between them was always possible, and the inevitable result of such an alliance would be the ruin of all the Russian establishments on the Ural River. To achieve this end, he decided to place in the power of the Kazaks the wives and children of the Bashkirs who had left Russia to seek refuge among the Kazaks. Elizabeth's ministry had wished to protect the Russian border by a method more consistent with the views of kindness and humanity, but it was necessary to yield to

[232 cont.]
x 648 circumstances, and Nepluev, who had finally received the orders
662 he had requested for the execution of his plan, at once informed
661 the Khan, the Kazak sultans, and the most distinguished elders that as a reward for their faithfulness and devotion to Russia, the Empress was presenting them, as a gift, all the wives and daughters of the Bashkirs who were among them, on condition that the men be surrendered on the line, or at least driven out of the Kazak hordes. In addition, other rewards were promised for the extradition of the deserters.

[721
726] The voluptuous Kazaks hastened to seize the women who were being abandoned to them. The Bashkirs wished to defend their families, but their number was toosmall and they could not resist. Some of them perished on the spot, others were surrendered to the Russians, and still others returned by themselves to their homes, waiting impatiently for the time to carry out their firm resolve to avenge this offense perpetrated by the Kazaks.

Rage and jealousy immediately aroused bands of avengers among the Bashkirs, who requested permission from the government to cross the Ural. Nepluev replied that the Empress did not grant permission to cross the border, but in secret he gave orders to the commanders of the forts and military posts to pay no attention to the people who crossed without permission into the steppes beyond the [233] Ural. Taking advantage of the pretended negligence of the guards, whole bands of Bashkirs crossed the Ural, fell upon the hordes, and began to pillage and massacre and to take away women and children.

Khan Nurali complained; he received the reply from Orenburg that the Kazaks had brought all these misfortunes upon their own heads by receiving the faithless deserters in their villages, and that all the Bashkirs were going to hasten to make similar exploits. Then Nurali's subjects took arms and began to repulse the attacks of their enemies, which the latter repeated constantly. The two people continued to destroy each other in this manner until Nepluev decided that it was fitting to call a halt to these disturbances. It was then strictly forbidden to the Bashkirs to cross the Ural, and it was suggested to the Kazaks that they retreat to

[233 cont.]

*648 [662 661] the southern region of that river for their own safety. At the same time the border commanders were directed not to permit its crossing from either side, and guards were reinforced for this end.

[727 728] The bloodshed diminished, but the hatred between the two peoples has continued to this day. Mutual reprisals from time to time have helped to maintain it.

[661] These results could cause the Russian government to be accused of cruelty. But let us examine the circumstances: if one takes a glance at the geographical position of the military line and the region of Orenburg, one can see what sorts of people occupy it and its outlying areas. On the other hand, if one notes the small number of troops covering the Russian border, it will be granted that the measure taken by Nepluev was the only one which could save the region he governed, and perhaps most of the southeast part of Russia. The Kazaks who lived beyond the military line would not have been the only supporters of the Bashkirs. They could have joined the Tatars of Kazan, Orenburg, Simbirsk, and Penza, who lived in the interior of the empire, and even the Teptiars and Meshcheriaks, who because of the wise measures of the [234] Orenburg authorities served to punish the rebels instead [771] of revolting. All these peoples profess the same religion, and with all of them recognizing Mohammed and seeing the Christians only as infidels (kashfyr /sic/), what could one expect from their joining together?

If these matters are considered impartially, one sees that Russia had to decide to sacrifice either the Bashkirs or the Russians. If she sacrificed the former in order to save the latter, this conduct cannot be deserving of any blame.

[661] Khan Nurali as well as his two brothers, Erali and Aichuvak, did much to help the Orenburg authorities find the Bashkirs who had fled beyond the Ural River and to bring them back to the borders. In order to please Russia they not only fought the deserters, but also those Kazaks who defended them. Although this zeal was not entirely disinterested, still, since it was accompanied by other signs of being favorably disposed, the

[234 cont.]
x648 government took notice of it and gave orders, by way of reward (1),

> 1. By an ukase of August 25, 1755, the Khan was given a letter patent on this subject.

to begin to give Nurali the stipend which he had been assigned five years before and which had been withheld because he had not delivered the Russian prisoners. Later, as a favor, he was also granted permission to send kinsmen or the most distinguished of the sultans or elders to the court every two or three years.
[431 These trips entailed, on the one hand, advantages and gifts to
661] the Khan and his deputies, and on the other hand, they were useful to the government. During their stay at court, the envoys could serve as hostages, and as they became acquainted with the laws, customs, and habits of Russia during this sojourn, it was possible that they might become accustomed to it and spread information within the horde about the Europeans.

[721 The hatred and mutual hostility between the Bashkirs and
726] the Kazaks saved many Russians from certain destruction by preventing their alliance. However this did not assure [235] peace on the border. The Bashkirs were burning with a desire for vengeance, and in spite of being forbidden to cross the Ural, they never ceased to raid the pastures of their enemies and to ruin them. Likewise the Kazaks never stopped pursuing and punishing these fiery enemies to the very center of their land. Once they had entered this region across the border, they fought the guards and pillaged the Russian settlements on their return, and these events were frequent. Although the Khan and sultans had good
y648 intentions, they could not calm their subjects. They frankly
578 admitted their lack of power and wrote that the common people even suspected them of maintaining secret liaisons with the Orenburg authorities in order to subject all the hordes to Russia (1).

> 1. Sultan Aichuvak in his zeal for Russia wrote to Nepluev as early as 1754 that the ordinary Kazaks suspected him and the

x648 [235 cont.]
[578]

> Khan of having secret relations with the Orenburg authorities. As a result, in order not to confirm the opinions of his subjects on this idea, he asked that when he was sent reprimands for them in letters coming from Orenburg, they be sent for him also. Concerning known brigands, he said he could make them known in secret but could not deliver them, leaving the power of sending troops against them to the Russian government.

As a result the government resolved to increase Nurali's power and at the same time to devise a plan for punishing the Kazaks in such a way that they would feel at least once the power and the force of the empire. An order had already been given to draw a detailed map of the western part of the Kazak steppe, and the best means were already being sought for carrying on a campaign beyond the Ural. Everything foretold a terrible calamity for the Little Horde (2), when the Seven Years War opened between Russia and Prussia, and it was averted.

[646] Nevertheless there was a great national assembly in the Little Horde in 1756, no doubt with the aim of discussing ways of averting the danger menacing them, and it opposed not only the [728] demand of the Khan and his brothers to return the Russian prisoners and the Bashkir deserters, [236] but also undertook to help them. The Sultans Erali and Aichuvak pursued the interests of Russia with great warmth on this occasion.

x648 At the beginning of 1757, Dunduk Dashi, deputy of the khan 662 of the Volga Kalmuks, warned the governor of Astrakhan that all 721 the Kazaks were intending to enter the Turkish possessions on the Kuban and that they had already requested permission from the Ottoman Porte through an embassy sent for this purpose. This news was difficult to believe. Nevertheless prudence demanded

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2. See the ukase of June 10, 1756.

[236 cont.]

x 648 662 721 that its probability be considered and also the basis for it. From information received about the Little Horde from an officer (1) who was sent there for the purpose, it was found out that the Kazaks had had no thought of the Kuban, but that Dunduk Dashi and two other Kalmuk princes had themselves sent confidential agents to Khan Nurali to warn him that the Crimean Tatars intended to attack Russia and to invite him to give them help, as the Kalmuks had themselves decided to do. Nurali had not rejected this proposal, but he had asked that he be warned of the moment when the Tatars would carry out their plan.

x 648 661 662 This duplicity on the part of Dunduk Dashi and his Kalmuk subjects' eternal hatred of the Kazaks caused the presumption that his real aim was to decide Nurali to march against the Russians and to profit by the absence of a large part of the Little Horde to attack its defenseless auls.

However this is only a presumption, and events did not prove that it was true. For neither the Crimean Tatars nor the Kazaks attacked Russia in 1757, and consequently the Volga Kalmuks had no occasion to help the first nor to destroy the second.

x 648 [237] The behavior of the Middle Horde in 1758 disturbed the Russian government more than the rumors of Nurali's alliance with the Crimean khan. Part of this horde had invaded the [727] borders and taken the liberty of carrying off 220 Tatars of the Kuznetsk district as prisoners, people known by the name of Dvoedantsy (this name means "those who pay double tribute, or two tributes"). The Russians and the Dzungars levied tribute on these people at the same time. Another part of the Middle Horde, and this was the largest part, having seized the lands of the Dzungars who had been driven from their country, were coming closer to China and seemed too devoted to that empire.

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1. See Prince Urakov's reports of 1757 in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

[237 cont.]

x 648 Their chief, Sultan Ablai, had sworn an oath of fealty to Russia, but later he had been under the protection of the kungtaidji of the Dzungars, Galdan Tsyren, and finally, as we said, he received a patent as a Chinese prince from the Chinese emperor. Thus the assurances of submission which he repeated to the Russian government from time to time were meaningless, and it would have been even more unwise to rely on them since his relations with China were quite frequent.

In 1756 he received a Chinese ambassador for the first time. In 1757 another officer of the Emperor came to seek to convince the entire Middle Horde to solemnly acknowledge itself as subject to China.

[661 Ablai refused to carry out this request, not out of respect
662] for the oath he had sworn to Russia but because he found this double position highly advantageous. First of all, it assured him greater independence and consideration from the two empires, and secondly, he was afraid to renounce his obedience to Russia completely because a large number of his subjects were nomadizing near the Russian borders in very favorable regions.

Russia, however, could not be satisfied with this apparent submission. In addition to the Kazak raids, she was then afraid of attacks from a much more [238] powerful enemy. For the Chinese army, which had ravaged Dzungaria had crossed the Siberian border and was threatening to enter the interior of the empire.

This fear was soon dispelled because the Chinese promptly retired into their own country, but the re-establishment of peace could not seem secure between the two empires as long as the differences remained unsettled concerning the surrender of the Dzungarian prince, Amursan, who had first acknowledged himself a vassal of China and later had sought asylum in Russia. His death ended the disagreement, but before it occurred and quiet was restored, the Orenburg authorities had opened relations with the Kazak princes of the Middle and the Little Hordes, by order of the government, [on the subject of] giving aid to Russian troops against China and of attacking the western territories of that state.

[238 cont.]

x648 On this matter Khan Nurali was presented /sic/ on March 19, 1758 with a letter patent in the name of the Empress inviting him to act in unity with the Russian troops, because the Chinese had violated the peace and invaded the Siberian border. It is not known why this letter patent was not sent. It is still preserved at Orenburg. It can be seen, however, by the business of that year that Nurali announced to the Russian officer who was sent to him expressly with gifts and orders to induce him orally to second
[721] Russia that he consented to wage war against the Chinese and that he would hold himself in readiness to march.

Another officer announced, on his return from the Middle Horde, that Sultan Ablai had also promised to fight for the Russians against the Chinese. To corroborate his promises, Ablai sent two deputies who asserted that he had never acknowledged himself a subject of China but had always remained faithful to Russia and that he had relations with the Chinese and had expressed submission to them only out of fear. Although it was clear that these assurances
[662] were false, the authorities intentionally pretended to be persuaded of [239] their sincerity (1), and Ablai not only received praise for his steadfast loyalty to Russia, but received a costly saber as
[1431] a reward, in the name of the Empress, and he was made to hope for other favors later.

[661] Khan Nurali also received several marks of good will from the Russian government because of his intention to fight the Chinese (2). Thus, when his son who was held hostage in Orenburg

1. During this same period, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote in one of its papers to the Russian Senate that Sultan Ablai had solemnly acknowledged himself a subject of China.

2. Nurali even showed a desire to help the Russians in the war against Persia, although he had no means of carrying out his plan.

x
648 [239 cont.]
died, he was obliged to send another at once to take his place,
[661] but he delayed and thought of weak excuses, and finally the local
[343] authority received an order not to force him. It was also ordered
that sheds and enclosures be built near the Ural River for him and
his brothers, at the expense of the crown, for the wintering of their
animals. Finally the Khan and the most distinguished sultans re-
ceived many gifts at this time.

[728] In order to calm all the Kazaks in the north and to protect
them from attacks which could have stopped them even during their
preparations to march against the Chinese, the strictest prohibitions
were repeated to prevent the Bashkirs from crossing the Ural River.

[343] Certain difficulties which arose in building the livestock enclosures for the Khan and the sultans, their constant requests that they be allowed to spend the winter in the steppes of Astrakhan, and the fear that this concession might bring about the destruction of the Volga Kalmuks, led the government to return, in 1759, to the idea of building a city at the mouth of the Emba. It was thought that even if the Khan and the Kazaks could not be persuaded to live there permanently, at least they would not refuse to spend the winter there in order to care for their studs and livestock. However this plan has remained [240] unrealized to this day, like the one of which we spoke above.

After Amursan's death and the cessation of the unpleasant
relations which had taken place concerning him between the Russian
and Chinese governments, Russia's preparations to repel an attack
by the latter, as well as the aid promised by Khan Nurali and
Sultan Ablai, became unnecessary. Nevertheless the Russian
court continued to fear for a long time that the Kazaks might
[167] withdraw across the borders into the ravaged lands of Dzungaria.
Because of Ablai's ties with China and the efforts of the Chinese
to draw him into their vicinity, the Middle Horde even seemed
disposed to change its place of habitation. It was supposed that
if it withdrew eastward, the Little Horde would also follow its
example.

[577] Such an emigration could not harm Russia with regard to her security, for the Kazaks, after becoming her subjects, had

[240 cont.]

x648 not ceased their thieving and laid waste the border provinces as before. But the departure of the Kazaks would have been very [439] injurious in regard to trade, and it was to prevent this that Russia wished to keep her semisavage subjects in their old habitat.

[662 643] It was essential to keep Sultan Ablai well disposed toward Russia, for he was acquiring more influence over his subjects every day and was becoming more fitted than anyone else to drive them in some high undertaking. A large part of the Middle Horde had already given him the title of khan. He himself in his relations with the Russian authorities did not yet give himself more than the title of sultan. But his power and his rank as a Chinese prince, to which Ch'ien Lung had elevated him, made it easier for him to change his title and to adopt that of supreme chief of all the Middle Horde, without any permission or cooperation on the part of Russia. This manner of behavior would have been contrary to the dignity of the empire, for the Middle Horde was among its subjects. But it was impossible to prevent such an event by [241] prohibiting it, and it would have been too injurious to take revenge by force of arms. It was therefore decided to induce Ablai by kindness and favors to himself request his investiture with the title of khan in the name of his people. In anticipation of this request, he was assigned an annual stipend, and an officer was sent to him charged with subtly showing him the path by which he could acquire the position of khan and to inform him that in order to reach this goal it was necessary that he give his son as hostage, following the example of Nurali.

Against all expectations Ablai received the Russian envoy in a very unfriendly manner and refused to present his son. In addition, it was learned soon after from a reliable source that Abul Mahmet, who had been created the khan of the Middle Horde by Russia, was still alive, and therefore the elevation of a new khan was put off to another time.

[726] In 1760 the Kirghiz-Kazaks of the Middle Horde attacked the savage Kirgiz, or Buruts, and inflicted great losses upon them. [727] Later they caused a disturbance in a sector of the new conquests of China and took several prisoners there. The Chinese demanded

X 648 [241 cont.]
of Ablai that they be returned, and sent an army to support their
[728] demand (1). The appearance of this army threw terror into the Middle Horde. They not only undertook to satisfy the desires of the Chinese government, but a large number of Bashkirs, Barabin Tatars, and Russian prisoners were surrendered on the Russian border.

Nevertheless Russia owed the return of these prisoners less to the terror inspired by the Chinese armies than to the efforts and power of Ablai, who, although he was a subject of two empires,
[662] sought for political reasons to prevent his people from making raids into Russia. In addition, this border opposite the Middle Horde was always much more secure than the military line along the Ural River.

Let us return now to the Little Horde, whose khan, together with [242] his brothers, seemed more devoted to Russia than Sultan Ablai.

[726 721] The Little Horde had not ceased to pillage the settlements along the borders from the beginning of spring until the middle of the summer, because the Volga Kalmuks had carried off much of its livestock during the preceding winter and because the guard along the Ural prevented the Little Horde from going along the Volga to recover its losses. Perhaps this first reason was joined by a second, which was less important but could also have influenced the conduct of the guard. During the autumn of 1759, Khan Nurali had come to Orenburg with his brothers, and the governor who had replaced Nepluev treated them with scant courtesy and, what was even worse, failed to make them any presents. This
[578] irritated them to such an extent that they did not wish to take leave of him, and they steadfastly refused to comply with any of his requests.

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1. See the reports of the interpreter Gordeev in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

[242 cont.]

x648 These moods were constantly increasing the audacity of the Little Horde, and the Khan pleaded as an answer the weakness [579 685] of his power. In this situation an order was sent from St. Petersburg (1) to require the Kalmuks to return the horses they had stolen and to punish the raids of the Kazaks by sending troops into their lands to find the offenders and to seize their possessions, or at least to arrest their kinsmen. But this was to be done without touching, under any circumstances, those who were strangers to them.

[721] In 1761 part of the Little Horde attacked the Russian borders again and was again punished by force of arms. The reason for its attacks was the same as that for the year before. The Kalmuks had not returned the stolen horses, and the courtesies which were owed them had not been shown to the Khan and his brothers in Orenburg, although at the beginning of the year they had not taken part in the raids. In the autumn the Sultans Erali and Aichuvak were [579] in such a state of outrage at the behavior toward them [243] that they began to halt the caravans which were returning to Orenburg. Aichuvak even had the intention of withdrawing with the [167] Semirod descent line toward the Chinese border into the lands which had belonged to the Dzungars. In order to keep these two [661] sultans as well disposed toward Russia as they had been earlier, the higher authorities granted annual stipends to each of them in spite of the conduct of the local authorities in Orenburg.

x648 Because of this state of affairs in the Little Horde and the ambiguous position held by Sultan Ablai, which nevertheless was not harmful to Russia, when Emperor Peter III was elevated to the throne, the Khan and the principal Kazak sultans were sent [662] letters with this information without demanding a new oath from them. It was believed that they would have refused, and it was decided not to carry out this formality until they should be in Orenburg themselves. In order to keep them in a state of

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1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of July 18, 1760.

[243 cont.]

x 648 subordinacy and keep them from maintaining friendly relations
662 with China, the government continued to spare neither expense
nor effort. In the instructions presented to the border authorities
of Orenburg and Siberia at the beginning of 1762, it was ordered
that the most distinguished of the Kazaks should be flattered in
[431] every possible way, that presents and rewards should be distributed
to them generously, and that those who wished it should have
sheds and stables built for them near the border.

[342 It was ordered that engineers should be sent to Sultan Ablai
343] without delay to build him a house with outbuildings and the
necessary storehouses, surrounding it all with a rampart to give it
the appearance of a small fort (1). Such a mark of distinction was very flattering to the vanity of a Kazak.

1. A house really was built for Khan Ablai opposite the fort of Petropavlovsk, but only several years later.

By these and other similar means, the Khan and the Kazak sultans were kept faithful to Russia, at least in [244] appearance. When Nurali, Ablai, and Aichuvak received the letters of information concerning the elevation of Empress Catherine II to the throne, they swore an oath of fealty to her immediately.

x 648 It is worthy of remark that Ablai was not the only one who,
having long been a vassal to two empires, swore an oath to the
Empress of Russia, without intending because of this to give up his
ties with China. Khan Nurali, following his example, decided
about this time to enter into relations with the court of Peking.
During this same year, 1762, he sent an embassy to Peking which
left for that capital with the deputies of Sultan Batyr of the Middle
Horde and Sultan Abulfenz, son of Abul Mahmet, khan of the
Middle Horde. They were all loaded with presents by the Emperor,
especially the deputies of Khan Nurali (1), who was puffed up by

1. See the reports of the interpreter Gordeev on his return from the Middle Horde in 1763.

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[244 cont.]
648 this distinction and paid no more attention to Russian complaints. [721] His subjects again began their raids against the Volga Kalmuks and later insisted that they be allowed to spend the winter on the right bank of the Ural River. They had been refused this request several times, but the new refusal enraged them so that they wished to pass the border by force to spend the winter in Russia with their herds and studs. This insolence led the Empress Catherine to give [68] Ubashi, a deputy of the Kalmuk khanate, a letter patent (2) on May 18, 1763 to punish the Kazaks of the Little Horde by force of arms as soon as he received word from the government of Orenburg that part of them had crossed the border. Orders were also given to authorize the Bashkirs and Yaik Cossacks to do the same. But no one gained from this, because the Kazaks remained in their steppes.

The wily Sultan Ablai, who for several years had succeeded in pleasing two powers with opposing interests, was called at this time to the aid of a third, which was less [245] necessary than the first two to his security in the horde but to whose fate he was linked by both the laws of the Koran and his amour-propre.

× 648 721 The Chinese conquered what is called Little Bukhara almost at the same time as Dzungaria and wished to extend their conquests still further over other small Moslem states of Central Asia. The expectation of this invasion and the impossibility of repulsing it forced the khans of Tashkent and Kokand and their neighbors, who were as weak as they, to beg help against the Chinese first of all from Akhmet, sovereign of the Afghans, for with this title and as a Moslem, he should protect his coreligionists. The inhabitants of Kashgar and Yarkend and other cities already conquered by the Chinese likewise asked him to deliver them from the rule of the infidels. Aroused by so many demands, Akhmet sent a strong army against the Chinese, which halted between Tashkent and Kokand to enter into discussions with the Chinese.

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2. This letter remained in Orenburg, where it is still preserved.

[245 cont.]

x648 721 During the correspondence and the sending of couriers, the zealous Moslems joined their defenders from all sides, and by letters and sermons they incited everyone to come to their aid. Abul Mahmet, who was regarded as the khan of the Middle Horde, also received a letter of invitation, but since he had ceased to rule the Kazaks long before, he transmitted the invitation to [662] Ablai (1). The latter would no doubt have entered the general league of the Moslems if he had been a little less closely linked to the Chinese. But the court of Peking, in order to forestall his inclinations to help his coreligionists, had sent to Ablai shortly before the arrival of Abul Mahmet's letter a letter patent (2) which permitted him to occupy the environs of the Ili River and assured him constant protection. But at the same time [246] the [661] court of Peking took as hostage his father-in-law, Sultan Sultanamet, several elders and their children.

[662] It was also proposed to Nurali that he join the Afghans, and he did not categorically refuse. But the position of his horde and the circumstances did not permit him to march with an army toward the Chinese borders. The Kalmuks on one side and the Bashkirs on the other would not have failed to profit by the absence of the Kazaks and would not only have pillaged all their riches but also have carried off their wives and children into slavery. Nurali had reason to fear this, for the Bashkirs retained a vivid memory of the injuries they had suffered in 1755 from the Little Horde, many of which had not yet been avenged. And in 1762 the Kalmuks had suffered another blow from the Kazaks, who had reached the Volga by crossing the Caspian Sea over the ice.

1. The Bashkir, Tergulov, who was sent to the Middle Horde, brought a copy of this letter to Orenburg in the same year of 1763.

2. See the reports of the interpreter Gordeev.

x 648 [721] [246 cont.]
This same year 200 tents of Turkmen, who had been living with the Kalmuks for a long time, fled beyond the Yaik /Ural River/, and after the Kazaks had allowed to enter their territories they enslaved the fugitives and divided them among themselves.

[167 439 579] During the first years of the reign of Catherine, Russia's relations with the Kazaks were directed more than ever toward the two ends which she had in view: the first, to establish settlements in the two hordes; the second, to insure the inviolability of the caravans.

[361] For the first point, it was wished to revive the plan to build a strong city at the mouth of the Emba and to build a house there for Khan Nurali. But since his subjects feared to see the Russians in the middle of their steppes it was ordered to build a camp in the form of a redoubt instead of a fortress, to shelter the fishermen who came into this region. And in order to keep this establishment from even scaring the nomads, it was ordered that a market be opened where they could provide themselves with wheat from the crown at the lowest price. It was also wished to teach
[177] them to [247] mow hay and to build sheds for their animals and dwellings for themselves if they asked for it. Likewise orders were repeated to the border authorities to build sheds for the animals and houses for those Kazaks who wished it on the Irtysh River and beyond the Ural. Taking advantage of the consent of a small number of Kazaks, the Siberian authorities, who had the advantage of living in good relations with certain Kazaks, were ordered to build an entire village on the small Kolchakly River and to obtain for it every imaginable advantage. In a word, the government tried every possible means to imbue its nomadic subjects with a taste for sedentary life. But they always had, and still have today, an invincible aversion to it, either as a result of their
[181] nomadic life or for fear of losing their savage liberty, which they value above every kind of possession.

[439 579] For the second goal, the security of trade, it was necessary to seek new means, for 30 years of experience had proven that neither the khans nor the sultans could offer the caravans a sure and inviolable protection over the entire extent of their territories.

[247 cont.]
x648 The weakness of their power and their frequent dissensions are still
[439 almost unsurmountable obstacles to the security of trade, and
579] even to this day they make it impossible to make the caravan routes
used by the merchants of Tashkent, Kokand, or their eastern
neighbors perfectly safe. As for communications with the
Bukharans and the Khivans, Russia has another route, that of the
Caspian Sea. Before the hordes acknowledged themselves vassals
of the empire, it was the only route which served Russia for its
trade with Persia and Central Asia. Catherine was not slow to
turn her attention to this matter, and having rejected useless hopes
from the promises of the Kazak princes, which were both empty
and pompous, she wished [248] to concentrate all the commercial
relations of her subjects with Khiva and the dominion of Bukhara
in Astrakhan. But this plan was not carried out, on the one hand
because the Asiatics did not find it advantageous for them, and
[316] on the other hand because it threatened Orenburg, Troitsk, and
all the copper and iron mines established in their environs with
complete ruin.

[439] Nevertheless the intentions of the Russian government with
regard to trade with Central Asia did not prevent it from supporting
the exchange of goods with the Kazaks in every way possible.
[712] At first this was only done at Orenburg, while later it was begun
at Troitsk and, in 1764, at the fort of Semipalatinsk. This last
fort was designated for this purpose on the entreaty of Sultan
Abulfenz, son of the famous khan, Abul Mahmet, and brother
of Polat, khan of Turkestan. In the Middle Horde he was in
command of the powerful Naiman descent group. He was independent, but camped in the former lands of the Dzungars, which
had made him seek the protection of the emperor of China.
[439] Having never sworn loyalty to Russia nor had relations with her,
he was able, without deception, to send a respectable elder to
the authorities of the Siberian border to plead that his subjects
have the liberty of trading with the Russians in Semipalatinsk.
And this was immediately granted to him.

[342
177] At this time Sultan Ablai requested the Russian government
to send him ten tillers of the soil to teach his Kazaks agriculture.
[661] Catherine gave orders to satisfy his request, after having taken

x [248 cont.]
648 secure hostages from Ablai to guarantee the freedom of the
[661] Russians sent to him.

x 648 662 Khan Nurali, who was proud of his relations with the army of the Afghans and with China, wrote directly to the Empress in 1764, both to inform her of the invitation sent him by all the Moslems of Central Asia to take part in the war against China and also to acquaint her with the distinguished reception his embassy had had in Peking. These two circumstances inflated his vanity, and in his dreams of [249] his importance, he thought he could exact several concessions which he had already been refused. However, these repeated demands had no more success than they had had the first time. He was sent thanks from Russia for the news he had provided about the Afghans, and several gifts were added with a reply which was as polite as it was lacking in satisfaction. His horde did not remain calm, however, but con-
[721] tinued its raids against the Volga Kalmuks as much as against the Russian settlements on the border, nor did they renounce their usual dissensions, which are not worth a detailed description. Thus passed the years 1765 and 1766. In 1767 Russian troops punished them in a clear manner, by pursuing the brigands to the very middle of the horde.

x 648 662 663 There is no doubt that this chastisement made Nurali violently angry. Since he needed Catherine's good graces, however, he hid his resentment for a long time. He was afraid that after his death the position of khan might pass to another family, and asked that a successor or deputy be designated while he still lived and that the Russian government ceremonially elevate his eldest son, Ishim, to this new post. This was a new desire, but it was not in opposition to Russian views. It was true that Russia could designate one of Nurali's brothers as khan of the Little Horde if she chose. But since there was no reason then for preferring them above other sultans and since the Empress Anna, when she promised Abulkhair to preserve the post of khan for posterity, did not fix any rule for the choice of his successors, Nurali's wish could be fulfilled. Also the particular qualities of Sultan Ishim were no obstacle to the accomplishment of his

x648 [249 cont.]
662 father's aims. It was only necessary to know whether the creation
663 of a deputy of the khan would not make the Kazaks discontented and whether they might not refuse to recognize their future chief. It was also necessary to know what [250] Ishim's personal inclinations toward Russia were and whether this novelty might not lead to some unpleasant consequences for her. It was ordered that research be made at the horde itself on all these points and that the results be sent to Petersburg. The authorities in Orenburg replied that according to the custom of the Kazaks, the position of khan should pass to one of his brothers after the death of Nurali and not to one of his sons. The Minister answered that the law of succession in private life could not be applied to succession to the title of khan, because this title always passed from one man to another by the choice of the people. Nevertheless it was decided, in order to avoid grumbling and dissension, to induce the Kazaks to choose Sultan Ishim themselves as the deputy of the khan and to confirm the choice of the people afterwards.

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[167] While studies were being made on this subject and the correspondence continued, the year 1771 arrived and the desertion of the Kalmuks caused the Kazaks matters to be forgotten, not only by the government but by the Kazaks themselves, as we will see later. This is why Khan Nurali's plan to elevate his son to the post of his deputy remained unfulfilled.

[152] He could have attained his end if the death of his son, who arrived in Orenburg in 1769 where he was held as hostage, had not grieved him sorely and had not driven him into a stubbornness which was forgivable for a father but unpleasant for the Russian government. It was the second son he had lost in Orenburg, and both had died as children. Attributing their deaths to lack of care, he did not wish under any circumstances to give up another child of his own as hostage. And he himself refused to come to Orenburg, although he was invited to come several times by the
[152] authorities for conferences. Certain quarrels which arose between
[578] him and his brothers increased his troubles. The envy caused by the marks of attention given them by the Russian government, by using them more than it did him in its relations with the Little

European Kalmyk RF4
Kalmyk (Oirat) AH5

x K [250 cont.]
648 Horde, and with greater success, and finally the vexation of his
[152 [251] own weakness, all troubled him and removed his power to
578] act with coolness. Having aroused his arrogance, the court of
K Petersburg rejected the thought it had had of increasing his power
[66] over the Kazaks, a measure which had once been thought indispensable. Thus Nurali came to the point where he began to be given less consideration. In spite of his brothers' quarrels with him, they were sent sabers as a reward for their zeal, and his request for stipends fixed by the year were put aside. He was even refused permission to send deputies to Petersburg. It was directed to pay no attention to his obstinacy on the matter of the hostage and to say to him always that Russia would know how to maintain the Kazaks in obedience without that (1). The same thing was written that year to Sultan Ablai, who, in the hopes of receiving several advantages and privileges from Russia, offered to give up one of his sons as hostage, but later, after he saw that most of his demands could not be satisfied, he refused on fantastic pretexts to carry out what he himself had proposed.

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[721] The renewal of the raids on the Orenburg border by the Little Horde in 1770 was about to bring still another punishment (2) upon them by the Russian government, which they were fortunate enough to avoid only because of the desertion of the Volga Kalmuks, which gave affairs a new turn. This change gave a new destination to the Russian troops, who had been enemies of the Kazaks and now became their allies. We will now give the history of

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167 upon them by the Russian government, which they were fortunate
EK enough to avoid only because of the desertion of the Volga Kalmuks,
KO which gave affairs a new turn. This change gave a new destina-
648 tion to the Russian troops, who had been enemies of the Kazaks
167 and now became their allies.

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1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of March 16, 1770.

2. Reinsdorf, the governor of Orenburg, received on January 10, 1771 an order from the Empress to send troops into the Kazak steppe in order to punish the bandits and free the prisoners.

x K
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[167]

[251 cont.]

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[167]

that event (3). The land of the Kalmuks, or, more precisely,

3. We regard it our duty to inform our readers that the description of the flight of the Torguts and the battle they fought with the Kazaks is drawn from two good sources: the first from the journal of Captain Rychkov, who was sent with the Russian troops in pursuit of the fugitives, under the command of [252] General Traubenberg; the second, the description of that flight by the Chinese prince Tsichi [Ch'i Shih?], a work whose translation we owe to Mr. Lipovtsov (see the Siberian News /Sibirskii Vestnik?/ of 1820).

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EK
[114]

of the Torguts, [252] whose bands are nomadizing today on the right bank of the Volga, in the Astrakhan government, were located in the present territories of China in the west. They left them because of the constant attacks of their neighbors, the Dzungars, whose power had not ceased to grow from the beginning of the 17th century and who threatened to subjugate them entirely. The lack of forces with which to avenge themselves upon their enemies and the fear of one day becoming their slaves led the Torguts to leave their old territories and to withdraw to the west.

In 1636 they came into Russia, and Tsar Michael Fedorovich accepted them among his subjects, giving them the vast lands on the two shores of the Volga as pasture land.

After the conquest of Dzungaria by the Chinese in 1756 and the destruction of most of its inhabitants, the weak survivors, numbering 10,000 tents, all composed of the Derbet, Khoit, and Khoshut descent lines, remembered their compatriots on the Volga, and forgetting their old emnity, they joined them, under the command of Sheren, one of the most zealous companions-at-arms of the Dzungarian prince, Amursan, whose acquaintance we have already seen.

European Kalmyk RF4
Kalmyk (Oirat) AH5

KO [252 cont.]
EK 648 we have already made.
K Sheren and his Kalmuk subjects of the three descent lines
x648 we have mentioned brought from Dzungaria interests and desires
KO which were completely different from those which the Torguts
EK had after living 120 years in Russia. The former were accustomed
[181] to civil wars and fighting, and the latter to peace, sometimes
EK troubled by the pillaging of the Kazaks.

KO The former secretly aspired to avenge themselves upon the
[662] Chinese, who had driven them from a homeland which they hoped
to reconquer by force of arms. The latter lived on the land where
they were born and where they enjoyed peace. In the order [253] of
things, it seemed that these new Russian subjects, weary of the
misfortunes of a long war, who had come to join a much larger
number of old inhabitants along the Volga, would joyfully consent
to live forever in a place of security. The enormous space which
divided the Volga from Dzungaria, the annexation of the latter
country to China, and the barbarity with which it had been
ravaged by the troops of the Chinese emperor served to strengthen
KO the opinion that it was impossible for the Kalmuks who had come
EK to Russia ever to return to their homeland. But experience proved
[668 662] the opposite. Sheren and his companions, the Derbets, Khoits, and
Khoshuts, not only failed to give up the desire to go back and
nomadize on their old lands, but even caused it to be born in
the hearts of their compatriots who had been born in Russia.

After spreading various rumors about the so-called bad intentions and even barbarous plans of the Russian government against the Kalmuks, Sheren and his restless accomplices succeeded in becoming the masters of the weak and credible mind of Ubashi, chief of the Kalmuks. He profited by the differences existing between him and the nearest Russian authorities; he flattered Ubashi with the hope of changing his title as subject to that of independent sovereign, and he finally succeeded in inducing him
KO to withdraw to the old Dzungaria, across the Kazak steppes.

EK [793] The ordinary people, who were frightened by the rumors and
KO listened with blind superstition to the exhortations of their clergy,
EK could not offer any resistance. Ubashi made up his mind, and
[167 668]

European KalmyK RF4
KalmyK (Oirat) AH5

EK
KO [253 cont.]
648 after having taken counsel with the princes and the lamas (priests),
xK 648 he fixed the time of departure for the time when the Volga should
EK be covered with ice. This arrangement was necessary because,
KO although Ubashi himself was on the left bank of the river, a
[767 large part of the Torguts were on the right bank and could not
668] join him with what they possessed except by crossing the ice.

This is why a [254] large part of the inhabitants of Astrakhan are still composed of Kalmuks today. For the winter of 1770 was warm and the rivers of southern Russia did not freeze, and Ubashi, after waiting in vain until the month of January for the Kalmuks from the right bank to join him, was obliged to abandon them and to leave with only those who were on the left bank.

They departed on the fifth of January, numbering 30,000 tents (1).

1. This is what Rychkov's journal says, but the Geographical Dictionary of the Russian Empire puts it at only 28,162.

As they approached the Yaik /Ural River/, the governor of
K Orenburg warned Khan Nurali that they were going to attack the
EK KO Kazaks. Consequently, in the name of the supreme government,
[662] he granted Nurali the right to fight against them and to take as much booty from them as he could, on condition that they then be made to return to their former places of abode within our borders. The government of the borders of Siberia transmitted the same advice to the Middle Horde through Sultan Ablai and other chiefs. In order to confirm these declarations, on January 27, 1771 an imperial letter patent was presented in the
EK KO name of Nurali and all the Kazak people to seize the Torguts.

K Every kind of instigation or advice was quite superfluous
[721 for the accomplishment of such designs. Every Kazak considered
186] the chance to contribute to their execution a special bit of good fortune. Stirred with a violent hatred for all the Kalmuk descent groups, a heritage from their fathers and their most distant

European KalmyK RF4
KalmyKs (oirat) AH5

K K 648 [721 186]

[254 cont.]

EK KO 648 [721 186]

ancestors, they hastened out to fight against them and despoil them. In less than a month the Kazak hordes were under arms, and the entire length of the country, from the shores of the Yaik to the borders of China, was covered with bands of warriors waiting impatiently for the appearance of a people whom the Kazaks burned to immolate for injuries suffered and for the hatred they aroused simply by their name and their origin. Nurali replied to the letter patent that he was not only ready to comply [255] with the wishes of the Russian government but that he was already on the march with his subjects against the fugitives. At the same time news was received that Ablai and his horde were ready for combat. Aichuvak and other sultans wrote in the same vein, and Kaip, who had been khan of Khiva and who lived within the Little Horde after his expulsion by his subjects, promised to join the Russian troops. East of the Kazak steppes, the Kalmuks were awaited by the Sultans Abulfenz, son of Abulkhair Khan, and Erali, sultan of the Great Horde, and finally by the savage Kirgiz, or Buruts, who surpassed all the neighboring peoples in daring and ferociousness.

EK KO K [721 167]

What a terrible series of battles the Torguts had to endure! What a succession of attacks, murders, and robberies occurred on their route all the way to their destination on the banks of the Ili, traveling not with an army always ready to fight, but taking along with them their wives, children, herds, and all their possessions!

Several detachments of Russian troops were immediately detailed to restrain the Kazaks, but various circumstances prevented them from acting in a manner which corresponded to the hope of the government. From then on all hope was lost of seizing the Kalmuks, and the arming of all the Kazak hordes served only to exterminate a large part of the Torguts, without contributing in any way to their return to Russia.

The first barrier which should have been opposed to them was the army of the Ural (Yaik) Cossacks, whose lands they crossed. After the Kalmuks had passed, the Cossacks were firmly ordered to pursue them, but they rebelled and openly refused to leave their homes.

5: Levchine--123 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
European Kalmyk RF4
Kalmyks (Oirat) AH5

x K
648 [255 cont.]
[721
167] A second detachment was composed of Orenburg Cossacks. They entered the Kazak steppe and joined Khan Nurali in the first half of February. But their horses were so exhausted by the lack of fodder that this [256] detachment remained in the rear and was finally forced to pass into Russia.

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167] Regular troops were detailed to replace them. But the same lack of forage in the steppes beyond the Ural River during the winter and the loss of precious time in correspondence and preparations prevented this corps under the command of Major General Traubenberg from leaving the fortress of Orsk until April 12. He was directed to join Khan Nurali and to await the Kalmuks on the Irtysh, but he did not reach this river until they were already on the Turgai. Having thus lost the opportunity of action in any other way than against the rear of the fugitives, the Russians who had joined the troops of Nurali (1) and Kaip (2) marched swiftly in pursuit of the Torguts. Near the Ulu-Tau Mountains famine and bad water caused swelling ailments to spread among the soldiers, and the horses tired and began to die in large numbers. Meanwhile the fugitives were moving farther and farther away, and the impossibility of reaching them became more evident every day. Finally, General Traubenberg was obliged to turn from the east to the north and to return into Russia by the fort of Uisk, which was the nearest point on the border.

1. On this occasion Nurali paraded his devotion to Russia in the presence of the commander of the Russian troops and complained of the fact that they had not asked his help in the Prussian War or the one against Turkey.

2. Nurali effected his meeting with the Russian troops near the Aksakal Barbi lakes, and Kaip did so on the Karaganly-Turgai, 754 versts /805 km./ from the fort of Orsk.

5: Levchine--124 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
European Kalmyk RF4
Kalmyks (Oirat) AH5
Cossacks RD2

x K 648 [256 cont.]

[721 167] The Kazaks alone could not seize the Kalmuks, and they did not need to. The aim of their cooperation was better accomplished by their endless and repeated attacks, their pillaging and the capture of a large number of prisoners. Sultan Aichuvak routed one section on the Sagiz. Nurali delivered a violent blow to another section toward the east, and he also carried off several victories over them near the Mugodzhar Hills and on the Ishim River. Ablai [257] fought them with constant success. In some regions he acted in accord with Sultan Abulfenz, and their united forces caused immense losses to the Kalmuks, especially through the number of prisoners they took.

EK KO 648 [721 167]

Erali, sultan of the Great Horde and at the same time paladin of the court of Peking, invited Ablai to join him against the Kalmuks several times. The latter refused to aid him, but this did not stop him from carrying out the plan he had devised. Erali found other allies and caused the fugitives to undergo enormous losses in men, animals, and personal belongings. We saw the details of this event in the historical account of the Great Horde.

When they were finally free of the Kazaks, the Kalmuks fell into the hands of the Buruts, and the misfortunes which the latter inflicted upon them were much worse than those they had suffered previously, particularly with regard to losses in prisoners. The Buruts, who were as greedy as they were ferocious, pursued them all the way to the Chinese border, to the new line established on the lands of the Dzungars. Ubashi crossed this line, not as he had imagined when he left the Volga as an independent sovereign, but as a humble subject who wished to save his life. He brought to China less than half of the Kalmuks who left Russia with him, the rest having perished en route.

K X648 669 662 C 648 669 662

In 1773 and 1774 Pugachev's revolt caused violent agitation in the provinces in the southeast of Russia. The lands washed by the Ural River, almost from its source to its mouth, were most exposed to this, because the Yaik Cossacks were the first accomplices of the false Peter, and the Bashkirs were his first allies. The troops forming the border guard assembled in the principal forts to defend them against the rebels, and the borders remained

Cossacks RD2

K [257 cont.]
x 648 undefended. No one could protect them from the raids of outside
C
648 enemies, for everyone thought about saving himself from an
K enemy from within who was far more dangerous. This is why
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[669 there was reason to fear then that the Kazaks [258] might join
662] the rebels, enter the empire, and pillage and lay waste all the
border settlements. This did not happen because the Yaik Cossacks
and the Bashkirs who made up Pugachev's army were enemies of
the Kazaks.

Nevertheless, if this hatred prevented them from joining together to march into the interior, it did not protect the borders from the usual pillaging and raids which the Little Horde often repeated during Pugachev's revolt.

We see by a report from the commander who was then in the city of Yaisk (now Uralsk) that Nurali had armed quite a large number of his subjects but was making no move, waiting near the border for the outcome of the affair. One might suppose from the assurances he gave and the zeal with which he extradited several rebels who had taken flight that it was his intention to decide for the legitimate government, but in spite of this the local authorities were very much afraid that in case good luck favored the leader of the insurrection, Nurali might join him.

On this basis and to punish several raids, some across the borders, by the Kazaks during the revolt, the government of Orenburg sent a body of troops against the Little Horde in 1774, after the defeat of the rebels. These troops succeeded in capturing a large number of prisoners, carrying off many animals, and made the audacious bandits feel Russia's might.

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At this same time an event took place in the interior of
[643 the Little Horde which is worthy of attention. Several Turkmen
651] tribes who nomadized near the Caspian Sea chose Sultan Pirali,
the second son of Nurali, for their khan. The new sovereign
immediately left his father and went to live in the midst of his
new subjects on the route which led from Khiva to Saraichik
[259] and Guryev. He soon made a name for himself through
the high duties he exacted from the merchant caravans.

K
In 1775 the Kazaks did not disturb Russia. The Little
[727] Horde remained quiet because it still felt the painful consequences

[259 cont.]
×648 of the punishment inflicted upon it by the Russian troops the year
[727] before. The Middle Horde had been causing suspicion for some
time because the rumor had spread that Ablai, profiting from the
recent troubles of the Bashkirs, had sent several messengers to
them to induce them to move under his domination. But investigations proved that these rumors were false.

During the months of June and October of this same year,
several elders and sultans who were independent of Ablai sent
deputies to the commander of the Siberian line to propose that
[661] they be recognized as Russian subjects. Among these was the
son of Khan Abul Mahmet, Abulfeis, who had asked that he be
assigned an annual stipend. Ablai's son and nephew asked for the
same thing.

Empress Catherine received the report and replied in a rescript of May 25, 1776 in the name of the governor of Orenburg, as the principal administrator of Kazak matters, that the individual proposals made by the Kazaks of the Middle Horde to be received as subjects were founded on nothing more than the desire to obtain gifts. It was added that they were completely useless, for the entire horde had been recognized as subjects of the empire since the reign of Empress Anna, and that if such demands were satisfied this would only produce new demands. Furtheremore it was said that the fixing of annual stipends would become an obligation for the government and would accustom the Kazaks to regard as a duty that which was only the effect of the government's indulgence, and consequently it would be much better to conciliate them with gifts which were not fixed. These concepts showed a profound knowledge of the character of the Kazaks; they were the fruit of 46 years experience, from 1730 to 1776.

×648 Irnazar Maksiutov, the Bukharan ambassador, who came to
439 [260] Russia in 1775, revived the idea of building a Russian city
in the Kazak steppe at the mouth of the Emba in the conferences
he had on the means of removing the trade of caravans between
Russia and Bukhara from all danger. The Russian government
showed itself ready to carry out the plan (1), but it remained without

1. As a result of the ukase given on this

x648 [260 cont.]

[839] subject on December 17, 1775, the geodetic specialist Vasiliev drew a map of the environs of the Emba and the rivers which flowed into it.

execution, as had all the others which had been made previously.

[721] It can be seen in the reports from the governor of Orenburg, Reinsdorf, to the Empress in the months of March and April, 1776 that the Little Horde had once more begun acts of hostility against Russia, and although after the Russian troops entered the steppes in 1774, the border authorities had been forbidden to send troops beyond the Ural, yet Khan Nurali himself had asked for armed assistance to bring his restless subjects to their senses.

[662] Sultan Ablai, on the contrary, was then becoming more powerful, older, and wilier from day to day. Having had more experience than any of the contemporary Kazak princes and being known for his intelligence, dreaded by his subjects, and distinguished for his ties with the empress of Russia and the emperor of China (2) /sic/,

2. The best known among them was Sultan Dair, son of Barak, who complained to the governor of Orenburg that Ablai had unjustly usurped the title of khan.

he had every possible right to the post of ~~chief of the~~ Middle Horde. Sure of his ability, he knew how to attract followers by his importance and his prudent behavior. He threatened his enemies with his power and acknowledged himself now a subject of Russia and now that of China (3), depending on the occasion,

3. Some Kazaks who came within our borders stated that Ablai spoke Chinese.

being in fact a completely independent sovereign. One can notice this especially after the year 1771, when he made less [643] effort to conserve appearances of an external submission to Russia, and having become less hypocritical, he openly took the title of khan.

[261]

x 648
643 The Russian government asked him by what right he had taken this title, and he boldly replied that he had acquired it by his victories over the Torguts and, after the death of Abul Mahmet, not only by the choice of the Kazak hordes but also by that of the residents of Turkestan and Tashkent. He added that following the example of his independent ancestors and the khans who were his predecessors, he wished to live in Turkestan near the tomb of Khodja Akhmet (1). It was then too late to remind Ablai of the obligations of a faithful subject. But it was necessary at least to sustain the idea in the hordes that no one could become khan in one of them without the consent of Russia. The Empress ordered that an officer be sent to Ablai to induce him especially to request the confirmation of his new position from the Russian government.

[661] He consented to this proposal and promised to send his son, Sultan Tugum, to St. Petersburg.

On November 25, 1777, it was officially announced to him that the Empress had agreed to his request, if he would transmit it in writing rather than orally. It was ordered to return his son from the border to the horde in the opposite case.

Ablai made not the slightest opposition to sending a written request. Consequently, Sultan Tugum, who conveyed it to St. Petersburg, was received most graciously, and his father was confirmed as khan by a certificate on October 22, 1778.

This certificate was sent to Orenburg, accompanied by a robe of honor, a saber, and a hat, and Ablai was invited to present himself to receive them and to swear the oath in Orenburg, Troitsk, or on the Siberian line. But when he refused to come, the Russian government consented to his taking the oath in the horde in the presence of a Russian officer, who would then

1. The Kazaks regard Khodja Akhmet, who is buried in /the town of/ Turkestan, as the greatest saint after Mohammed.

[261 cont.]
x648 deliver the objects. Ablai did not wish to swear a new oath of
643 loyalty even under this condition. He believed that the demand that was being made for these [262] external signs of submission had the goal of rendering him suspect to the Chinese, to whom he was then particularly attached. For this reason all the proposals which Russia made him were fruitless, and the certificate and the marks of the position of khan remained at the fort of Petropavlovsk, opposite which he lived in the house which the Russian government had had built for him.

x648 Ablai's disobedience became more patent when the Russian
662 government turned down his request for aid in men to make war against the Buruts, and he openly refused to return the Russian prisoners in his horde, as well as the Turkmen whom the Kalmuks had taken away from the Astrakhan government in their flight and who had remained with the Kazaks. The government was justly annoyed by Ablai's audacity and insolence, and withdrew his stipend and sought to humble him by supporting one of the sultans among his enemies. Measures had even been taken to this effect, and it was thought for a moment to take him prisoner
[721] and send him into the interior of Russia. But at this time he assembled troops, attacked the Buruts, delivered a severe defeat to them, took hostages from them, and returned to nomadize in the environs of Turkestan.

x648 While he was living there, he built a house surrounded by a
[361] rampart on the little river Talash, near the Ulu-Tau Mountains for his son, Sultan Hadil, and at the entreaty of his Kazak subjects of the Great horde, he founded a village nearby, which he populated with Karakalpaks who were accustomed to agriculture. As
[166] for the Buruts he had captured, he made them go north of the Middle Horde, where they are still living today with their children, making up the tribe of the Djany or Iany-Kirgiz, which means New Kirgiz.

[764] In 1781 Ablai returned toward the Russian frontier, but he died on the way at the age of 70 and was buried in Turkestan. As soon as this news arrived in Peking, the Chinese government

[262 cont.]

x648 sent a [263] high officer to the horde, who joined the family of [724] the deceased and celebrated a ceremonial funeral service in its presence.

Thus ended Ablai's relations with Russia. Although the disobedience of this prince in the last years of his life was open, yet [721 it had no important consequences. The Little Horde, whose khan 579] seemed entirely devoted to Russia and proved this by his actions, was much more disturbing to the borders, as it continued its raids and brigandage as usual. As we saw earlier, in 1775 the Empress had forbidden the sending of troops beyond the Ural to chastise the Kazaks, and although not only the Orenburg authorities but the Khan himself had asked that this measure be employed again in 1776, it was not done. The supreme government had made up its mind to substitute gentle means for severity. This system, which was so favorable to the Kazaks, did not last long. Their plundering forced it to be changed. Nurali himself again declared the absolute urgency of punishing the guilty persons. As a result, on October 4, 1779, the Empress gave orders to the governor of Orenburg, by a rescript, not only to pursue the bandits with armed force, but, as before, to seize their kinsmen if necessary, or even their neighbors, so that the families of these neighbors would make an effort to deliver the guilty persons or at least to force the return of the Russians who had been held prisoner.

[721 According to tradition, the southern part of the Middle Horde 727] underwent a terrible defeat from the Great Horde after Ablai's death, being attacked and having many animals taken away. Those who had suffered did not remain quiet but avenged themselves upon their enemies. The northern part of the Middle Horde took no part in these reprisals. This horde chose as the successor to Ablai his son Vali, and the latter esteemed the protection of Russia and did not wish to be at odds with her. As a result he x648 asked her to [264] confirm his new position. His request was ful- 643 filled, and in 1782 he was proclaimed the khan of the Middle Horde by Lieutenant General Jacobs in the fort of Petropavlovsk. The ceremonies observed on this occasion were the same as those which the Russian government observes at every installation of a khan. We have already spoken of them.

[264 cont.]

648 643 The election of Vali by Ablai's Kazak subjects and his confirmation by Russia did not prevent another khan from appearing in the same horde. He was chosen by the Naiman descent line and confirmed by the emperor of China. The descendants of the ancient Naimans, who had blended into the mass of the Kazak people of the time, obeyed, at the time of Ablai, Sultan Abulfenz, son of Abul Mahmet and brother of Pulat, the khan of Turkestan. And although he had had some relations with the Orenburg authorities and had even requested a stipend, he was nevertheless a subject of China. He died in 1783, leaving a son named Bupu and a son-in-law, Khan Khodja, son of Barak, whose acquaintance we have already made. One of these princes was to inherit Abulfenz's authority, but each had his partisans, who could not come to an agreement on the choice and who set the entire Naiman descent group in commotion with their quarrels. The majority of the votes were in favor of Khan Khodja, however, so that this prince became the sovereign of the former subjects of Abulfenz, and the troubles were ended. When the emperor of China learned this, he sent him a certificate as khan by one of his high officials. The ministry in Peking considered this a necessary measure because it regarded the entire Middle Horde as subjects of China and because it had named Ablai a Chinese prince. When it was seen that Ablai's son Vali was submitting [662] himself to Russia, he was speedily replaced, for the dignity of the empire, by another Kazak prince who was submissive.

648 With the exception of Vali, the other sons and close kinsmen of Ablai had few relations with Russia. Some of them proudly acknowledged themselves to be subjects of China.

This was the behavior adopted by Sultan Chingis, who [265] marched in 1784 with an army raised in the steppes to put down a revolt which had broken out in Tashkent. Another brother of [186] Khan Vali, Sultan Tyz, who was also devoted to China, is known to us only for his hatred of the Buruts.

Tyz was not the only one to attack his bloodthirsty neighbors. [721] Several sections or branches of the Kazaks who lived near the Chinese borders continued to maintain the war against the Buruts

[265 cont.]

x 648 begun by Ablai. But the Buruts, who were accustomed to con-
[721] stant fighting, were not easy to defeat. The Chinese also ex-
perienced the effects of their valor several times and sometimes
were vanquished by them. Thus it is not surprising that Sultan
Tyz, who rashly attacked them with a handful of men, was
[727 defeated and taken prisoner, and he emerged from prison only
728] under humiliating conditions and after giving them the slaves
which belonged to him.

[721] The elder Berdy Khoja suffered still more from the
Buruts (1). He ruled the part of the Middle Horde which
nomadized near the Chinese borders, and often fought against
the savage Kirgiz, winning battles against them frequently. In
1785 he won quite an important victory over them, but it was
his last. Acting as an auxiliary of the Chinese army, which was
marching against them from the shores of the Ili, he advanced
swiftly from the shores of the Ayaguz and gave them a terrible
rebuff. Encouraged by his success he set out again with a small
number of his men and halted on his arrival at the Jidisse /Djidis?/
to await reinforcements. The Buruts took advantage of his
[727] weakness and attacked him during the first night, defeating him
and taking him prisoner. The unfortunate elder, in despair,
knowing the customs of his enemies, could no longer hope for
good luck in the future, and resolving to hasten his death, he
killed one of the Buruts who was [266] leading him to the chief
of the tribe. The others could not endure the idea of letting
this act pass unpunished for an instant. They stopped on the way

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1. This same Berdy Khoja came to the fort of Semipalatinsk in the month of July, 1785 and imparted the information to the Russians which we have given here about Ablai's son and on the Buruts. This was published for the first time in Sibirskii Vestnik, Bk. III, 1820, and we have taken it from this source.

[266 cont.]

x648 and put Berdy Khoja to death in the most barbarous manner. They [727] cut off his head, his feet, and his hands, and then they opened his stomach and put all the dismembered parts into it.

The revenge which was exacted for this execrable assassination showed that if the Kazaks were less valorous than the Buruts, they yielded nothing to them in ferocity. Ak-Kaiak, the brother of Berdy Khoja, and his sons Lepes and Choka, in a fortunate battle with the Buruts, managed to capture the son of the elder of the latter group and to bring him to their village. There the wives of Berdy Khoja threw themselves upon the unfortunate prisoner. Each of them wanted to kill him. It was a question of who would inflict the most wounds upon him, and he finally died under their blows.

[721] Let us return to the Little Horde. It was an object of concern to the Russian government in many respects during the ten years from 1781 to 1791. Above all, the goal of these concerns was to re-establish order and peace, but they had no success and often found themselves obliged to have recourse to arms in order to punish the bandits who never ceased to make raids over the Orenburg border in defiance of all kinds of reproof.

Having firmly resolved to introduce some kind of order among the Kazaks and from there to come little by little to fixed regulations, in 1872 Empress Catherine commanded first, the establishment of a special border administration under the name of the expedition of the borders, whose duty would be to use [233 every possible means to carry out Her Majesty's benevolent in- 166] tentions toward the Kazaks; and second, she abolished the prohibition against allowing the livestock of the Kazaks to enter within the line to spend the winter (1). Third, she gave strict

1. Besides, it is well to note that in spite of this prohibition the Kazaks [267] often crossed the Ural River secretly and came to spend the winter with their animals in the Astrakhan steppes.

[266 cont.]

x648 orders to the authorities to keep [267] constant and vigorous watch upon the maintenance of justice, desiring that they grant the Kazaks every possible protection and help (1). Fourth, large [314] sums of money were given to build mosques on the borders of Orenburg and Siberia, to which schools and caravansaries were to be attached.

[177] By assembling all these establishments at the principal points of the border, the Empress intended not only to bring the Kazaks closer to the Russians but also to moderate their ways.

Exertions and expenditures were all in vain, for the Kazaks showed not the slightest desire to be civilized. In the [721] following year (1783) they did so much damage with their raids that it was impossible not to use armed force to punish them. Consequently, in the month of February, 1784, a detachment of 3,462 men was sent beyond the Ural River, and when they were unable to find the guilty persons, they seized 43 Kazaks who had [722] not taken any part in the last raids, in order to force them to x648 give up the prisoners. Their kinsmen were exasperated by this 721 injustice and immediately crossed to the right bank of the Ural 726 to avenge themselves. Independently of this attack, the residents along the border were laid waste at other points by Kazaks who were not pillaging for vengeance but for the love of pillage (2). A certain Syrym Batyr stood out among them, and we will soon point him out as a man chosen to be the instrument of the most important revolutions among the Kazaks. Meanwhile

1. This wish of Empress Catherine was written in her hand, December 27, 1782 on the report from the commander of Orenburg, Lieutenant General Apukhtin.

2. In 1784 the Kazaks captured 176 Russians, and 175 in 1786? who knows how many more -- they killed?

x 648 [267 cont.]
721 we will say that his raids and those of his partisans forced the
726 Russians to send two [268] detachments of troops beyond the Ural. The first was composed of 2,760 men and was sent from the Ural toward the source of the Emba. The second, of 1,250 Cossacks, was sent from Uralik /Uralsk?/ toward the mouth of that same river. Snow prevented these troops from acting according to their instructions, but nevertheless the expedition was not entirely useless. They seized 213 women and children, for
[727] whose ransom a large number of Russians who had been captured earlier were given up.

x 648 439 712 It will be understood that such conditions were not of a sort to make caravan trade flourish between Russia and Central Asia. For a long time the khans' promises to protect the caravans had not been believed. Long experience had made their weakness known. Nor could it be hoped to restore the brigands to reason for a long period of time. For this reason means were sought to establish the safety of trade by force of arms. It was proposed, to this end, to build forts on the Emba and Temir rivers and defenses on the route from these two points to Iletsk [Sol-Iletsk], or to set up only one fortification on Mangyshlak [Peninsula] on the Caspian Sea and to send the caravans from Guryev by sea. Thus from Orenburg to Guryev they could follow the route along the Nizhne-Uralsk line in complete safety.

One of these plans was not carried out, partly because of the extraordinary difficulties which had to be surmounted and partly because the old trade routes were very advantageous to the Khivans and Bukharans, for although the new ones would have beem safer, they still would not have been entirely safe from attack.

x 648 692 The Orenburg border commission controlled matters pertaining to the Kazaks, or rather it examined all the relations of the govenent with this people, but it could not study the individual disputes which arose between the residents on the two sides of the line. The [269] Empress, in order to remedy this, conceived the plan of establishing a tribunal in whose operations the Kazaks would take the same part as the Russians, and which would serve them as a school of justice. This at least was what

5: Levchine--136 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

X [269 cont.]
648 Catherine thought when she signed the ukase on May 2, 1784
692 for the formation of a border tribunal. Under the chairmanship
of the supreme commander of Orenburg, it was composed of two
clerks, two merchants, and two peasants who were Russians, a
Kazak sultan and six Kazak elders, a deputy from the Bashkirs,
and one from the Meshcheriaks. Its duty consisted of examining
litigation and criminal cases which might take place between the
Kazaks and the border residents.

X 648 At the same time as this establishment, from which great
[346] advantages were expected, it was ordered to open mosques and
schools for the Kazak children (1). The mosques were finished

1. May 2, 1784.

at Orenburg and Troitsk in 1785, and when this news was received, Catherine gave orders (2) to build schools and caravansaries

2. September 4, 1785.

or markets on the same sites without delay.

The persistent concern which this sovereign took in the state
of the Kazaks was guided by her close attention to matters concerning them and a perfect knowledge of the real situation of her half-
[177 savage subjects. Their constant banditry did not divert her from
721] the intention of giving them a taste of good organization. On the
one hand, she justly forgave them for many signs of insolence, as
men who had no idea of the advantages of public order. On the
other hand, her clever mind was not slow to discover that the Kazak
raids were often no more than just reprisals for the wrongs and
violences they had undergone from the Russians on the border,
without speaking of the Bashkirs, who often crossed the Ural in
defiance of all the prohibitions against it and laid waste their
enemies.

X 648 [270] Actually, many of the raids were the fruit of vengeance.
721 But the daring undertakings of a powerful band of brigands, which
gathered in 1784 near the borders, were not among those which

[270 cont.]
x 648 had been provoked. This band was composed of 3,000 men under
721 the command of Batyr Syrym, of whom we have already spoken.
For a long time it threatened several forts on the Orenburg line,
[724] and finally this daring band succeeded in winning a considerable
victory at the fort of Tanalytsk and against a body of troops sent
against them.

x 648 In 1785 a revolution began in the internal administration
668 of the Little Horde, which is of great note to the historian and
very interesting to the political scientist. The end for which it
was undertaken held to the plan conceived by Catherine and her
ministry to establish peace among the Kazaks. We shall describe
the means by which the local authorities attained such a desirable
result. Baron Igelstrom, who was then appointed to the post of
governor general of Orenburg and commander of the entire Russian
border from the Caspian Sea to the Tobolsk gubernia, found the
Little Horde in a state of violent agitation and the borders of the
[721 provinces in his care in danger. Troops of armed Kazaks riding
727] about the left bank of the Ural River caused the constant fear of an
attack and kept the peasants from busying themselves with the
work in the fields. And whenever they found a chance, they
carried men off, pillaged, and led away the livestock. The detachment commanded by Batyr Syrym showed itself even more
daring.

x 648 His attack on the fort of Tanalytsk was one of the first
721 events which took place after the arrival of Baron Igelstrom in
662 Orenburg. In order to take advantage of this fact, Khan Nurali
hastened to inform the new governor that all the brigandage
was committed by Kazaks who were defying his orders; that
Syrym was not satisfied with denying his authority, but was
even arousing the entire horde against him, and that in order
[271] to prevent the greatest disasters, both for Russia and for
the Kazaks, it was indispensable to punish the rebels by force
and to remove the fomenters of disorder from the horde. The
Khan concluded as before by acknowledging his weakness and
requesting help to bring the bandits to their proper duties.

[271 cont.]

x648 All this was true, but no one paid any attention to it be-
[721 cause no one in Orenburg believed in Nurali's sincerity, and the
[662] new government, being prejudiced against him, believed the
727] re-establishment of peace in the horde to be impossible without
changing its administration, or at least without a new khan.

x648 Baron Igelstrom's first choice for a new khan was Kaip, son
662 of Sultan Batyr, who had reigned in Khiva and was driven out
for his rapaciousness and cruelty. We have spoken of him several times, as well as of his father. The central government could not ignore the acts of hostility committed by this sultan against the Russians, nor his conduct in Khiva, and therefore his election was put off until more detailed information could be collected concerning him (1). And in the end it did not take place (2).

1. Rescript from the Empress to Baron Igelstrom of November 25, 1785.

2. A similar rescript of November 12, 1786.

Kaip was proposed for this position twice. The first proposal was brought about by two plans drawn up by Baron Igelstrom, who had firmly decided to introduce a new form of government in the Little Horde.

x648 In one of these plans he proposed to divide the horde into
[621 three sections, according to the number of its descent lines,
177] namely those of Semirod, Baiulin, and Alimul, and to give each
643] a khan, but to limit the authority of these new chiefs so that they
would bear only an honorary title and be, in effect, only the executors of the commands of the supreme head of the government of Orenburg.

[272] The other plan was to abolish the position of khan in the Little Horde completely and gradually to apply to them the
[671] code given by Catherine for the administration of guberniyas.

This last thought was drawn from one of the cherished as well as most remarkable works of the Empress, and thus it was especially commended and confirmed in St. Petersburg.

[272 cont.]

x648 No one stopped to reflect on the possibility or impossibility of carrying out this measure, because the Orenburg administration had proposed it itself and must have the means of accomplishing it.

[177] Having received the approbation of the court, Baron Igelstrom at once began to introduce the new order of things.

His first step produced results which were in perfect harmony
x648 with the end to which he aspired.

646 Without the intermediary of the Khan, he sent solemn procla-
728 mations throughout the entire horde, in which, without speaking
668 of the Khan nor of the sultans, he invited the elders and the peo-
177 ple to form an assembly in order to come to an agreement on the means of maintaining order in the horde and living in obedience to the Russian government. He advised them to renounce brigandage and raids and to expect the pardon they deserved for their repentance or severe punishments for the crimes which had been disturbing public order. These proclamations almost completely destroyed the last vestiges of the weak power of the Khan. Many Kazaks who were followers of the Khan abandoned him and joined his enemies, and all together they formed a national assembly which did not contain one sultan, and where Batyr Syrym, of whom we have spoken, twice presided as chief.

x648 The confidence shown by the people in Syrym in this instance
646 is very common, and is in perfect harmony with the Kazak notions
728 of the greatness of spirit. But who would fail to be surprised at the consideration given in Orenburg to this [273] man who the year before had been the leader of a band of brigands, at whose head he had attacked Russian troops and forts?

All Syrym's actions showed that he was a man of vast intelligence but one unsatisfied, restless, and vindictive, and moreover, of an enterprising character rarely found among a half-savage people. After having distinguished himself among the bandits, he soon came to eminence in the council which had assembled to re-establish the general peace, as he believed that new and brilliant advantages lay in this for him. As he was an irreconcilable enemy of the Khan, not so much because of specific disputes with Nurali as of the longing he felt for the heriditary

x [273 cont.]
648 privileges which the latter held by birth, Syrym proposed that
646 the position of khan was unnecessary and sought to make up for
728 his own lack of illustrious ancestors by personal merit. Under
his influence the national assembly swore the oath of loyalty to
the empress of Russia without the least opposition, promised to
stop its raids, and to apply its efforts to maintain peace in the
horde and to obey all the commands of the Russian government.
But it demanded as a guarantee of Russia's protection, that
Abulkhair's descendants, including Nurali himself, should forever
lose the right to be khans of the Little Horde.

x648 Can one fail to recognize Syrym's ambition in this demand?
643 Nurali and his brothers were poor leaders because of their weak-
662 ness, not because of their cruelty. Thus they could not have
incurred the hatred of the entire horde to the point of forcing it
to consider their removal from power as necessary to their peace.
Then the government even went so far as to say that it was no
longer up to it to change the course of affairs, because the idea
of abolishing the position of khan had long since been adopted.
Moreover, the peaceful inclinations of the national assembly and
Syrym's clever actions seemed favorable to the re-establishment
of calm within the horde.

x648 [274] Actually, the year 1786 stood out among all other
721 years, especially the two preceding, because of the calm which
727 reigned during its span and the more frequent relations between
the Russians and the Kazaks. It is true that there were also
several disturbances springing from the abasement of all the sultans,
especially the descendants of Abulkhair. Nevertheless this does
not prevent our notice of the fact that the greatest exchanges of
[439] livestock (1) on the line took place in 1786 and 1787, and in the

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1. See the table on the quantity of livestock exc by the Kazaks with the Russians from 1745 to 1820 that we have included in the statistical article [pp. 426 to 427, not translated].

×648 [721 727 439] [274 cont.]

course of these two years fewer prisoners were taken on the border than in the 13 years from 1782 to 1794 (2). Likewise, in 1786 his subjects released quite a large number of Russians [567] from slavery, up to the time Nurali was banished from the horde after Ufa had been fixed as his place of exile and the detention of his brother Aichuvak at Uralsk. That same year 45,000 [167 579] tents spent the winter inside the Russian borders and crossed the Ural River again in the spring without permitting the slightest infraction of the peace.

The first effects of the new system of administration of the Little Horde could not fail to be pleasing [275] both to the Empress, who ardently desired to establish order among the Kazaks, and to the supreme commander of the border, who was approaching the goal indicated to him by the advice of his sovereign and who saw the possibility of pleasing her by insuring the prosperity of an entire people. Occupied with these thoughts,

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2. As proof, we include here the following table for these 13 years. Along the line which extends from the fort of Zverinogolovsk to Guryev, the Kazaks took 34 prisoners in 1782.

21	"	" 1783
176	"	" 1784
175	"	" 1785
12	"	" 1786
2	"	" 1787
43	"	" 1788
53	"	" 1789
90	"	" 1790
34	"	" 1791
40	"	" 1792
60	"	" 1793
42	"	" 1794

[275 cont.]
x 648 Baron Igelstrom not only forgot Batyr Syrym's former actions but
even took him under his special protection, chose him as the
instrument of his operations, maintained a correspondence with
him at once, and held conferences with him, as though he were
the chargé d'affaires or the representative of the entire national
[662 assembly. When the Khan was informed of these details, he wrote
152] that Syrym was a knave who was deceiving the government and that
he had no thought of re-establishing good order but only considered
his own interests. The Khan also said that he attributed his own
opinions to the entire assembly and that in his heart he was a
sworn enemy of Russia, etc. These accusations were vindicated
by time, but coming from the lips of a weak and humiliated
sovereign and under circumstances which explicitly belied his
accusations, they could not appear true and were accordingly
allowed to slip into oblivion. It is true that Nurali added certain
unequivocal signs of his devotion to Russia, for at this time he
[728] released several Russian prisoners whom he had brought to the
horde, offered his children as hostages, and placed himself at the
disposal of the government. But he was too late. His personal
submission was no longer needed. What was wanted was the force
of power or of genius, which alone was capable of acting upon
the horde.

x 648 Syrym had already acquired this force by his intelligence,
643 his influence over the people, and by the protection of the border
661 authorities. Thus it appeared that he promised greater advantages
than the Khan, who had shown nothing but weakness for 37 years.
The fate of this unhappy prince deserves pity. Yet following
the opinion he had formed of Nurali and the system which had
been adopted, Baron Igelstrom no longer found it possible to
keep him in the horde. Thus he asked permission to [276] have
the Khan brought into Russia, and once he had been received (1),

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1. By a rescript of the Empress of June 3, 1786.

x648 [276 cont.]

[643 661] he was no less quick to profit from it, as he was soon presented with an opportunity to do.

[721 579] Syrym's followers, as much to please him as to satisfy their own greediness, did not stop with committing offenses against Nurali in all sorts of ways, but ended by attacking villages and pillaging everything they found there. Nurali, defenseless, turned to the power of Russia and requested an armed guard from the border authorities. When he was refused, he decided to withdraw to Orenburg for a time in order to save his life, and from this city he was taken to Ufa, where he died four years later. His brother Aichuvak was detained during this time in Uralsk.

[152 662] It is useless to describe the impression which these events gave to Nurali's children and the other descendants of Abulkhair. The eldest and the best known, because of his intelligence and valor, was Sultan Erali, who had had frequent relations with Russia, as we have seen. But six years before he had conquered the Karakalpaks and lived with them on the Syr [Darya] (2). He knew perfectly well who was mainly responsible for the misfortunes of his brothers and who had caused them to lose the protection of Russia, which Abulkhair and his line had had for more than half a century. Anxious to avenge the grievances of his [726] family, he resolved to attack Syrym and marched against him with an army which was few in number but could be counted upon. Luck smiled upon Sultan Erali on this expedition. He captured the representative of the national assembly, the title which Syrym gave himself.

[668 643] At this same time other tribes of the Little Horde, who were not attached to Abulkhair's family but also did not wish to follow the incitements of Syrym or of his principal accomplices and who were accustomed, furthermore, to having khans,

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2. Bekehurin, an interpreter of Orenburg, traveled on the Syr in 1781, and found Sultan Erali was already sovereign of the Karakalpaks.

x648 [277] elevated Kaip, a man of whom we have already spoken, to
668 this position several times. A third part of the horde did not wish to
643 recognize Kaip; but it asserted, as his subjects, that the Kazaks
should have a khan, that their ancestors had found it necessary, and
that they did not wish to set aside a custom which was hallowed by
time. For this reason, they demanded either the return of
Nurali or another khan in his place. During all this time, Syrym
was Erali's prisoner.

x648 The situation weakened the conviction of the Orenburg head,
177 and Baron Igelstrom, being afraid of allowing the Kazaks to indulge
643 themselves in new disputes, requested the confirmation of Kaip as
khan of the entire Little Horde. The Empress was of an entirely
different opinion. Having once decided to introduce a form of
government in the steppes beyond the Ural River which was in
harmony with that of the interior provinces, she did not wish to
change her plan unless absolutely necessary, and she replied,
with her usual firmness, with an explicit refusal to Baron Igelstrom
on November 12, 1786.

x648 Without entering into the good or the evil which could be produced by the authority of a khan among the Kazaks, we will only say that after all the proclamations made to the Little Horde in 1785 and 1786, Nurali's exile in Russia, and many other measures taken in order to introduce a new form of government among the Kazaks, Catherine could not give up a plan which had scarcely been tried without injury to her dignity. Consequently her reply was much more in accord with the dignity of the empire than was the proposal of the governor of Orenburg.

Besides, even if the Empress had consented to the restoration of the position of khan, she would not have preferred Kaip to the other sultans who had far more rights than he. Several circumstances were opposed to the accomplishment of his ambitious ideas.
[579] First, a report was even made to Orenburg of the fact that while
he was living on the Syr [Darya] after his expulsion from Khiva,
[177 [278] he had often pillaged caravans and had expressed an open
643] hatred for Russia (1). Second, there was another obstacle in the

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1. See Baron Igelstrom's reports of September 23 and October 15, 1786.

[278 cont.]

x648 promise given to Abulkhair by Empress Anna to choose khans
177 only from among his successors. Third, Nurali had on his side
643 not only his kinsmen but also the most powerful princes of the Middle Horde, the most important of whom was Sultan Khudai Mendi, a man as distinguished for his intelligence as for the large number of his followers and the authority he had acquired over them.

x648 Vali Khan took a great interest in Nurali's fate and argued
664 vigorously with the Russian government (2) on his behalf, and he also wrote the same thing and warmly defended the descendants of Abulkhair, whom he called the father of all the Kazak khans subject to Russia and the first creator of the submission of the Little Horde (3). Finally, in 1787 a large part of the national assembly expressed the desire to see Nurali returned to the horde, out of respect for Abulkhair, who was considered a saint by many Kazaks. All these circumstances spoke in Nurali's favor, but they did not promise peace among the Kazaks in the future. Therefore, the execution of the latest intentions of the Russian government, to introduce in the Little Horde an organization conforming to that of the interior guberniyas continued unabated.

x648 Meanwhile Batyr Syrym regained his freedom and once again
662 began to influence the people in accord with the plans of the
177 Orenburg authorities, which he seconded as long as [illegible] were not contrary to his own views. Under the guise of [illegible] to Russia and gratitude to the local authority which had chosen him as its instrument, Syrym helped Baron Igelstrom greatly in the reforms which he made in the Little Horde in 1787, which we are about to describe.

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2. See Baron Igelstrom's report of December 18, 1786.

3. See another of Baron Igelstrom's reports, that of September 29, 1787.

x 648 [279]

The most important was the establishment of tribunals, 692 which were called rasprava. Two of these were opened in the 177 Alimul and Baiulin descent lines, because of their large numbers. 693 The Semirod line only had one. Each rasprava was composed of a president and two members, who were required to meet every day and to examine, with all three present, the petitions addressed to them and to give their decisions, to give satisfaction to the injured and the oppressed, and to give the dissatisfied the right to appeal to the border tribunal sitting in Orenburg. But since the members of these tribunals did not know how to read, all the writing was confided to a mullah, or secretary, who was assigned to each tribunal with an aide. His duty was to stamp the papers which were entered, copy them in a notebook, make the notes and protocols, make the examinations, keep the registers, establish and inscribe the hours of hearings, and write the reports, communications, and orders. All this was to be done according to the forms given by the government of Orenburg.

In addition a principal elder was chosen in each of the three descent lines of the Little Horde and several secondary elders to supervise the conduct of the people.

Batyr Syrym, who belonged to the Baiulin descent line, was chosen as one of the three principal elders.

All those who were elected to fill the positions we have named for the first three years were called upon to swear an oath to serve faithfully. Later they were confirmed (1) by the Empress, and they were given large stipends, partly in wheat and partly in money.

1. The preliminary decision of the Empress to open the tribunals was presented to Baron Igelstrom by a rescript of June 3, 1786, and the confirmation of the elders nominated for the places on December 7, 1787.

[279 cont.]

x648 After this beginning Baron Igelstrom, who felt, on the
basis of Syrym's assurances, that the establishment of peace in
the Little Horde was inevitable, [280] prepared to build cities,
mosques, caravansaries, and schools in the middle of the steppes.
[177] He reported this to the Empress and planned to comply in everything
with the organization of the provinces of the interior and
to the regulations published in Russia on public education.

[181] This gratifying and consoling hope did not last long. By
the following year, 1788, it was beginning to weaken, and soon
it disappeared completely. The people, who had long been
[662 accustomed to excitement and brigandage, tired of their in-
578] activity and once more began their old disputes, driven from
643 one side by Nurali's kinsmen, from another by Kaip, and from
a third by Batyr Syrym. The followers of the latter were the
most numerous and the most active. The sultans could have no
power over them, as they were no longer respected. The elders
[692] chosen to supervise the conduct of the people, as well as the
heads of the tribunals, had no authority and dared not give
commands, and followed the stream which carried them along.

[721 These internal circumstances were joined by others which
662] acted from outside. The Turks, then at war with Russia, sought
to incite the Bukharans against the Russians. The Bukharans
aroused the Little Horde, and it was to this end that they suggested
to Erali, at first, that they help him take back Khan Nurali by
force. Later they entered into relations with Syrym and sent him
x648 and those of his line an appeal couched in these terms:

721 "To the brave warriors, beys, and elders, Sarytai bey,
771 Syrym Batyr, Shukurali bey, Sadyrbek, Barak Batyr, Dajdan
186 Batyr, peace and blessing. And now our words. Glory to the
662 most high God! By His holy grace, all our affairs are running
smoothly. We have but one sorrow. Not long ago an ambassador
came to us from the Turkish sovereign, vicar of God, with a
letter informing us that the infidel Russians have assembled from
all sides and, in alliance with the seven Christian states, have
started to march. [281] Since you live closer to the Russians than
we do and, consequently, know better how to fight them, we propose

[281 cont.]

x 648 to all the servants of God and followers of Mohammed who trust
721 in the protection of Our Prophet, to join the Turkish army with
771 goods and with sentiments, and to go and strike the infidels.
186 This is a matter for which a great reward can be obtained. And
662 if in this war anyone fails to do all the harm possible to the
infidels, he must fear the great anger of God, and may not hope for the protection of Our Prophet. Besides, we beg that there should be faith in the words of the envoy.

"We learn that you Kazaks do not have your own wise and learned men, and for this reason you cannot carry out the laws of Our Prophet at all. And since the Lord God has commanded that his principles be known and that prayers be offered in conformity to his principles, fasting be observed, and alms be given of one's possessions, then the knowledge of letters in order to read books belongs to the service of God. There is a source of wisdom among us today. For from all the peoples, including the Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Arabs, and Turkmen, there are many who study in our schools, but from you, who are such a numerous people, there is not a single student. In the Koran, Our Prophet has prescribed that every believer, not only the husband and the wife, but the small children as well, should study the law and fear God and that when they are able, they should inform others. For this reason we advise you to send here two or three men from each tribe to be instructed. If they will not listen to your urging, then take two or three men from each tribe by force. They will receive their subsistence from us, and when they will have finished their studies and are skillful in the law, they will return to their homes with the principles of piety and the habit of prayers and fasting. And if you have the means of carrying out our proposal, O Kazak people, and leave it without execution, then [282] you will become traitors to God in this world, and on the day of resurrection you will burn in the fires of hell. If we did not offer this truth for your consideration, we ourselves would deserve the name of infidels in this world, and we should expose ourselves in the future world to the eternal fires of hell.

x648 [282 cont.]

721 "In closing, we are respectfully, in the year of the Hegira
771 1202 (1788 after the birth of Jesus Christ)."

186 To this letter was affixed the black seal of the atalyk of
662 Bukhara (first minister of Shah Murat).

Syrym, in spite of his ties with the Orenburg authorities,
721 replied to the atalyk that he himself and his followers were ready
662 to obey the commandments of God, but that they could not begin
the war until the Bukharans and the other Asiatic peoples had entered
Russia.

This step came to the knowledge of the Russian government, and Syrym began to be suspected and his duplicity discovered, and all confidence in him was lost. On his part, he did not wish to suffer humiliation, and although he still seemed devoted for a certain time, at the same time he no longer seemed so disposed to agree with the views of the Orenburg gov-
721 ernment. Meanwhile his followers were again pillaging Russia
578 as before. The raids on the borders increased daily. The disputes
became much stronger in the horde. While the sultans and part of the people demanded a khan, the elders charged with supervising the conduct of the people, as well as the members of the tribunals, did not carry out anything, never met, did not look into matters, did not come to Orenburg except to collect their stipends, and had no influence over the horde.

643 In this state of affairs there was no longer anything else to do but to return to the old administration and to re-establish the position of khan. An auspicious pretext was offered for this re-establishment when Nurali, at his death, commanded, among his last wishes to his children, that they remain faithful to Russia.

[283] The Russian government's sole desire to designate a new khan for the Little Horde was a bolt of lightning to Syrym and stripped off the mask with which he had covered himself. When he saw his most cherished hopes destroyed and had lost all his importance, he no longer had the will or the need to restrain himself. For this reason he returned to his early pursuits and once more openly began to act as a brigand.

[283 cont.]

x 648 It was in 1790 that he began to give the strongest proofs of his hatred. But before describing them, we believe it our duty to recall certain regulations made by Empress Catherine for the good of the hordes during the period when the establishment of peace seemed possible there and even close at hand.

[431 423] On August 13, 1786, on the occasion of a demand for a concession of land made by Khudai Mendy, sultan of the Middle Horde, the border authorities were commanded not only to yield it to him as well as to his subjects, but also to give assistance in money as a pure gift to every family which wished to settle.

On July 15, 1788 it was permitted to give land to Kazaks who went into Russia without requiring any confirmation for this.

[871] On February 28, 1789 the staff of the Kazak schools on the Orenburg line were confirmed and the salaries of the teachers and the expense of feeding the students at the cost of the government were settled. It was further commanded that their fathers be given, as encouragement, certificates of praise, gifts, etc.

[642] On April 30, 1789 Baron Igelstrom received an order to compose a plan for a constitution for the Kazaks based on folk customs, habits, and oral laws.

x 648 668 Although Russia had already recognized the absolute necessity of re-establishing the position of khan in the Middle Horde, the khan had not yet been elected when Syrym broke every [284] kind of liaison with the governor of Orenburg and declared himself the foremost enemy of the Russians. Not satisfied with having aroused his compatriots and having attacked the inhabitants on the right bank of the Ural River, he sought help in Bukhara and sent agents into that land to this end in 1790. The Khan's atalyk replied that help would be sent, but after a certain time. Meanwhile he advised Syrym to continue his raids on the Russian border. One of the envoys who had received this reply in Bukhara was later taken prisoner by the Ural Cossacks and personally gave the

nost positive details about his embassy.

In the month of March, 1791 Syrym, hoping to induce the
ntire Little Horde to invade Russia, convoked a great national
ssembly at the mouth of the Emba and had letters distributed
verywhere to arouse the nation. This undertaking was not fully

[284 cont.]

x648 successful, because the sultans, and especially the descendants of
646 Abulkhair, were trying to please the Russian government, having
721 been informed of the Empress' intentions to re-establish the post
of khan among them. As for individual raids, Syrym's followers
continued them almost without interruption for seven or eight years.

x648 The main raids took place after the election of Sultan Erali
[726] to the position of khan, which was in 1791 by order of the Empress.
When she learned of Nurali's death, she commanded on January 29
that Erali be named his successor and that he be sent the patent of
[643] khan of the Little Horde without waiting for any representations.
In carrying out the will of his sovereign, the commander of the province of Orenburg at once informed Abulkhair's son of the honor which was being given him and invited him to appear at the border at the end of summer to receive the ceremonial investiture. Erali arrived at the Ural at the designated time with his followers and on September 4 was proclaimed khan, 15 versts from the fortress of Orsk.

This is how his election took place. On the day at the hour designated, Lieutenant General Peutling, supreme commander of [285] the border region of Orenburg, escorted by a body of troops appeared before the assembled Kazaks and commanded first of all that the imperial document be read to them, in which it was said that Erali had been designated khan, both because of his personal merit and because he was the eldest in Abulkhair's family. Then he invited the people to proceed to the election according to its old customs.

At this same moment there appeared the deputies of Batyr Syrym, those of Sultan Abulgazy Kaip, and those of several elders, who announced that they did not consent to the election of Erali. They received the reply that he had been designated by the wish of the Empress. The next day, after the proclamation of the Khan, that is, September 5, six deputies were chosen who were sent to St. Petersburg to ask that he be confirmed.

On September 6 a letter was received from the khan of Turkestan, Pirali, son of Nurali, in which this prince, who had

[285 cont.]

x648 pleaded since 1784 to be admitted under the suzerainty of Russia, once more repeated his request. His letter was sent to St. Petersburg, and on October 31 of the same year an ukase was given to receive him as a vassal of the empire.

x648 668 662 Meanwhile Syrym was manifesting more and more his desire to avenge the destruction of his power and the loss of the influence he had wielded in the horde during the time when the position of khan was considered unnecessary. At this time he had not completely lost the regard of his compatriots, which he owed to his earlier importance and his personal bravery. He still had enough means of doing harm to Russia and to the sultans who were devoted to Russia, above all when he had united what was left of his group with the subjects of Kaip, who had died shortly before and who had bequeathed to his children all the hatred of the descendants of Abulkhair which he had inherited from his father and his grandfather. After Kaip's death, the Kažaks who had recognized his authority passed under that of his sons, Sultans Abulgazy and Burkan (1). Syrym allied himself [286] with them and knew how, with the superiority of his intelligence, to make them the instruments of his plans.

Being unable to do without their help, Syrym ceased to inspire the people with contempt for the position of khan in general, as he had done before. But he proclaimed everywhere

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1. Their third brother, Shirgazy, was then in the service of Russia. He lived [286] in Petersburg for a long time, became accustomed to the glitter of Catherine's court, and seemed to have become European. But when he returned to the horde at the beginning of this [19th] century, he showed himself to be the worthy descendant of his bloodthirsty ancestors. Nothing of remark is known about his other brothers.

x648 [286 cont.]
661 that Erali's election was illegal, claiming that Baron Igelstrom
662 had concluded an agreement with the Little Horde by which he had promised, in the name of the government, to remove the descendants of Abulkhair forever from the position of khan. Using every possible weapon against Russia, he did not forget to call the Koran to his aid, pointing out that it is forbidden to Moslems
[688] to submit themselves to Christian powers. To this same end he sought, in 1791, to induce the Kazaks to end their barter with the Russians and, if possible, to withdraw into the interior of the steppes. He spread the rumor that he was expecting the Bukharan army which the khan of that country had promised him. He sent his son to Khiva in 1793 to ask for similar aid, and although he received a flat refusal, he boasted nevertheless of the success of the embassy. In 1792 he addressed an extremely insolent letter to Peutling, chief of the viceroyalty of Ufa, in which it was not enough to insult him by the most coarse expressions, but the Empress was attacked as well. Finally, in his
[721 rage, he solemnly declared war against Russia. The results of this
726] declaration were several new raids by bandits, made by Syrym upon Ilezkoi [Iletski] Gorodok [now Ilek], Fort Kalmuk, and various other places on the Iletsk line.

x648 Khan Erali could not make his enemy see reason, and therefore in 1792 he demanded that troops be sent to the horde to punish the offenders. The Empress did not grant this request. Rightly contemptuous of Syrym's malicious intentions, she [287] did not wish to spill the blood of the Kazaks, especially since the severe defeat they had suffered in 1790 in the midst of their steppes at the hands of the Ural Cossacks had in no way corresponded to her humanitarian intentions nor to the expectations of the ministry.

In the midst of the disturbances which were then troubling the Little Horde, we should note Erali's request for a house to be built for him near the fort of Orsk and the request of Sultan Ishim for the construction of a city in the midst of the steppes. Circumstances did not permit the satisfaction of this last demand at that time, but Erali's request would have been granted if he had not died in the month of June, 1794, after ruling the Little Horde for three years.

[287 cont.]

x648 This khan could not distinguish himself in such a short time and under such harassing circumstances. Yet his mind and his inclinations to support the Russian government in its views could have made him truly of service to his people.

[643] When the news of his death was received in St. Petersburg, the Empress commanded that inquiries be made among the Kazaks concerning whom they wished to have as khan and especially to find out their attitudes toward Sultan Ishim, eldest son of Nurali. [554] The latter had long been known for his attachment to Russia and was deserving, both for his personal qualities and the respect of the people, of inheriting the rank which had belonged to his father, his grandfather, and his most distant ancestors.

[631] Events served to lend greater force to his rights. The Little Horde was divided into two factions, the first under the name of Sultan Abulgazi, being obedient to Syrym, his ally and his rival, and the second ruled by Ishim. Russia could not count upon the first, for she had already had to suffer much mischief from it, and could still expect only hostile acts on its part. The second group included the sultans and elders who were most attached to Russia, and thus she could not act otherwise than to prefer it and to give privileges to its leader.

[643] [288] It must be noted, however, that even this group of the horde did not wish to choose Ishim as khan except under certain conditions. They asked that he become an independent sovereign (autocrat), that he not recognize the suzerainty of Russia, and that to this end he should withdraw into the interior of the steppes toward the Syr Darya. Ishim, who was accustomed to basing all his hopes on the protection of the Russian rulers, informed the Orenburg authorities of the demands of his people [664 681] himself, adding that Syrym's followers were not only preventing him from trying to find the bandits and pursue them, but were also exacting from him a kun /blood price/, or payment of 2,000 sheep, for having sent to Orenburg shortly before two Kazaks who were [643] famous for their banditry. Ishim's frankness and his promise not to go away from the Russian border led the government to use all its efforts to cause him to be elected khan. In mid-September of

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[288 cont.]

x 648 1795, his partisans assembled by invitation near Orenburg, and on [643] September 17 he was elected and proclaimed khan. They then swore on the Koran to live in peace with each other and not to disturb the Russian border.

x 648 681 Ishim's elevation did not diminish his attachment to the power which had given him a new title. After he became khan he did not cease to carry out the wishes of the Russian government as much as possible, against the wishes of his people, and this caused him to have many enemies. In order to avert the dangers which threatened him because of the severity with which he investigated the crimes as well the intrigues of Syrym and his followers, Empress Catherine decided to send him a detachment of troops to guard him and at the same time to help him carry out sentences against the offenders.

x 648 645 It was also decided to establish a divan or council of the khan around him to support him in the administration of the Little Horde. The members of this divan, chosen by the people from among the most distinguished sultans and elders, were to carry out the wishes of the Khan, to help him, to represent him, and to [289] live with him in houses which were ordered to be built for them in the steppes in the territory of Taissugan.

x 648 [669] These plans could not be carried out because Syrym Batyr attacked Ishim in November, 1797 near the fortified post of Krasny Yar [Krasnoiar] and, after causing him to perish cruelly, pillaged all his belongings.

This crime of Syrym's exhausted the patience of the government, but how and where was he to be punished, much less brought into Russia? No doubt it was possible to send troops against him, but the difficulty of looking for him, the maintenance of the troops beyond the borders, the loss of men from hunger and thirst, even the destruction of Syrym's followers still did not assure the success of the pursuit they might undertake. Thus we should not be astonished that this famous brigand evaded punishment for all his attacks against Russia.

[726] However, all the Kazaks who followed his example and pillaged the borders at that time did not remain without punishment.

[289 cont.]

x 648 During the winter of 1797-98, a strong detachment of Ural Cossacks
[726] crossed the Ural River and not only defeated the robbers but in exchange for the studs which had been taken from them in Russia,
[727] they carried off several thousands of horses, which were distributed to those who had suffered losses. Shortly afterward they were attacked by the Bashkirs, who took 5,000 horses from them.

It can be imagined that the Kazaks did not leave these two losses unavenged. The result was new raids, new reprisals, and new insults from one side and the other. In order to put an end to these disturbances, commissions were established on the borders composed of deputies of the Bashkir, Kazak, and Kalmuk peoples, as well as the Ural and Orenburg Cossacks. These commissions were supposed to examine the complaints which came to them from all sides and to satisfy them as much as possible, as well as to try to suppress permanently demands which were unjust or impossible to satisfy.

[290] These commissions did not fulfill the object of their meeting, and indeed scarcely set about satisfying the duties imposed on them, for no one appeared at the tribunal.

[167] At this time many Kazaks from different hordes asked to establish themselves permanently in Russia. Their requests were answered in an ukase of September 30, 1797, as a consequence of which 12,000 tents of the Middle Horde alone are settled down in various localities to this day.

[646] After Ishim's death the government of the Little Horde was entrusted to a council composed of Sultan Aichuvak, son of Abulkhair, as president, and six councilors, two from each tribe. They were all chosen by Baron Igelstrom, who was then commanding the Orenburg border area for the second time and had once
[648] again given the government the idea of maintaining the Kazaks without the intermediary of a khan. When Emperor Paul had sent a confirmation of his demands, he chose the Khobda River as the
[646] permanent residence of the council and had it opened in this region by the mufti Mohammed Djan Hussein, who was sent from Orenburg in 1797. The councilors took an oath of loyalty and swore to carry out their duties zealously, and the mufti remained with them

[290 cont.]
x648 for some time to observe their conduct. His supervision soon be-
[646] came useless, because the nomads did not wish to have a
council, did not turn to it in their affairs, and asked for a khan.

x648 In order to comply with their wishes, that same year it
643 was ordered to proceed with the election of a successor to Ishim.
Most of the horde wanted to elect Sultan Karatai, son of Nurali,
but his devotion to Russia was doubtful. Sultan Aichuvak, son of
Abulkhair and uncle of Karatai, who had presided over the council,
inspired much more confidence in the government and had much
more right to this honor. In October, 1797 the Kazaks assembled
near the [291] border proclaimed him, and the following year
Emperor Paul confirmed him, as the chief of the entire Little
Horde. The council which had been formed to govern the Little
Horde after Ishim's death was ordered to remain constantly by
Khan Aichuvak and was called the council of the khan.

x648 It can be seen by the Orenburg archives that Aichuvak had
[643 often distinguished himself, not only by his attachment to Russia
554] but also by his influence over the Kazaks while they were ruled
by Nurali. Thus his elevation to the rank of khan seemed to
promise various advantages. However, what followed did not
justify this hope. Being burdened with age, the Khan could not
[579 act as he had earlier and was nothing more than a very weak leader.
[578] The internal disputes, the Buruts, the pillaging of caravans, the
721] raids on the Russian frontier, especially against the Bashkirs, the
acts of vengeance which were taken after these, the investigations
[43] and the punishments caused a terrible confusion in the Little Horde.
The commissions formed of deputies from the different peoples,
which we described above, could not act, and it was decided to
dissolve them. The Khan did not have enough power to punish
the guilty or to protect the oppressed. The disorder and anarchy
which had more or less always prevailed among the Kazaks increased
from one day to the next, and finally the dissensions spread
everywhere.

[669 These circumstances produced very important consequences.
169] Many of the Kazaks who were nomadizing near the Ural River
withdrew to the far end of the steppes and refused to obey the
descendants of Abulkhair. Some of them fused with several

x [291 cont.]
248 descent lines of the Middle Horde and chose to live much farther
[669 to the east than the former. Others withdrew to the mouth of the
166] Syr[Darya], and after overthrowing the Karakalpaks, they chose
[727] Sultan Abulgazi Kaip as khan.

A third group attacked the Turkmen, and after forcing them to give up part of their lands, they occupied a large part of the isthmus which separates the Aral Sea from the Caspian Sea. Aichuvak himself and several sultans with [292] him were obliged to cross the Ural River to save their lives and to remain in Russia until this general fermentation was calmed.

[643 Sultan Bukei, son of Nurali, who had had the place of
646] president in the council of the khan, did the same, but he followed a different course. He lived near the border of the
[167] government of Astrakhan, and knowing that after the departure of the Kalmuks, many lands had remained deserted which were suitable for pasturage, he decided in 1799 to leave forever the steppes beyond the Ural River and to go over into the territory called Ryn Peski. Having decided thus and hoping to become an independent khan soon, Bukei addressed himself to General Knorring, the governor general of Georgia and Astrakhan, begging for permission to occupy the lands he had chosen between the Ural and the Volga and the freedom to transport there the Kazaks in his auls, while assigning him 100 Cossacks with their officers in order to maintain order.

It was impossible to neglect a proposal which was so advantageous and so useful. Governor Knorring brought it to the attention of Emperor Paul, who, by an ukase of March 11, 1801, commanded that it be put into execution.

[619 Without losing time, Bukei prepared to move into Russia
167] about the autumn of that same year. The Kazaks who followed him belonged mostly to the Baiulin descent line. There were few of the Alimul line and almost none from that of the Semirod. All
[511 of them together comprised about 10,000 tents. Once they had
727] occupied the Ryn Peski, they promptly became a clear and striking demonstration of the effects of a peaceful life. While their compatriots beyond the Ural River, ruined and exhausted by their

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[292 cont.]
648 dissensions, came to sell their children in Russian villages, Bukei's
[511 subjects not only remained peaceful but also became rich to the
727] point that their herds and studs increased almost tenfold in the
course of seven or eight years. It seemed that [293] such an attractive example for every nomadic people should have inspired
[181] the Kazaks to follow it, but their love for their savage freedom
and their homeland was more powerful than any example.

It is time to return to the history of the Middle Horde, which we interrupted at the moment when Vali, son of Ablai, became khan. Our silence concerning this part of the Kazak people has been due, first, to the uninterrupted continuation of the events which took place in the Little Horde during the last 20 years of the last century, second, to the monotonous calm in the Middle Horde during this period, and third, to the fact that this very calm makes the external relations of the horde with Russia, as well as the events which took place within the horde, unremarkable.

The statement of these reasons no doubt causes every reader to wonder why the Middle Horde enjoyed and still enjoys today more tranquillity than the Little Horde, even though the two hordes are composed of one and the same people. In our opinion two circumstances have produced this difference: the situation of the lands occupied by the two hordes, and the difference in ways, partly arising from this geographical position and partly from other causes. We shall explain ourselves in greater detail.

[101] The Little Horde has its compatriots for neighbors only to
the east. In the south it is often attacked by the Khivans, in the
[727] north it has the Bashkirs, its irreconcilable enemies, and in the
west it has suffered much in the past from the Ural Cossacks. Thus,
having had to sustain violent attacks from all sides, it has not been
able to remain at peace for long and has grown accustomed to
disturbances and to raids into neighboring territories. In addition,
[643] the khans are always distinguished for their weakness. The
Middle Horde, on the contrary, occupies the lands which have
[101] the Little Horde to the west. To the east it has its compatriots
of the Great Horde and the establishments of the Chinese border.
In the north is the [294] Siberian line, whose inhabitants are

[294 cont.]
x648 very peaceful. To the south there is once again the Great Horde,
[101] or the subjects of what is now the khanate of Kokand, including
the people of Tashkent, Turkestan, etc., who are little accustomed
[721] to war and little inclined to make raids upon the Kazak peoples.
With these neighbors, the Middle Horde was exposed only to the
attacks of the Bashkirs, who bordered it on the side of the fort of
Troitsk, and to those of the Buruts in the south. But the extent to
which these peoples could do damage was so small compared to
the expanse of its lands, that one must admit the advantages of its
geographical position over that of the Little Horde and to conclude
therefore that it was much less troubled than the latter from the
outside.

[721 Having clarified our first thought, we believe it is also
181] very simple to explain the second. For there is no doubt that a
people which is less often obliged to defend itself against outside
attack and less frequently prompted to wreak vengeance acquires
milder habits than a people which is always doing battle with
its enemies. We will note, in addition, that the khans and sultans
[643] of the Middle Horde always had more power and influence over their
subjects than those of the Little Horde. In this connection the long
administration of Ablai, first as sultan and later as khan, was
particularly useful.

[181 The Kazaks who followed Ablai became accustomed under
643] him to peace and the obedience which one can expect from a
half-savage people, and they remained peaceful under his son
Vali, although his khan did not have his father's talent for gaining
the general respect. On the other hand, however, he made a show
of never seeking the protection of Russia, paid no attention to
the demands of the authorities of the Siberian borders, refused to
surrender the Turkmen who had fled with the Kalmuks from the
government of Astrakhan and who were later held by Ablai, and
finally he persecuted the elders who were devoted to Russia. In
[167 1789 a large number of people who were considered [295] his
311] subjects crossed over into Russia with Tugum, sultan of the Great
Horde, in order to establish themselves permanently there, and
they received lands near the fort of Ust-Kamenogorsk for their
settlement.

[295 cont.]

x648 In 1793, Lieutenant General Strandman, commandant of the Siberian line, sent a body of troops into the Kazak steppes which liberated the Turkmen prisoners. Vali was so distressed at this loss that he complained to the Empress. The only satisfaction he received was the permission to come to St. Petersburg to explain all his needs and his requests, and he did not take advantage of this because he was afraid to leave the horde. Finally, after the death of his brother Chingis, he announced that all his complaints [662] had been made on the advice of his brother, and he reconciled himself with the local authorities and promised to help them in all matters.

This move, however, was not a proof of perfect devotion to Russia, for he wished to maintain his relations with China, following the example of his father, and to this end he sent his son to the emperor of China in the winter of 1794-95 to bear witness to his [643 submission. At the same time he continued to oppress the tribal 661] chiefs, except those who were attached to Russia. The result of this behavior was that in January, 1795 two sultans, 19 elders, 43,360 of their subjects and 79,000 other Kazaks submitted a petition to the Empress asking to be delivered from Vali's rule and to be accepted under the direct dominion of the Russian government.

The execution of this demand was too difficult and promised no advantage to Russia. In the meantime Vali showed signs of repentance and raised the hope that he would become reconciled with the malcontents, and therefore things remained in their original state.

[619] The part of the horde which lived along the Verkhne-Uralsk line and had the Bashkirs for neighbors, as we said above, in 1795 gave the most [296] convincing proof of the truth of our reflections about the causes which made the Middle Horde more peaceful than [639 the Little Horde. At the time when the tribes and divisions of the 721] Kazaks along the border were peacefully carrying on trade with the Russians on the Siberian line, it made several raids in the districts [727] of Chelyabinsk and Verkhne-Uralsk, laid waste several villages then, took many prisoners, and carried off quite a large number of

[296 cont.]

646 studs, to avenge themselves for the thefts and offenses committed [727] against them by the Bashkirs. Finally, this group decided to withdraw into the depths of their steppes and did not agree to come near the Russian borders except on the invitation of General Viazmitinov, the commander in chief of the Orenburg region.

[692] In 1798 it was ordered that a tribunal be established, after the example of the Little Horde and on the request of Khan Vali, in the fort of Petropavlovsk, for the judgment of suits and disputes between the Kazaks of the Middle Horde and the residents along the Siberian border. This tribunal, made up of deputies of these two peoples, was organized in 1800, but the Kazak members let several years pass without appearing, so that it was not opened until 1806.

Here we end the detailed description of the Kazak hordes. [114] Having shown everything which took place among these peoples until the end of the 18th century, we will not speak of the events of the 19th century. The time which has passed since its beginning is still too close to us, and the judgments we could bring to this period would seem either partial, or misplaced, or doubtful.

We consider it necessary, however, to mark the transition between the past and the present by indicating briefly the order of succession of the khans of the Middle Horde and the Little Horde of the Kazaks.

[643 578] Vali, who succeeded his father in 1781, reigned until his death, which came in 1818. However in his last years he was not the sole khan of the Middle Horde, for because of [297] his quarrels with several tribal chiefs and at the request of several Kazaks, in 1816 Emperor Alexander designated a second khan for this horde, who was Bukei, son of Barak, and who died in 1818.

[631] With him the title of khan died out in the Middle Horde. Today it is divided into districts and governed by a special regulation which we will enter at the end of this work. [This section not translated.]

[643] Aichuvak ruled the Little Horde until 1805 and then abdicated of his own accord because of old age and illness.

His successor was his son Djantiura, who was assassinated by his cousins, the sons of Khan Nurali, and their accomplices.

[297 cont.]

x648 After his death the Little Horde was without a khan for more [643] than two years. In 1812 his brother Shirgazy, who is still alive [1832], was elevated to that position, but he no longer rules the horde, because it too has been divided by the government into [631] three districts, whose chiefs are independent of the khan.

[643] At the same time as the elevation of Shirgazy, that is, in 1812, Sultan Bukei, son of Nurali, was appointed the khan of the Kazaks who had come with him from the left bank of the Ural into the government of Astrakhan and had since then been given the name of the Bukei Horde.

Bukei died in 1815, leaving several sons, of whom the eldest, Dhangir, was appointed khan in 1824. He is still governing the Kazaks who live in the government of Astrakhan.

This is the end of the list of the Kazak khans who have been recognized and confirmed by the Russian government. We do not include among them Barak, or Batyr, or Kaip, or his son Abulgazy, for, as we have said previously, they were not elected except by a small number of their partisans. The last, in spite of his title, was according to eyewitnesses (1), almost reduced

(1). See the memoirs of Dr. Bolshoi, who was taken prisoner by the Kazaks in 1803.

[298] to a state of mendicancy. His power and influence over the people was so weak after Batyr Syrym, that we would not even have mentioned him if he himself, his brothers and his children, among whom Sultan Arungazi must be particularly distinguished, did not continue to stand out for their hereditary hatred of Abulkhair's descent 578 line. We have followed the constant progress of this mutual hatred between the two families for a whole century. Our readers know that it already existed between Abulkhair and Kaip at the beginning of the last century.

It passed from them to their children, and to their grandchildren, and great-grandchildren, among whom it still continues today and who will carefully transmit it to their descendants, perhaps for another century or even more.

[298 cont.]

578 Kaip's principal descendants are indicated in the genealogical chart which we have made for them, as are the descendants of Abulkhair, as a complement to Tevkelev's charts to which we referred at the appropriate time.

[299]

Part III. Statistical Information on the Kirghiz-Kazaks

Chapter I. Population

101 When one speaks of a little known people, the first questions which seem proper to ask are usually as to what country they inhabit and what their population is.

The answer to the first is found here in the description which we give of the area occupied by the Kazaks, whose borders we also
161 indicate [in untranslated section]. The solution of the second seems impossible to us. If many of the civilized countries of Europe cannot know the exact number of their inhabitants, how can it be attained when it is a matter of half-savage nomads, who have no principle of administration, who are constantly moving from one place to another, and with whom the simple words of counting the people can suffice to cause an uprising?

Nurali, khan of the Little Horde, wished to know the exact number of Kazaks under his authority, and he charged his sons who
[578] governed the various tribes of this people with this duty. But a number of obstacles halted them from the first steps. He did not achieve his end and only managed to arouse grumbling and grave suspicions.

[166] A large part of the Kazaks who settled permanently in 1801 and 1802, under the orders of Sultan [300] Bukei, in the most favorable locations of the government of Astrakhan, crossed the Ural again in 1820 because the rumor had spread among them that it was wished to make a census of them and settle them in fixed places.

If one adds to this trait of their national character the vast expanse of the steppes occupied by the Kazak hordes and the

[300 cont.]

161 divisions of these hordes into several parts, he will be fully convinced that an exact census of this people is absolutely impossible.

Thus it is necessary to be content with information, no doubt quite uncertain, which they themselves have transmitted to the
162 Russians and which is far from resting on adequate data. The result of this is that the three hordes are composed of approximately 400,000 tents or families, and that of this number, the Great Horde has about 75,000, the Middle Horde 165,000, and the Little Horde 160,000 (1).

[161] 1. Since the beginning of the 14th /19th?/ century, the Little Horde has suffered considerable losses in men, as much through internal dissensions as through misunderstandings with their neighbors.

The number of individuals living in each tent is not always the same, but there is good ground for believing that the truth will not be distorted in carrying it to five or six, on the average. Consequently, the Great Horde would have 375,000 to 450,000 persons, the Middle Horde about 1,000,000, and the Little Horde about 900,000, while the three together would make up from 2,000,000 to 2,400,000 persons of both sexes.

Chapter II. Division of the People.

631 No matter what differences in origin are attributed to the tribes which make up the nation of the Kazaks, they have all been fused into a single people living in the same country, which
[301] in olden times was subject to a single chief. The proof of this is in the language, the religion, the customs, and the habits, which are everywhere the same.

643
173 The traditions confirm this, adding further that at the death of one of their khans, who had reigned over the entire nation, his three sons divided it among themselves, and that according to the order of birth of their respective chiefs, these three divisions

[301 cont.]

643 173 adopted the names of the Great (1), the Middle, and the Little Horde.
161 631 Tradition also has it that the difference in population of the groups was caused by war and varying success, and as the divisions gradually increased, each one divided into several descent lines which took the names of their chiefs or kept the names of their ancient ancestors, such as the Naimans, the Kipchaks, etc. The descent lines were subdivided in turn into tribes, and the latter into sections, the sections into branches, and the branches into parts. It is almost impossible to enumerate all these subdivisions. The work necessary (2) for such an enterprise would require too much patience and, above all, a long sojourn among the Kazaks, not only in every tribe or section, but also in every part of a section.

1. The other hordes regard the Great Horde as the oldest.

[115] 2. What zeal and love for genealogy one would need to have to decide to verify and examine the reports of the Kazaks! One says that his tribe is divided into five or six sections. Another asserts that it is divided into twelve. A [302] third confuses the sections of his tribe with those of the neighboring tribes. Finally, a fourth, who is more honest than any of the others, frankly admits his ignorance.

621 Thus we will limit ourselves to enumerating the descent
631 lines and the tribes, beginning with the Little Horde, as the
611 closest to Europe. We base ourselves on Tevkelev's memoirs
[114] written more than a century ago. (See the historical section [not translated]). In the opinion of the Kazaks themselves, the information contained in these memoirs is worthy of the greatest confidence, both by their precision and by the circumstances under which they were written.

[301 cont.]

The Little Horde

631 At its time of origin the Little Horde was composed of the
619 powerful Alchin descent line and of seven small tribes, which,
611 during the [302] civil wars and reprisals (baranta (1)), were not strong enough to resist the Alchin descent line, which was more numerous, but were combined by the famous Tiavka, khan of the Kazaks, into a single descent line which is known today as that of the Seven Tribes (Semirod). The ancient name of Alchin is still found in Khan Abulkhair's correspondence with the Russian government in the first half of the last century. This descent line was composed of two stocks, called Alimuly, that is "the sons of Alim," and Baiuly, that is, "the rich sons." Later the new subdivisions which took place in this horde caused the generic name to fall into oblivion. But the names of the two stocks, to which the name of the descent line belonged equally, survived. For this reason the Little Horde is divided today into three principal parts, namely: I. The Alimuly descent line; II. The Baiuly descent line; III. The Djetir-urug descent line, or that of the Seven Tribes (Semirod).

1. The Alimuly descent line is composed of six tribes, whose names are Kara-Sakal, Kara-Kissiek, Kitie, Dört-Kara, Chumekei, and Chikly.

II. The Baiuly descent line is composed of the following 12 tribes: Adai, Djapas or Yapas, Alacha, Baibakty, Maskar, Bershch, Tazlar, Issentemir, Cherkes, Tana, Kizyl-Kurt, and Shikhlar.

III. The Seven Tribes (Semirod) descent line is composed of tribes which are called Tabyn, Tama, Kerdery, Djagal-Baiuly,

[578 628] 1. Among the Kazaks, the name baranta is given to the raids they make against each other, most often as reprisals or as a consequence of hereditary vengeances.

[302 cont.]

631 Kereit, Tiliau, Ramadan (2).

619

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2. Some sections of the Middle Horde camp with the Little Horde, and likewise [303] some sections of the Little Horde are mixed with the Middle Horde. This fact does not destroy the genealogy of the nation.

[303]

The Middle Horde

The Middle Horde is divided into four descent lines: I. The Argyn; II. The Naiman; III. The Kipchak; IV. The Uvak-Girei.

The latter, like the Seven Tribes descent line, was formed by that same Khan Tiavka out of three tribes which will be named below.

I. The tribes of the Argyn descent line are Kara-Kissiek, Karavul-Kissiek, Chardjitim, Djandjar, Chakchak, Dõrt-Avul, Atygai, Altai, Tebich, Tabakly, Borchi, Karpak, Bassantien, Agysh-Kalkaman, Kandjigali, Koziugan, and Kukshal.

II. The tribes of the Naiman descent line are Ak-Bura (1), Bulachi, Kara-Girei, Tirs-Tamgaly, Dõrt-Avul, Kuk-Djarly, Irginiekly, Semis-Baganaly (2), and Sadyr.

1. Ak-Bura means "white wolf."

2. Semis-Baganaly means "those who have fat lambs."

III. The tribes of the Kipchak descent line are Tori-Aigyr, Tuiuchka, Kytabak, Bultun, Karabalyk, Kundelien, Tana-Buga, Uzun, Kuk-Boron.

IV. The Uvak-Girei descent line is made up of the tribes of Uvak, Girei or Kirei, and Tarakly.

[303 cont.]

The Great Horde

631 The Great Horde originally was composed of the Uisiun or
619 Usiun, Tulatai, and Sargam descent lines. Later the Konrat or
611 Kunrat descent line detached itself from the Middle Horde and
joined the Great Horde.

From these first descent lines the following tribes issued: Botboi, Chimir, Djanis or Yanysh, Sik-Am, Abdai-Suvank, [304] Sary-Suly, Chanych-Kily, Kanly or Kankly, Djalair, etc.

II. The Konkhrat descent line formed the following tribes: Bailar-Djandjar, Uras-Geldy, Kuldjegach, Bochman, Tok-Bulat, Yaman-Bai, Kura-Kusia, Etimlier, Kuyush-Kansyz.

Each of the tribes is divided into sections. A section is composed of parts, and the latter also have their subdivisions, and all have different names. For example, the Maskar tribe of the Baiuly (in the Little Horde) descent line has two sections, namely: Kutlu-Gadam and Massak. The Kutlu-Gadam section is made up of two parts called Kurman and Baba-Nasar. The Kurman part has three subdivisions, which are Atamkan, Umier, and Kudaigul. The Baba-Nazar part has two subdivisions: Abdu-Shokur and Djidik.

What a volume the names of all these subdivisions for the three hordes would make! Without wearying the reader with such
[561 an enumeration, it will suffice to say that the increase of popula-
178] tion among the Kazaks is constantly giving rise to new subdivisions,
and that the original names of the descent lines will end up by being lost. In this manner, the Baiuly and Alimuly have ceased to bear their generic name of Alchin. It also develops from this that there are Kazaks who do not know what descent line they belong to and know only the name of their tribe and their section.

It can be concluded that in a hundred years most of the names of the Kazak branches which we have cited will no longer exist except in the Russian archives and in the memory of a few old men.

565 In addition, these subdivisions concern only the common
611 people. The upper class has another genealogy. This is why
643 the Kazaks divide themselves into two estates, the White bone

[304 cont.]

565 611 643 [792] and the Black bone. The White bone is made up only of khans and their descendants, who have the title of sultans. /305] Zealous Moslems also put in this class the khojas, or descendants of saints in the Moslem chronicle of saints (1). The name of Black bone is used not only for the common people but also for the elders and other chiefs who do not have a hereditary position.

According to this distinction, one says "here is a sultan of the pure white bone," because he is descended from a khan in both the male and female line, and "this man is of mixed white bone," because his mother is of common descent.

[554] Thus one finds among the Kazaks the hereditary distinctions to which so much value is attached in Europe. Savages know how to take pride in services rendered by others, as we do, and to claim privileges as a recompense for the merit of their ancestors.

565 567 We do not place the Telenguts, or servants of the khans (2), in a special class, nor the kuls, or slaves. The former are accepted among the people and enjoy the same rights, while the latter are considered as chattel or merchandise and are not Kazaks. These are the Russian, Persian, Kalmuk, and other prisoners.

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[114] 1. Timkovskii, in his Journey to Peking, gives approximately the same meaning to the word khoja. Klaproth, in his notes to the French translation of this work, opposes Timkovskii's opinion. As for me, I repeat what I have heard many times from Kazak lips.

[728] 2. The Telenguts are of Mongol origin but were subjugated by the Kazaks and have adopted the language of their masters. See on this subject, Klaproth's note in his Magasin Asiatique, vol. I, p. 19.

[305 cont.]

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Chapter III. Principal Camping Sites of the Kirghiz-Kazaks.

Although the descent lines and tribes of the Kazaks, who are constantly moving from one place to another, cannot have [306] fixed habitations just for this reason, nor can they possess lands, strictly speaking, still, in order to avoid disputes, each group stays as much as possible in the same camping places, especially during the winter. Only reasons of the greatest importance can make them go against this custom.

Their present camping sites are approximately in the following places:

The Little Horde

The Alimuly descent line always spends the winter on the Syr [Darya] River, the Kuvan, and on the dry bed of the Yany-Darya, as well as in the sands of Kara-Kum, Burzuk /Barsuki/, and at the mouth of the Emba. Only a small part [of this descent line] camps on the Ilek River, the Or, and the Ural, from the fort of Krasnogorsk to that of Verkhne-Ozernaya. Their summer camps are on the Temir, Emba, Sagiz, Uil, Ilek, Khobda, Or, and Irgiz rivers, in the Mugodzhar Hills, and in the sands of Kara-Kum.

The Baiuly tribes are Adai, Cherkes, Tana, Baibakty, Shikhlar, Maskar, Kizil-Kurt, Issen-Temir, part of the Djappas [233] tribe, and most of the Alacha, Tazlar, and Bershch tribes. All nomadize in the territory opposite the lower Ural River line and spend the summer between the Ural and the Emba, in the vicinity of the Karakul lakes and the Kuldagaity, Buldurty, Ulenty, Djusaly, Chungurlau, Ankaty, and Uilu rivers, as far as the Khobda. In winter they camp on the Caspian Sea, at the mouths of the Ural and the Emba, on the gulfs opposite Guryev, and some parts of the Adai tribe camp on Mangyshlak. The rest of the Tazlar, Alacha, and Bershch tribes are on the Syr [Darya], the Kuvan, and in the sands of Kara-Kum. Most of the Yappas camp in summer on the Tobol and the Turgai, opposite Troitsk, and in winter on the Syr [Darya] and the Kuvan.

[306 cont.]

101 Moreover, as was said earlier, several parts of all the tribes
361 of the Baiuly descent line (except for the Yappas tribe) crossed over
221 in 1801 and 1802 [307] into the government of Astrakhan, under
619 the leadership of Sultan Bukei. They camp in the district called
[1166
-101] Ryn Peski and form the horde there which is called the Bukei Horde.

The Djagal-Baily tribe, of the descent line of the Seven Tribes, spends the winter in the vicinity of the Irgiz, the Or, the Kumak, and the Sugunduk /Suunduk/ rivers, and the Karacha Mountains. It spends the summer near the Russian border, from the fort of Verkhne-Ozernaya to Verkhne-Uralsk, and extends south as far as the Irgiz.

The winter camps of the Kerder and Tama tribes are on the Ural River, from Orenburg to Uralsk, and their summer camps are on the Donguz, Khobda, Kanlys, and Ilek rivers.

Most of the Tabyn tribe camps near the two preceding tribes. Another part camps on the Tobol, Turgai, Syr [Darya], Kuvan, and Emba rivers.

The rest move with the Middle Horde along the shores of the Issel and Tsu, and the desert known as the Aremetei.

The Kereit tribe spends the winter along the Syr [Darya], and in summer it comes to the Irgiz River, the Karacha Mountains, and Troitsk.

The Tiliev or Tilieu and Ramadan tribes in winter live on the Syr [Darya] and the Kuvan, near the camps of the Kereits. In summer they go to the Turgai River and the vicinity of Lake Urkach-Kandykli.

The Middle Horde

The Argyn tribe moves about in the vicinity of the Ulug, Boyan-Ola, Ireimen, Kizyl, Kuyucha, and Mukcha mountains, and the districts of Urch-Burlyk, Kylchakty, Uch-Kundan, and Bikchentei, and the shores of the Turgai, Nura, Tobol, Irtysh, Sary-Su, Ishim, Issel, Ubagan, Ulkoyak, and Ayati rivers, as well as the sands of Kara-Tusun and the environs of the Kizyl, Kurzhan, Tiba, and Bish-Kun lakes.

Most of the Naiman tribe [sic] occupies the Tarbagatai Range, the upper sections of the Irtysh River, and several other

[307 cont.]

101 localities in the direction of the eastern borders of the [308]
361 Chinese empire. The rest of them occupy the upper parts of the
221 Ishim, a sector of the shores of the Turgai, Kara-Uziek, Syr
619 [Darya], Kuvan, Lap-Su, and Kuk-Su rivers, the vicinity of Lake Ak, and the Ulug and Kichi mountains, etc.

The Kipchak descent line camps on the shores of the Issel, Turgai, Chakiek, Ubagan, Tobol, Ayat, Muyunli, and Uya rivers, opposite the forts of Troitsk, Stepnoi, and Ust-Uisk, and in the Kara-Kum desert, as well as in the districts of Aman-Karagay, Ebelei, Yedis, and Tiriekly.

The camps of the Uvak-Girei descent line are on the Ubagan, Ishim, Uya, Taguzak, Irtysh, Issel, Sary-Su, and Tsui or Chui rivers, as well as in the sands of Ich-Kungur, the vicinity of Lake Kechubay-Charkar, and opposite the part of the line between the forts of Stepnoi and Verkho-Uralsk, as well as opposite the forts of Zverinogolovskoye and Presnogorkovskoye.

The Great Horde

The tribes of which we have spoken camp on the Chui or Tsui, Tala-Su, Ili, Kuk-Su, Karatal, Chirchik, Syr [Darya], and Sara-Su rivers, in the vicinity of the lakes of Kara, Ala, Al-Su, and Anamas and the cities of Kuldja, Kashgar, Kukan /Kokand/, Tashkent, and Turkestan, and in the neighborhood of the Kara-Tau, Tarbagatai, and Chingiz-Tsazan [Chingis-Tau] mountains, as well as in the district called the Seven Rivers /Semirechie/. They are also in other regions near the Chinese border, in the old lands of the Dzungars. Some tribes live in the towns of Tashkent and Turkestan and in the near-by villages.

One part of the Kunkrat descent line moves about in these same areas, while another part camps with the Naimans.

[309] Chapter IV. Way of Life.

233 The Kazak way of life is a faithful image of that of the
181 patriarchs. The sight of a whole nation of shepherds, who live only, so to speak, for their flocks, the settlements or auls which

[309 cont.]
233 disappear from one place to appear a moment later in another,
181 the simplicity of this type of life which is so close to nature:
the whole offers the novelist or poet an interesting spectacle.
Their active imagination sees in the Kazaks the happy and carefree shepherds of Arcadia, or the peaceful contemporaries of
Abraham. They can delude themselves about the good fortune
of a people which does not know the vices which reign in the
cities and can seek in these lands the subjects of eclogues and
idyls. But the traveler, who is more wary, sees in the Kazaks
only half-savages, like the Scythians of Herodotus, the Mongols
of Chingis, the Bedouins of the present day, the Kurds, the
small peoples on the shores of the Yenisei, and the Hottentots
and other uncivilized races of Africa and Asia. Actually, the
Kazak hordes are close to these peoples, both in their ways and
in the numerous herds from which they draw their only subsistance
and which they follow from place to place with their movable
342 dwellings. The Kazak dwelling is a kibitka, or yurt, in other
words, a hemispheric tent made of a wooden trellis covered with
felt and provided with a large round opening in the upper part,
which is opened and closed at will. This serves as a window and
takes the place of a chimney when a fire is made in the tent.
These tents, which are like those of the Kalmuks in every way,
are from four to eight arshins (1) /2.84 meters to 5.68 meters/
high, and from [310] eight to fifteen arshins /5.68 to 10.67
meters/ in diameter. The trellis wall is attached by means of
ropes made of horsehair to posts fixed in the ground. The doors
are made of wood and adorned with ornaments made of small bones
which are inlaid. Sometimes a simple piece of felt takes the
place of a door. The ropes which serve to tie and hold the trellis
353 are usually of wool but of silk among the rich. In summer the
walls are covered on the inside with a kind of curtain woven of
straw and threads of various colors. In very hot weather the felt
is lifted from the bottom, and then these curtains let the fresh air

1. An arshin is slightly more than two
feet in France.

[310 cont.]
342 in and protect the interior of the tent from dust and the heat of
the sun. The tents of ordinary people are of gray felt, and those
of the great or the rich of white felt. But some sultans, the most
powerful ones in the Middle and the Great Hordes, have theirs
covered with red cloth and lined inside with fabrics of silk. The
[565] poorest people, on the contrary, substitute mats of tree bark and
leaves for the pieces of felt, and sometimes they even use reeds
and grass.

352 The far side of the tent, opposite the door, is occupied by
[291 chests covered with rugs. These serve for the storage of dresses,
411 robes, and other clothing. Rifles, sabers, bows, arrows, saddles,
415] harnesses, powderhorns, etc. are hung inside the tent, as well as
towels, teapots, jugs, tursuks (kinds of sacks of hide), and frequently pieces of smoked horsemeat as well. The ground, which
serves as the floor, is covered with rugs or pieces of felt. On
these rugs great vases are arranged, kettles, wooden headboards
[chevêts] on which pillows are placed, and boxes of a special
kind which are ornamented in different ways and in which sacks
are placed which contain kumiss.

[492 A Kazak assembles and dismantles his tent in half an hour
231] and constantly carries it on the back of a camel to the places
where he finds good pasturage and water for his herds. Thus he is
more dependent upon his herds and studs than on anything else.

[233 [311] Later we will give a detailed description of their herds.
182] But it should be stated here that this kind of occupation determines
all their social obligations and relations, so that no matter how one
imagines a Kazak one can only see an armed shepherd in him.
And the habit and taste for the pastoral life is the source of all
his actions, both moral and physical.

233 The continual travels of the Kazaks and the change of loca-
152 tion does not tire them. On the contrary, they find in it a source
181 of pleasure and consider themselves lucky not to be attached to the
soil. During the summer the nomadic life is really very pleasant,
221 but it is unbearable during the winter. During this season the
132 Kazak, surrounded on all sides by piles of snow, rarely emerge from
their tents. There, huddled around the fire (1), they suffer almost

---

1. In places where there is no wood, they use animal dung for fuel.

[311 cont.]
221 equally from heat and cold.
132 The violence of the wind brings enormous flakes of snow
132 into the tent through the door and the opening at the top, and
857 sometimes a storm blows over the felt edifice with all its occupants.
The children, half-naked, come out from under the felts
or the sheepskins in which they are usually enveloped, throw
themselves on the hot cinders, burn their hands and feet, and
utter cries which pierce the heart.

361 In order to protect themselves from the misfortunes and
unpleasantness which winter causes them, the Kazaks choose
for their winter camp the middle of some grove, reeds, hills,
or the sands in the southern part of the steppes.

221 We have said earlier that their camps, winter as well as
summer, cannot be exactly determined and are not always occupied
by the same inhabitants. Nevertheless, they are quite
constant in the choice of the former, because not all localities
present the [312] necessary conditions for a winter camp to the
[132] same degree and because the depth of the snow does not allow
them to move.

[222 Some Kazaks, especially those who are nearest to the
231 Russian border, collect supplies of fodder in the autumn, dig pits
359] in the ground to put their livestock in, and build fences of
wattling, when the place permits it, to protect themselves from
the wind, especially the north wind.

[517 The suffering they are caused by the frosts and storms makes
273 them celebrate the return of spring with rapture. They spend most
262] of the summer days sleeping and drinking kumiss, and they eat very
little meat. At night they gather to enjoy the pleasures of the
[536 table together, and to tell each other stories, or to listen to
533
534] musicians who play the chibyzga or the balalaika.

But the autumn is the best time of the year for them. It is
[484] in this season that they undertake their longest trips (1), and they

[784] 1. We will note in passing that superstition
prevents the Kazaks from undertaking long
trips when the moon is on the wane.

221 [312 cont.]

[484] [527 [579] 628] have their principal festivals at this time also. They also choose autumn to practice barantas (2), for this season is favorable because of the darkness of the nights and the vigor of the horses, which have been restored in good pastures for a whole season and are all the better disposed for long-distance and rapid running.

361 721 The Kazaks rarely camp in large numbers in the same place, for their herds would be too cramped for space. But they form groups of several families, united by ties of blood or by reciprocal advantages. These groups move in a body from one place to another and do not separate unless there are important reasons. These mobile villages are called auls. The number of tents which comprise them depends on the circumstances.

101 [241 342] Some Kazaks live in Khiva, the dominion of Bukhara, the possessions of [313] China, in Tashkent and Kokand, and in these places they have houses, lands, and gardens (1), but their number is very limited.

---

2. See footnote 1, Chapter II, page 167, on the barantas.

1. 712 346 [361] 103 651 311 It is said that in the last years of the 18th century, Karabulat, a rich Kazak of the Durt-Kara tribe of the Little Horde, built a small fort made of clay on the shore of the Syr [Darya]. Inside he built a small mosque, also of clay, and lived near it in his tent, in the midst of a large number of his kinsmen and faithful adherents, who camped with him. This fort, which soon tumbled down, was called Kara-Bulat-Tam i. e., "Karabulat's wall." Caravans came to this place to buy provisions and paid a small toll to the lord for free passage across his pasture lands. There were also some cultivated lands near the fort.

[313 cont.]

Chapter V. On the Possibility of Making the Kirghiz-Kazaks Adopt Sedentary Customs.

631 The division of territory, of which we spoke in relation to the
636 camps of each tribe, might cause one to believe it possible to
311 establish each tribe or each descent line on the land it occupies,
177 in fixed positions, since it recalls to a certain point, the idea of
territorial property. But this idea vanishes when one comes to
consider the nature of the country and the moral inclinations of
its inhabitants.

233 The care of the herds and their propagation is, as has been
said before, the favorite and cherished occupation of the Kazaks,
as well as the source of all their wealth. In order to sustain this
311 branch of economy in the flourishing state in which it is at
181 present, vast pasture lands are indispensable, and considering
579 the inclination of nomadic peoples for brigandage, these pastures
cannot have fixed limits, and in addition, they are divided into
two classes, summer and winter pastures. An open plain, smooth
and rich [314] in fodder, is excellent for the livestock in summer,
but during the winter confining hills are necessary, especially for
the ewes, to protect them from the winds and storms, and also
sand which absorbs moisture and on which, therefore, the snow
222 remains for a shorter time, as well as reeds and heather, which
372 provide good nourishment for the camels and good fuel for the
shepherds.

311 This is why every tribe has its winter and summer pastures,
233 the former usually in the south. Thus the Baganaly and the
Naimans, who spend the summer on the Ishim or the Turgai rivers,
withdraw in winter to the Kuvan-Darya, while the Djappas people
leave the market of Troitsk in November to go toward the shores
of the Syr [Darya]. The same could be said for many others.
361 It is clear from this that the Kazaks must either have two different
439 camps according to the seasons or reduce the number of their
animals. In this last case they would do harm not only to themselves but also to their neighbors, whose trade relations with them
have the sole purpose of exchanging livestock.

[314 cont.]

311 On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that all the Kazaks
241 can apply themselves to agriculture, for aside from their aversion
for this kind of life, they have too little arable land, as one can
see in the geographic section of this work [untranslated]. In addition, even assuming that these nomads did occupy themselves
with the cultivation of land, would the products they grew compensate for the reduction of the herds? All the peoples who border
[243] on the Kazak steppes need livestock, and they produce enough
grain so that it is always a better bargain for them than grain which could be brought from far away. So that if neither the Russians, nor the Chinese, nor the inhabitants of Kokand, nor the Bukharans, nor the Khivans will pay the Kazaks the price of their labors as agriculturalists, what will the latter have to give them in exchange for the manufactured products which they cannot do without and which they pay for today with livestock?

[175 [315] Let us add to this picture the physical revolutions to
132] which the surface of the Kazak steppe is subject. The Dimas and
312] Bascatis [rivers] which, according to Ptolemy, watered these lands,
no longer exist. The Kenderlik [River], which indicated in the Bolshoi Chertezh, is no longer there. The Kizil-Darya, so often discussed by Abulgazi Baiadur Khan and which is still seen on the old maps, has completely disappeared. The Yany-Darya, which was born, so to speak, in our day, has already ceased to flow. The Aksakal-Barby lakes have diminished greatly. The high points of Sari-Bulak and Kuk-Tirnak, which used to be washed by the Aral Sea according to old Kazaks, are now at a distance of eight hours walk away. Many tiny lakes and wells have dried up entirely. Finally, in regions which are completely deprived of water one sees huge ruins which indicate the former existence of a large population. These phenomena are nothing to a nomadic people, because they move their location all the time, but they are destructive for a sedentary people.

181 Let us now recall the prejudice which has been implanted, and
152 is unfortunately well fixed, and has spread among the Kazaks,
namely that they will lose their freedom (1) the moment they leave

[636 1. The Russian government has built houses
342] for the Kazak sultans (as for Ablai and others),

[315 cont.]

> 181 often as its own expense, and has used
> 152 every means of persuasion to induce
> [636 certain individuals among them to settle
> 342] down, at least to provide an example.
> But all these efforts have been futile.

[579 their tents to live in houses. Next let us examine the ethical rela-
627 tions of the tribes and descent lines. Vengeance carried out by
628 one individual against another, the participation of their families
578] in it, their auls, their /clan/ divisions, and sometimes their tribes,
and the perpetual reprisals which result from this, sometimes re-
[166] quire hundreds of families to move away from their dwelling
places and to withdraw much farther away, forever, in order to
evade the persecutions of their enemies.

721 It is thus that the entire Karakalpak nation, which had lived independently under the orders of its own khans on the [316] shores of the Syr [Darya], lost its existence as a state in the last years of the 18th century and was forced to disperse as a consequence of the frequent attacks of the Kazaks and the acts of vengeance that they carried out to wipe away old injuries.

101 In 1740 a large part of the Middle Horde, with its khan,
Abul Mahmet, occupied the eastern shores of the Khobda River.
Abulkhair lived most often on the shores of the Syr [Darya] or the
Kuvan. This is why he wrote to Nepluev in Orenburg in 1742:
166 "I am with the Little Horde on the Syr [Darya], and the Middle
Horde is near you, General." Today it is the opposite. None of
the tribes of the Middle Horde are near Orenburg. Several of the
auls of the Alimuly descent line in 1821 even came to make their
winter camps on the banks of the Ilek, although they had always
578 had them on the Syr [Darya], as a result of internal dissensions,
during which their enemies were supported by the khan of Khiva.
At the same time several auls which habitually camped near the
361 Russian border withdrew toward the land of Khiva. All this leads
181 us to the conclusion that the present way of life of the Kazaks and
636 the nature of the land they inhabit do not permit them to form
177 permanent establishments, and that for their own advantage as

5: Levchine--181   G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

[316 cont.]

361 well as that of the neighboring states, and especially of Russia,
181 it is to be desired that they not change their condition of being
636 rich herders for that of poor farmers, since their steppes seem,
177 as it were, to be made for nomadic peoples. Good order and peace
will not be made to reign in their tribes by establishing villages.
There will be no success in making them appreciate the fortunate
results of peace except in training them in obedience and especially
in observing rules of strict equity with regard to them.

5: Levchine--182 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Plate 2

Chart I

173
643
613

Genealogy of the First and Main Branch of the Kirghiz-Kazak Khans
(The earliest founders of the descent groups are two brothers)



Usiak
and
Djadik
Buliakai Kuiane
Shigai Khan
Aichuvak
Ishim
Irysh
Djangir Khan
Sultan Syrdak
Adja
Tiavka Khan
Sultan Syrdak
Abulkhair Khan
Pulat Khan
Sultan Ksref
Abul Mahmet Khan
Kaip Khan
Sultan Pulat
Sultan Abulfeis
Sultan Batyr
Kaip Khan at Khiva
Sultan Khodai Mendy

Khan of Turkestan in 1630, 1643 and thereafter

He made himself and his people Russian subjects in 1730

[636
648]

who made himself and his people Russian subjects in 1730

who wrote to Peter the Great in 1715

Note: The circles with double lines are for the khans and sultans who were still living in 1748, the time at which these charts were made up.

Plate 3

Chart II

173
643
613

Genealogy of the Second Branch of Khans


Bukei Khan
Kuchak
Khodai Mendy
Tursunl Khan
Kuchak
Barak
Shigai
Khan Babai

Chart III

Genealogy of the Third Branch of Khans

Vali
Ablai
Vali
Ablai Khan

The last was still khan in 1748

Note: Those whose names are underlined were still living in 1748.

173
643
175
613

Supplement to Chart I Prepared in 1824
Khan Abulkhair's Descendants


Abulkhair Khan died in 1748
Nurali Khan 1749-86
Erali Khan 1791-94
Khodja Ahmet Sultan
Aichuvak Khan 1797-1805
Adil Sultan
Chingis Sultan
Karatai Sultan
Ishim Khan 1795-97
Pirali Khan of the Turkmens
Bukei Khan of the Interior Horde 1812-15
Djanturia Khan 1805-09
Shirgazi last khan elected in 1812
Djangir Khan of the Interior Horde in 1824

Note: All these khans governed the Middle Horde. No mention is made here of the sultans who are sons or grandsons of Abulkhair. They are so numerous that a list of their names would unnecessarily weary the readers.

Plate 4

5: Levchine--185 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Plate 5.

231
142
291
293
411
302



Kirghiz-Kazak Man

5: Levchine--186 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Plate 6.

231
142
291
301



Kirghiz-Kazak Woman

5: Levchine--187 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Plate 7.

231
142
291
301



Kirghiz-Kazak Girl

5: Levchine--188 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Plate 8

Tamghas

or

212
613
619

Marks Used by the Kirghiz-Kazaks By way of Signatures and Seals

In the Little Horde

Descent Lines*	Marks or Stamps	Descent Lines	Marks or Stamps
Chikli		Mashkar	
Karakisiak		Tazlar	
Chumiakei		Cherkes	
Durt Kara		Tabyn	
Adai		Cama	
Djapas		Kerderi	
Alacha		Djagalbaiuli	
Berch		Kereit	

In the Middle Horde

Keipchasky		Uvaksky	
Naimansky		Kireisky	

[*The following are tribes according to the text.--Ed.]

5Levchine--189 G-4,5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Plate 9

Two Kirghiz-Kazak Melodies


Air N° 1.
Air N° 2.
D.C.

5: Levchine--190 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Plate 10

Plan of a Kirghiz-Kazak Field

241
311
312
134
102



Profile of Irrigation Canals



Line AB.
i
a
k
A
h
c
d
B
Sandy clay soil
Line CD.
f
h
d
g
h
g
C
D
Sandy clay soil
pied
Sagene

5: Levchine--191 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

102
103
487
133
101



ORENBOURG
Kalmikof
Sakharnaia
Koch-Ouralskaia
Topoly
Saratchiko
Presquîle Bazatchy

Versts

(A verst is equivalent to 1.067 km.)

D...Districts

P...Bridges

T...Tombs

C^{ents}...Camps

C^{res}...Cemeteries

R^{nes}...Ruins

5: Levchine--192 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

102
103
487
153
101


Verkhné-Ouralsk
Magnitnaia
Kizilsk
Ourtazimsk
Tanalytsk
Krasnogorsk
URG
R. Tobol
L. Djarik
L. Aksakal-Barbi
Rozelières
M E R

5: Levchine--193 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

102
103
487
133
101


83
85
87
89
L. Tenaghi
L. Ostrovnoe
L. Kabanie
L. Tarane
L. Beloe
L. Tenis
Tchokchi Tegrie
R. Diourbi-Tourgaï
R. Moïnaky-Tourgaï
R. Sary-Tourgaï
Jelanou-Tourgaï
J. Kamennaia
Kaiandy-Tourgaï
Sountaovia
L. Khourkhaldjine
R. Ichim
R. Noura
Ouloutaou
Rozelières
L. Denghiz
R. Sari-
Stèpe Bëtpak

5: Levchine--194 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

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103
487
133
101


OMSK
L. Kiridchak
L. Tenis
L. Gorkoe
Semipalatinsk
Dist. Kar Karalinsky
R. Noura
R. Sari-Sou
L. Saki

5: Levchine--195 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

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103
487
133
101


Nor-Zaïçan
TCHOUGOUTCHAGH
L. Ala-Tau-ou
Sassyk-Koul
Ala-Koul
MPIRE DE L CHINE

5: Levchine--196 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

102
103
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133
101


Presqu'ile Bazatchy
O U S T O U R T
Tchink
Tchink
Tchink
D. Ala-Sakal-Bach-Daou
C A S P
M E R

5: Levchine--197 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

102
103
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133
101


MER
D^T ARAL
KHIVA
T
U
R
K
E
BOUKHARA
Zandanit
Bardancy
Sables
77
79
81
83

5: Levchine--198 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

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101



Stepe Betpak
TURKESTAN
L. Sikir
Les Kizil Koum
TACHKENT
N
KHODJANT
KOKAN
T
S
E
SAMARKAND
CHERSABES
HISSAR
BADACHKHAN OU
Ankoi
BALK

5: Levchine--199 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

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101


L. Sali
P O S
L. Sikirli
R. Talas
Cent des Khirghis
dit Khirghis des R
ACHKHAN ou FAZABATT

5: Levchine--200 G-4,5 (ca.1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

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

Map
of Region Occupied
by the
Kirghiz-Kazaks or Kirghiz-Kaissaks
and of
Turkestan
Prepared according to the most recent data in
1832
Paris
Arthus Bertrand, Editor, 25 Rue Hautefeuille
1840

5: Levchine G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

p. 191	p. 192	p. 193	p. 194	p. 195
p. 196	p. 197	p. 198	p. 199	p. 200

Chart showing the position of the pages of the sections of the "Map of Regions Occupied by the Kirghiz-Kazak or Kirghiz-Kaissaks and of Turkestan." (Translated text pp. 191-200)

5: Levchine
636

RQ2 Kazak RQ2

[For the role of the Kazak as dependents of the Russians, see category 116, pp. 23-163.]

5: Levchine RQ2 Kazak RQ2
648

[For information on international relations, see category 116, pp. 23-163.]